docker-compose.yml

# Self-host for loopover (#980). Two ways to boot the `loopover` service — everything else in
# this compose file (profiles, env, health checks) is identical either way:
#
#   RECOMMENDED: ./scripts/deploy-selfhost-image.sh     # pulls the published image, no local build
#   Building from source: docker compose up --build     # for contributors / custom Dockerfile changes
#
# SECRETS: copy .env.selfhost.example → .env (the focused self-host starter) or .env.example → .env
# (the exhaustive reference) and fill in your GitHub App credentials and any optional secrets. The
# file is gitignored. Every value in either sample is a placeholder — never commit real secrets.
#
# PROFILES — activate optional services by passing --profile <name> (combine freely):
#
#   (none)                      SQLite + Redis single-node stack (default — no flags needed)
#   --profile postgres          pgvector/pg16 shared database (multi-instance capable)
#   --profile pgbouncer         PgBouncer connection pooler in front of Postgres
#   --profile qdrant            Qdrant vector database for RAG
#   --profile ollama            Local Ollama AI backend
#   --profile gpu               GPU metrics exporter (nvidia-smi -> Prometheus -> Grafana), requires the NVIDIA
#                               Container Toolkit; combine with --profile ollama on a GPU host
#   --profile visual-review     Headless Chromium (browserless) for before/after PR screenshot capture
#   --profile rees              Review-enrichment service (REES) for heavier PR analysis, in-network only
#   --profile litestream        Continuous SQLite backup to S3/B2/R2 via Litestream
#   --profile workflows         n8n workflow automation (Slack/Teams/email fan-out, scheduled reports)
#   --profile storage           MinIO S3-compatible object store (Litestream destination, artifact blobs)
#   --profile caddy             Caddy HTTPS terminator with auto-TLS (set DOMAIN= in .env)
#   --profile discovery-index   Local orchestration for the hosted discovery-index service (#4250, #7164)
#   --profile observability     Prometheus + Alertmanager + Loki + Promtail + Grafana (pre-wired)
#   --profile ams-observability Exports AMS (loopover-miner) attempt-log/prediction-ledger data to the
#                               AMS Attempt Log / Prediction Ledger Grafana datasources
#   --profile tailscale         Tailscale sidecar — access the stack via your tailnet
#   --profile runners           GitHub Actions self-hosted runner
#   --profile backup            Scheduled Postgres/SQLite + Qdrant-snapshot backups with freshness metrics
#
# Examples:
#   ./scripts/deploy-selfhost-image.sh                            # SQLite + Redis, published image
#   docker compose up --build                                    # SQLite + Redis, build from source
#   docker compose --profile postgres --profile caddy up -d     # Postgres + HTTPS
#   docker compose --profile observability up -d                 # metrics + logs + dashboards
#   docker compose --profile rees up -d                           # local REES review enrichment
#   docker compose --profile workflows up -d                        # n8n automation at :5678
#   docker compose --profile storage up -d                          # MinIO S3 API :9000, console :9001
#   docker compose --profile tailscale --profile runners up -d   # tailnet + CI runners
#
# HOST CLOCK (#3811): containers share the HOST kernel clock, so this compose file cannot fix a
# drifting clock for you -- configure at least two independent NTP sources on the host itself
# (chrony/ntpd), not just one. A single dead NTP source silently drifts the clock with no local
# symptom until GitHub App JWT auth starts failing ("Bad credentials") once the drift exceeds the
# JWT's 60s skew tolerance. See docs/self-hosting/operations → "Host clock sync (NTP)" and the
# loopover_clock_skew_seconds Grafana panel/alert (--profile observability) for live drift.

# Bounded container logging (#audit-rate-headroom): every service below defaults to Docker's
# json-file driver, which has NO size cap on its own -- a long-running 24/7 stack can fill the
# host disk purely from log growth (the app, Postgres, Redis, and the CI runners are the biggest
# producers). This anchor caps each service to 3 rotated files of 10MB (30MB/service ceiling,
# ~600MB worst case across every service in this file) and is merged into every service via
# `<<: *default-logging`. Override per-service if you need more retained log history.
x-logging: &default-logging
  logging:
    driver: json-file
    options:
      max-size: "10m"
      max-file: "3"

# Self-hosted GitHub Actions runner temp env (#selfhost-runner-tmp): a container's plain /tmp lives in
# Docker's overlay/containerd snapshot storage, NOT any mounted volume -- high-volume CI scratch writes
# there (language toolchains, build caches, ad hoc `mktemp` calls) grow the HOST's Docker root storage
# directly and are invisible to volume-scoped cleanup (confirmed in production: unbounded overlay growth,
# disk pressure, and `docker system df` races against disappearing temp files). Every self-hosted-runner
# service -- the `runner` service below, merged in via `<<: *runner-tmp-env`, AND any additional runner
# service you add for a multi-runner deployment -- must point TMPDIR/TMP/TEMP at its own mounted
# runner-work-style volume the same way, so job temp writes always land on mounted storage instead of the
# container's writable layer. A second compose file (e.g. docker-compose.override.yml) CANNOT reference
# this anchor directly -- YAML anchors don't cross files -- so an override adding another runner service
# must redeclare this same x-runner-tmp-env block in its own file before merging it. See
# docker-compose.override.yml.example and the self-hosting operations docs for the full pattern.
x-runner-tmp-env: &runner-tmp-env
  TMPDIR: /tmp/runner/tmp
  TMP: /tmp/runner/tmp
  TEMP: /tmp/runner/tmp

services:
  # ── Core app (always runs) ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
  loopover:
    build:
      context: .
      args:
        INSTALL_AI_CLIS: "${INSTALL_AI_CLIS:-true}"
        INSTALL_VISUAL_REVIEW: "${INSTALL_VISUAL_REVIEW:-false}"
    restart: unless-stopped
    <<: *default-logging
    ports:
      # Remove this when using the caddy profile — Caddy becomes the public listener.
      - "${PORT:-8787}:8787"
    env_file:
      - path: .env
        required: false
    environment:
      PORT: "8787"
      DATABASE_PATH: /data/loopover.sqlite
      # Container-private per-repo config (#1390): point at a mounted dir holding {owner}__{repo}/.loopover.yml
      # files layered over an optional root .loopover.yml global default, itself layered over an optional
      # _shared/.loopover.yml cross-repo base for multi-repo operators (#1959) — a higher layer overrides only the
      # keys it sets; anything it doesn't mention is inherited from the next layer down — see
      # config/examples/README.md). Keeps each repo's policy OUT of the public GitHub repo so contributors can't
      # game the rules. Empty/unmounted ⇒ repos use the public file / defaults.
      LOOPOVER_REPO_CONFIG_DIR: "${LOOPOVER_REPO_CONFIG_DIR:-/config}"
      # Claude Code usage telemetry → OTEL collector → Prometheus → Claude usage dashboard. OFF unless you set
      # CLAUDE_CODE_ENABLE_TELEMETRY=1 in .env (requires --profile observability so the otel-collector is up).
      CLAUDE_CODE_ENABLE_TELEMETRY: "${CLAUDE_CODE_ENABLE_TELEMETRY:-}"
      OTEL_METRICS_EXPORTER: "${OTEL_METRICS_EXPORTER:-otlp}"
      # Claude Code trace export (beta) → OTEL collector → Tempo. Empty by default; set OTEL_TRACES_EXPORTER=otlp
      # in .env (with CLAUDE_CODE_ENABLE_TELEMETRY=1) to capture per-review spans.
      OTEL_TRACES_EXPORTER: "${OTEL_TRACES_EXPORTER:-}"
      OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_PROTOCOL: "${OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_PROTOCOL:-http/protobuf}"
      OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT: "${OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT:-http://otel-collector:4318}"
      OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_METRICS_TEMPORALITY_PREFERENCE: "${OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_METRICS_TEMPORALITY_PREFERENCE:-cumulative}"
      OTEL_METRIC_EXPORT_INTERVAL: "${OTEL_METRIC_EXPORT_INTERVAL:-10000}"
      # Uncomment the next two lines and activate --profile postgres to use Postgres:
      # DATABASE_URL: postgres://loopover:${POSTGRES_PASSWORD:-CHANGEME}@postgres:5432/loopover
      # PGVECTOR_ENABLED: "true"
      # With --profile pgbouncer, route through the pooler instead of postgres directly:
      # DATABASE_URL: postgres://loopover:${POSTGRES_PASSWORD:-CHANGEME}@pgbouncer:5432/loopover
      # Required shared transient state for review correctness, webhook dedup, and rate limiting.
      REDIS_URL: "${REDIS_URL:-redis://redis:6379}"
      # Enables the GitHub GET-response cache when >0 (0 disables); not a per-entry TTL, see .env.example.
      GITHUB_CACHE_TTL_SECONDS: "${GITHUB_CACHE_TTL_SECONDS:-20}"
      # Native secret-file mounts (see the top-level `secrets:` block + secrets/README.md). Each points at
      # the file Compose mounts below; src/selfhost/load-file-secrets.ts only reads it when the plain
      # <NAME> variable above is unset, so an inline .env value always takes priority over these — purely
      # additive, zero effect on an operator who has never touched secrets/.
      GITHUB_APP_PRIVATE_KEY_FILE: "${GITHUB_APP_PRIVATE_KEY_FILE:-/run/secrets/github_app_private_key}"
      GITHUB_WEBHOOK_SECRET_FILE: "${GITHUB_WEBHOOK_SECRET_FILE:-/run/secrets/github_webhook_secret}"
      LOOPOVER_API_TOKEN_FILE: "${LOOPOVER_API_TOKEN_FILE:-/run/secrets/loopover_api_token}"
      LOOPOVER_MCP_TOKEN_FILE: "${LOOPOVER_MCP_TOKEN_FILE:-/run/secrets/loopover_mcp_token}"
      # Admin MCP surface (#7721): OFF by default (tools aren't even registered) and requires BOTH this
      # flag AND its own higher-privilege token (never LOOPOVER_MCP_TOKEN) -- a leaked ordinary MCP
      # credential can never rewrite fleet-wide gate policy through it. Writing through it also requires
      # flipping the config mount below (under `volumes:`) from :ro to :rw yourself -- see its own comment.
      LOOPOVER_MCP_ADMIN_ENABLED: "${LOOPOVER_MCP_ADMIN_ENABLED:-}"
      LOOPOVER_MCP_ADMIN_TOKEN_FILE: "${LOOPOVER_MCP_ADMIN_TOKEN_FILE:-/run/secrets/loopover_mcp_admin_token}"
      # loopover_admin_trigger_redeploy (#7723): a SEPARATE credential from LOOPOVER_MCP_ADMIN_TOKEN, checked
      # by the host-side companion itself (systemd/loopover-redeploy-companion.service.example), not by this
      # app -- defense in depth across the two independent layers (MCP-tool auth here, host-socket auth
      # there). Entirely opt-in: absent the companion running on the host with a matching token, the tool call
      # just reports connection-refused -- every other admin tool is unaffected.
      REDEPLOY_COMPANION_SOCKET_PATH: "${REDEPLOY_COMPANION_SOCKET_PATH:-/run/loopover-redeploy.sock}"
      REDEPLOY_COMPANION_TOKEN_FILE: "${REDEPLOY_COMPANION_TOKEN_FILE:-/run/secrets/redeploy_companion_token}"
      INTERNAL_JOB_TOKEN_FILE: "${INTERNAL_JOB_TOKEN_FILE:-/run/secrets/internal_job_token}"
      SELFHOST_SETUP_TOKEN_FILE: "${SELFHOST_SETUP_TOKEN_FILE:-/run/secrets/selfhost_setup_token}"
      TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_SECRET_FILE: "${TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_SECRET_FILE:-/run/secrets/token_encryption_secret}"
      DRAFT_TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_SECRET_FILE: "${DRAFT_TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_SECRET_FILE:-/run/secrets/draft_token_encryption_secret}"
      ORB_ENROLLMENT_SECRET_FILE: "${ORB_ENROLLMENT_SECRET_FILE:-/run/secrets/orb_enrollment_secret}"
      PAGERDUTY_ROUTING_KEY_FILE: "${PAGERDUTY_ROUTING_KEY_FILE:-/run/secrets/pagerduty_routing_key}"
      CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN_FILE: "${CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN_FILE:-/run/secrets/claude_code_oauth_token}"
      # Uncomment for Qdrant RAG vector store (--profile qdrant):
      # QDRANT_URL: http://qdrant:6333
      # Uncomment for Ollama AI (--profile ollama):
      # AI_PROVIDER: ollama
      # OLLAMA_AI_BASE_URL: http://ollama:11434/v1
      # RAG needs an EMBED-capable endpoint (#8765): with LOOPOVER_REVIEW_RAG=true and a CLI-only review
      # chain (AI_PROVIDER=claude-code / codex), the two lines below are REQUIRED or the index never
      # populates — CLI-subscription providers cannot embed. See .env.example's AI_EMBED section.
      # AI_EMBED_BASE_URL: http://ollama:11434/v1
      # AI_EMBED_MODEL: bge-m3
      # BROKERED mode — use the central LoopOver Orb App instead of creating your own GitHub App. Install the
      # Orb App on your repos + set ORB_ENROLLMENT_SECRET in .env (loaded above); the engine then brokers
      # short-lived GitHub tokens from the Orb on demand (no own App private key). See .env.example.
      # ORB_BROKER_URL: https://api.loopover.ai   # override only for a private Orb deployment
    volumes:
      - loopover-data:/data
      # Container-private per-repo config dir (read-only). Create ./loopover-config/{owner}__{repo}/.loopover.yml
      # locally, optionally alongside a ./loopover-config/.loopover.yml global default that every per-repo file
      # is deep-merged over (gitignored — never commit real policy; see config/examples/ for generic templates).
      # Absent ⇒ Docker mounts an empty dir ⇒ defaults apply. Stays :ro even with LOOPOVER_MCP_ADMIN_ENABLED
      # set (#7721) -- the admin MCP write tools need this changed to :rw yourself before they can write
      # anything; the app flag alone never makes this mount secretly writable. Flip it locally:
      #   - ./loopover-config:/config:rw
      - ./loopover-config:/config:ro
      # Host redeploy companion socket (#7723, opt-in -- see systemd/loopover-redeploy-companion.service.example
      # for the host-side setup). Deliberately a single narrow Unix socket, never /var/run/docker.sock: this
      # mount grants the app container reach to exactly one purpose-built request/response protocol on the
      # host, not the full Docker Engine API. Absent (companion not installed) ⇒ Docker bind-mounts an empty
      # placeholder file here ⇒ the admin tool's connection attempt fails closed with connection-refused, same
      # "present but harmless when unconfigured" degradation as the config mount above.
      - "${REDEPLOY_COMPANION_SOCKET_PATH:-/run/loopover-redeploy.sock}:${REDEPLOY_COMPANION_SOCKET_PATH:-/run/loopover-redeploy.sock}"
    # Mounted read-only at /run/secrets/<name> (Compose's default target). See the top-level `secrets:`
    # block above and secrets/README.md.
    #
    # NOT uid/gid/mode-pinned (#secrets-uid-mismatch, confirmed against a real Compose v5.3.1 daemon, not
    # just docs): standalone (non-Swarm) Compose secrets are a plain bind mount under the hood, and a bind
    # mount cannot remap ownership -- Compose itself warns "secrets `uid`, `gid` and `mode` are not
    # supported, they will be ignored" and silently no-ops them, so the in-container permissions are
    # whatever the HOST file has. This is WHY scripts/selfhost-init-secrets.sh chmod 644s (not 600s) each
    # placeholder -- see that script's own comment for the full reasoning (the Dockerfile's `USER node`
    # runs as uid 1000/gid 1000, essentially never the deploying host user's own uid, so a host-owner-only
    # file is unreadable to the container process; load-file-secrets.ts's readFileSync throws, surfaced as
    # a Sentry-visible selfhost_secret_file_unreadable error -- first caught live on edge-nl-01).
    secrets:
      - github_app_private_key
      - github_webhook_secret
      - loopover_api_token
      - loopover_mcp_token
      - loopover_mcp_admin_token
      - redeploy_companion_token
      - internal_job_token
      - selfhost_setup_token
      - token_encryption_secret
      - draft_token_encryption_secret
      - orb_enrollment_secret
      - pagerduty_routing_key
      - claude_code_oauth_token
    depends_on:
      redis:
        condition: service_healthy
      # Gate startup on a healthy Qdrant when --profile qdrant is active; required:false means the
      # dependency is ignored when qdrant isn't started (default/other profiles). Belt-and-suspenders
      # with the app-side waitForQdrant retry in src/server.ts (which also covers a mid-life restart).
      qdrant:
        condition: service_healthy
        required: false
      # Same pattern for --profile postgres / --profile pgbouncer: without this, compose starts loopover
      # in parallel with a cold Postgres initdb instead of waiting for it, and the app's own waitForPostgres()
      # fallback (~30s hard cap) commonly loses that race on a slow disk/first pull, crash-looping the app via
      # restart: unless-stopped before Postgres is reachable. required:false keeps the default SQLite path
      # (no profile active) unaffected.
      postgres:
        condition: service_healthy
        required: false
      pgbouncer:
        condition: service_healthy
        required: false
      # Unlike postgres/qdrant above, this is NOT a crash-loop risk if lost: visual capture is used
      # per-PR-event, long after boot, not at startup, and every capture call is already fail-safe
      # (a network error just degrades to a placeholder, never a thrown error). This dependency exists
      # purely so `docker compose --profile visual-review up` starts services in a sensible order.
      browserless:
        condition: service_healthy
        required: false
      # Same "start-order convenience only, not a crash-loop guard" reasoning as browserless above: REES
      # enrichment runs per-PR-review, long after boot, and is already fully fail-safe end to end (any
      # timeout/error just means the review proceeds without the brief -- src/review/enrichment-wire.ts).
      # required:false keeps every deployment not using --profile rees unaffected.
      rees:
        condition: service_healthy
        required: false
    # Sane defaults so a runaway optional service (below) can't OOM-kill or starve the core review pipeline;
    # override via .env for a bigger/smaller host (#1828).
    deploy:
      resources:
        limits:
          memory: "${LOOPOVER_MEM_LIMIT:-2g}"
    healthcheck:
      # Probe /ready (not /health): /health is a liveness stub that is 200 even when the DB is down,
      # whereas /ready returns 503 until the DB answers AND migrations are applied — so dependents that
      # wait on `condition: service_healthy` only start once the app is truly serving. start_period 60s
      # tolerates the Postgres cold start (waitForPostgres blocks up to 30s before the HTTP server binds).
      test:
        [
          "CMD",
          "node",
          "-e",
          "fetch('http://127.0.0.1:8787/ready').then(r=>process.exit(r.ok?0:1)).catch(()=>process.exit(1))",
        ]
      interval: 30s
      timeout: 5s
      start_period: 60s
      retries: 3

  # ── Redis (always on; required by the review runtime) ─────────────────────
  # Shared transient review state: pending-CI first-seen stamps, webhook dedup/coalescing, rate limits, and
  # short-lived GitHub caches. Losing it on restart is safe; the app requires it while running.
  redis:
    image: redis:7-alpine
    restart: unless-stopped
    <<: *default-logging
    command:
      - redis-server
      - --maxmemory
      - 256mb
      - --maxmemory-policy
      - allkeys-lru
      - --save
      - ""
      - --appendonly
      - "no"
    deploy:
      resources:
        limits:
          memory: "${REDIS_MEM_LIMIT:-512m}"
    healthcheck:
      test: ["CMD", "redis-cli", "ping"]
      interval: 10s
      retries: 5

  # Redis has no native Prometheus endpoint (unlike Postgres/Qdrant) -- the official sidecar exporter is the
  # standard way to get visibility into an always-on, required backend that otherwise has zero metrics today.
  # Gated on --profile observability (not its own profile): Redis itself always runs, but nothing needs its
  # metrics unless the observability stack is up.
  redis-exporter:
    image: oliver006/redis_exporter:v1.79.0
    restart: unless-stopped
    <<: *default-logging
    profiles: ["observability"]
    depends_on:
      redis:
        condition: service_healthy
    environment:
      REDIS_ADDR: "redis://redis:6379"
    expose:
      - "9121"
    deploy:
      resources:
        limits:
          memory: "${REDIS_EXPORTER_MEM_LIMIT:-64m}"

  # ── Postgres (--profile postgres | --profile pgbouncer) ───────────────────
  postgres:
    image: pgvector/pgvector:pg16
    restart: unless-stopped
    <<: *default-logging
    profiles: ["postgres", "pgbouncer"]
    environment:
      POSTGRES_USER: loopover
      POSTGRES_PASSWORD: ${POSTGRES_PASSWORD:-CHANGEME}
      POSTGRES_DB: loopover
    volumes:
      - loopover-pg:/var/lib/postgresql/data
    deploy:
      resources:
        limits:
          memory: "${POSTGRES_MEM_LIMIT:-2g}"
    # start_period (#3898): pg_isready's failed-probe count applies from the very first check unless a
    # start_period grace is set. A genuinely cold initdb (first pull, slow disk, low-memory VPS, creating
    # the pgvector extension) can plausibly take longer than the 5x10s=50s this healthcheck otherwise
    # allows before Docker marks the service unhealthy and fails every downstream service_healthy gate.
    healthcheck:
      test: ["CMD-SHELL", "pg_isready -U loopover"]
      interval: 10s
      timeout: 5s
      start_period: 20s
      retries: 5

  # ── PgBouncer (--profile pgbouncer) ───────────────────────────────────────
  # Transaction-mode pooler — allows hundreds of app clients with a small PG connection cap.
  # Set DATABASE_URL in loopover to: postgres://loopover:<pw>@pgbouncer:5432/loopover
  pgbouncer:
    image: edoburu/pgbouncer:v1.25.2-p0
    restart: unless-stopped
    <<: *default-logging
    profiles: ["pgbouncer"]
    depends_on:
      postgres:
        condition: service_healthy
    environment:
      DB_HOST: postgres
      DB_PORT: "5432"
      DB_NAME: loopover
      DB_USER: loopover
      DB_PASSWORD: ${POSTGRES_PASSWORD:-CHANGEME}
      LISTEN_PORT: "5432"
      POOL_MODE: transaction
      MAX_CLIENT_CONN: "200"
      DEFAULT_POOL_SIZE: "20"
      AUTH_TYPE: md5
    # The image ships the full postgresql-client toolchain (Alpine-based), so the same probe postgres itself
    # uses works here: pg_isready only checks that the server accepts the startup packet, not that auth
    # succeeds, so it reports "accepting connections" even before the upstream Postgres is reachable through
    # the pooler — exactly the pooler-layer liveness signal loopover's depends_on needs.
    healthcheck:
      test: ["CMD", "pg_isready", "-h", "127.0.0.1", "-p", "5432"]
      interval: 10s
      timeout: 5s
      start_period: 15s
      retries: 5

  # Postgres internals exporter. Starts with the Postgres profiles so Prometheus can scrape it when
  # observability is enabled, without starting against a missing DB on SQLite-only installs.
  postgres-exporter:
    image: quay.io/prometheuscommunity/postgres-exporter:v0.20.0
    restart: unless-stopped
    <<: *default-logging
    profiles: ["postgres", "pgbouncer"]
    depends_on:
      postgres:
        condition: service_healthy
    environment:
      DATA_SOURCE_URI: "postgres:5432/loopover?sslmode=disable"
      DATA_SOURCE_USER: loopover
      DATA_SOURCE_PASS: ${POSTGRES_PASSWORD:-CHANGEME}
    expose:
      - "9187"

  # ── Qdrant (--profile qdrant) ─────────────────────────────────────────────
  # Dedicated vector database for RAG — replaces the built-in sqlite-vec / pgvector when
  # QDRANT_URL=http://qdrant:6333 is set. Scales to millions of vectors with ANN search.
  # REST API: http://localhost:6333  gRPC: localhost:6334  Dashboard: http://localhost:6333/dashboard
  qdrant:
    image: qdrant/qdrant:v1.18.2
    restart: unless-stopped
    <<: *default-logging
    profiles: ["qdrant"]
    # Ports are bound to LOOPBACK (127.0.0.1), not 0.0.0.0: the app reaches Qdrant over the internal
    # docker network (QDRANT_URL=http://qdrant:6333), so the host mapping exists only for the local
    # dashboard/debugging. The local container runs UNAUTHENTICATED, and it holds the RAG embeddings +
    # PR context — never expose it beyond localhost without setting QDRANT_API_KEY (honored by
    # qdrant-vectorize.ts) plus a firewall rule. SSH-forward the port for remote dashboard access. This
    # matches the in-network-only posture of Prometheus/Loki/Alertmanager above.
    ports:
      - "127.0.0.1:${QDRANT_HTTP_PORT:-6333}:6333" # REST API + Web UI (localhost only)
      - "127.0.0.1:${QDRANT_GRPC_PORT:-6334}:6334" # gRPC (localhost only)
    volumes:
      - qdrant-data:/qdrant/storage
    deploy:
      resources:
        limits:
          memory: "${QDRANT_MEM_LIMIT:-2g}"
    # The image is Debian (bash present) but ships no curl/wget/nc. bash's /dev/tcp pseudo-device speaks
    # HTTP without an external binary, so we hit Qdrant's k8s-style /readyz probe (200 once it accepts
    # traffic). This lets the app's depends_on gate on a serving Qdrant. /readyz is unauthenticated even
    # when QDRANT_API_KEY is set, so no secret is needed here.
    healthcheck:
      test:
        - CMD
        - bash
        - -c
        - 'exec 3<>/dev/tcp/127.0.0.1/6333 && printf "GET /readyz HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: localhost\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n" >&3 && grep -q "200 OK" <&3'
      interval: 10s
      timeout: 5s
      start_period: 15s
      retries: 5

  # ── Ollama (--profile ollama) ──────────────────────────────────────────────
  # After `docker compose --profile ollama up -d`, pull a model:
  #   docker compose exec ollama ollama pull llama3.2
  # Then set AI_PROVIDER=ollama and OLLAMA_AI_BASE_URL=http://ollama:11434/v1 in .env.
  #
  # GPU hosts: request the device via a local override (gitignored), e.g. docker-compose.local-gpu.yml:
  #   services:
  #     ollama:
  #       deploy:
  #         resources:
  #           reservations:
  #             devices:
  #               - driver: nvidia
  #                 count: all
  #                 capabilities: [gpu]
  # A device reservation only takes effect on container CREATION -- `docker compose restart ollama` reuses
  # the existing container's already-baked-in config and will NOT pick it up, even after adding the file to
  # COMPOSE_FILE. Confirmed in production (#4327): the override existed for days while the
  # running container's `docker inspect --format '{{json .HostConfig.DeviceRequests}}'` stayed `null`, and
  # `ollama ps` kept reporting 100% CPU. Use `docker compose up -d --force-recreate ollama` (or any change
  # that forces a recreate) after adding or editing a device reservation, then re-check `ollama ps` for
  # "100% GPU" and/or `docker inspect`'s DeviceRequests to confirm it actually took.
  ollama:
    image: ollama/ollama:0.30.10
    restart: unless-stopped
    <<: *default-logging
    profiles: ["ollama"]
    volumes:
      - ollama-models:/root/.ollama
    # The image ships the ollama CLI but no curl/wget, so probe the daemon through it directly instead of a
    # raw HTTP request: `ollama list` only succeeds once the server is accepting API calls.
    healthcheck:
      test: ["CMD", "ollama", "list"]
      interval: 10s
      timeout: 5s
      start_period: 15s
      retries: 5
    # Concurrency/residency tuning for a shared embed+vision GPU deployment (#4327/#4335). Defaults sized
    # for a single 24GB-class card running bge-m3 (embeddings) alongside one vision model concurrently --
    # NUM_PARALLEL=2 keeps worst-case VRAM (resident weights + per-slot KV cache) well under 24GB; raising
    # it on the vision model without also raising MAX_LOADED_MODELS/testing risks per-slot KV cache
    # exhausting VRAM under burst load (latency collapse, not a hard OOM crash -- Ollama backpressures via
    # its request queue instead). MAX_LOADED_MODELS pins exactly {embed model, vision model} resident so a
    # stray third pull mid-burst can't force an unload/reload cycle on either one you actually need.
    environment:
      OLLAMA_NUM_PARALLEL: "${OLLAMA_NUM_PARALLEL:-2}"
      OLLAMA_MAX_LOADED_MODELS: "${OLLAMA_MAX_LOADED_MODELS:-2}"
      # Reviews land in bursts, not constant load -- keep both models warm across typical gaps between
      # bursts instead of Ollama's 5m default forcing a cold-start reload every time.
      OLLAMA_KEEP_ALIVE: "${OLLAMA_KEEP_ALIVE:-30m}"
      # bge-m3's real context window is 8192 tokens, but Ollama's own default batch size (2048) is well
      # below that -- confirmed in production logs ("input (N tokens) is too large to process") on RAG
      # chunks up to ~4991 tokens, each one silently dropped from that PR's review context
      # (rag_embed_batch_degraded, src/review/rag.ts's per-item fallback). The embed request itself
      # (src/selfhost/ai.ts) has no way to set this per-call -- it's server-side only.
      OLLAMA_NUM_BATCH: "${OLLAMA_NUM_BATCH:-8192}"
    # Ollama can load multi-GB models into memory; raised from the single-embedder-era default (8g) now that
    # a vision model (#4335) shares this container's memory ceiling alongside bge-m3 -- still capped so a
    # runaway pull can't exhaust host RAM and take down the core review pipeline (#1828).
    deploy:
      resources:
        limits:
          memory: "${OLLAMA_MEM_LIMIT:-20g}"

  # ── GPU metrics exporter (--profile gpu, #4367) ─────────────────────────────
  # Shells to `nvidia-smi` via the NVIDIA Container Toolkit -- DCGM is built for datacenter fleets and is
  # the wrong fit for a single consumer/workstation-class card like the one this deployment targets. The
  # device reservation below only takes effect once this profile is actually activated, so a host with no
  # GPU (and no --profile gpu) never evaluates it.
  gpu-exporter:
    image: utkuozdemir/nvidia_gpu_exporter:1.3.2
    restart: unless-stopped
    <<: *default-logging
    profiles: ["gpu"]
    environment:
      # The exporter only shells out to nvidia-smi -- it never runs CUDA workloads itself, so the
      # lightest capability tier is sufficient (matches the upstream project's own recommended config).
      NVIDIA_DRIVER_CAPABILITIES: utility
    deploy:
      resources:
        reservations:
          devices:
            - driver: nvidia
              count: all
              capabilities: [gpu]
    expose:
      - "9835"

  # ── Host + container resource metrics (--profile observability) ────────────
  # node-exporter: host-level CPU/memory/disk/network -- previously invisible in Grafana (docker stats-only).
  # Read-only bind mounts of the HOST's own /proc, /sys, / -- the standard, widely-used node-exporter Docker
  # recipe. Deliberately NOT network_mode: host or privileged: true (this repo's established posture favors
  # isolated bridge networking over broader host access; a bind-mounted host /proc/net/dev already reflects
  # the real host network interfaces without needing host networking).
  node-exporter:
    image: prom/node-exporter:v1.9.1
    restart: unless-stopped
    <<: *default-logging
    profiles: ["observability"]
    volumes:
      - /proc:/host/proc:ro
      - /sys:/host/sys:ro
      - /:/rootfs:ro
    command:
      - "--path.procfs=/host/proc"
      - "--path.sysfs=/host/sys"
      - "--path.rootfs=/rootfs"
      - "--collector.filesystem.mount-points-exclude=^/(sys|proc|dev|host|etc)($$|/)"
    expose:
      - "9100"
    deploy:
      resources:
        limits:
          memory: "${NODE_EXPORTER_MEM_LIMIT:-128m}"

  # cAdvisor: per-container CPU/memory/network/disk-io -- which container is actually using the resources it's
  # been given. Deliberately does NOT mount /var/run/docker.sock: this repo's own docker-proxy service exists
  # specifically because even a READ-ONLY docker.sock bind mount doesn't limit what Docker API calls a
  # container can make (the read-only flag only applies to the socket's filesystem entry, not the API surface
  # behind it) -- see the docker-proxy service's own comment below for the same reasoning. Running cAdvisor
  # on cgroupfs/rootfs alone (no Docker API access) gives real per-container resource metrics at the cost of
  # friendlier labels (containers show by cgroup path/id rather than their docker-compose service name). A
  # self-hoster who wants richer labels can add a docker.sock mount via their own docker-compose.override.yml.
  cadvisor:
    image: gcr.io/cadvisor/cadvisor:v0.49.2
    restart: unless-stopped
    <<: *default-logging
    profiles: ["observability"]
    volumes:
      - /:/rootfs:ro
      - /sys:/sys:ro
      - /var/lib/docker/:/var/lib/docker:ro
      - /dev/disk/:/dev/disk:ro
    expose:
      - "8080"
    deploy:
      resources:
        limits:
          memory: "${CADVISOR_MEM_LIMIT:-256m}"

  # ── Browserless / visual review (--profile visual-review) ──────────────────
  # Headless Chromium for automated before/after PR screenshot capture (src/review/visual/**).
  # Set BOTH of these in .env (browserless always requires a token; there is no way around setting
  # it in two places — the server reads TOKEN below, the app embeds the same value in the client URL):
  #   BROWSERLESS_TOKEN=<a-strong-random-value>
  #   BROWSER_WS_ENDPOINT=ws://browserless:3000?token=<the-same-value>
  # Then set LOOPOVER_REVIEW_SCREENSHOTS=true. Official release images already have puppeteer-core
  # installed (release-selfhost.yml builds with --build-arg INSTALL_VISUAL_REVIEW=true) — a rebuild is
  # only needed for a LOCAL/custom image build from this Dockerfile directly (see Dockerfile). Unset/
  # default = fully inert, no container, no screenshots, no error — this whole feature is opt-in end to end.
  browserless:
    image: ghcr.io/browserless/chromium:latest
    restart: unless-stopped
    <<: *default-logging
    profiles: ["visual-review"]
    environment:
      # Deliberately a SOFT default (":-", not ":?") -- docker compose interpolates every service's env
      # vars for the WHOLE FILE even when a service's profile isn't active, so a hard-required var here
      # would break `docker compose up` for every self-hoster NOT using visual review. If left unset,
      # browserless auto-generates its own random token per boot (see its startup log) that will never
      # match whatever you hardcoded into BROWSER_WS_ENDPOINT below -- captures then just fail closed
      # (graceful placeholder, not a crash) instead of authenticating. Set BROWSERLESS_TOKEN explicitly.
      TOKEN: ${BROWSERLESS_TOKEN:-}
      # Self-host reviews PRs one at a time in practice; keep this low so a stray retry storm can't
      # spin up a dozen Chromium tabs. Raise via env if you genuinely need more parallel captures.
      CONCURRENT: "${BROWSERLESS_CONCURRENT:-2}"
      QUEUED: "${BROWSERLESS_QUEUED:-4}"
      TIMEOUT: "${BROWSERLESS_TIMEOUT_MS:-30000}"
    # Never published to the host — reached only over the internal docker network at ws://browserless:3000,
    # same in-network-only posture as postgres/redis/qdrant.
    expose:
      - "3000"
    # Chrome needs real shared memory or it crashes under load writing to /tmp instead of /dev/shm.
    # Docker's 64 MiB default is far too small for this; 2g matches browserless's own documented minimum.
    shm_size: "2g"
    deploy:
      resources:
        limits:
          memory: "${BROWSERLESS_MEM_LIMIT:-2g}"
    healthcheck:
      test: ["CMD", "curl", "-f", "http://127.0.0.1:3000/docs"]
      interval: 10s
      timeout: 5s
      start_period: 15s
      retries: 5

  # browserless's own /metrics?token=<token> endpoint returns JSON (a rolling history of 5-minute-window
  # snapshots), not Prometheus text -- this sidecar polls it and re-exposes the newest snapshot's fields as
  # real Prometheus gauges (#5368), same "translate non-Prometheus output" pattern as backup-exporter above.
  # Gated on the same --profile visual-review as browserless itself; meaningless without it running.
  browserless-exporter:
    image: alpine:3.20
    restart: unless-stopped
    <<: *default-logging
    profiles: ["visual-review"]
    depends_on:
      browserless:
        condition: service_healthy
    environment:
      BROWSERLESS_METRICS_URL: "http://browserless:3000/metrics"
      BROWSERLESS_TOKEN: "${BROWSERLESS_TOKEN:-}"
    volumes:
      # Directory mount, not a single-file one -- same #reporting-exporter-stale-bind-mount rationale as
      # the backup-exporter service above.
      - ./scripts:/scripts:ro
    expose:
      - "9102"
    command:
      - /bin/sh
      - -c
      - "apk add --no-cache jq busybox-extras >/dev/null 2>&1 && sh /scripts/browserless-metrics.sh"
    healthcheck:
      test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget -qO- http://127.0.0.1:9102/metrics | grep -q '^browserless_exporter_last_scrape_success'"]
      interval: 30s
      retries: 5
    deploy:
      resources:
        limits:
          memory: "${BROWSERLESS_EXPORTER_MEM_LIMIT:-64m}"

  # ── REES / review-enrichment (--profile rees) ──────────────────────────────
  # Self-hosted alternative to pointing REES_URL at a managed/external instance (see the self-hosting docs).
  # REES runs the heavier PR analysis (dependency CVEs, secret scan, license, EOL runtime, lockfile drift, IaC
  # misconfig, ...) that the no-checkout `claude --print` reviewer can't do inline; the engine splices its
  # brief into the AI review prompt and treats any REES timeout/error as "no brief" and proceeds regardless
  # (src/review/enrichment-wire.ts) -- this whole service is optional end to end, same as browserless above.
  # After `docker compose --profile rees up -d`, set in .env: LOOPOVER_REVIEW_ENRICHMENT=true,
  # REES_URL=http://rees:8080, and a freshly generated REES_SHARED_SECRET -- do not reuse a secret from any
  # other REES instance you also point at (#1667).
  rees:
    build:
      context: review-enrichment
    restart: unless-stopped
    <<: *default-logging
    profiles: ["rees"]
    # Deliberately NOT `env_file: .env` like the loopover service above: that would also hand this
    # analyzer service every unrelated secret in .env, and REES reads the same POSTHOG_API_KEY key name the
    # main app uses (src/selfhost/posthog.ts) -- blanket-forwarding .env would silently point REES's error
    # reporting at the main app's PostHog project instead of a dedicated one. Add REES-specific PostHog vars
    # via docker-compose.override.yml if you want REES error reporting (see review-enrichment/README.md).
    environment:
      PORT: "8080"
      # Soft default, not ":?required" -- compose interpolates every service's env vars for the whole file
      # even when --profile rees isn't active, so a hard-required var here would break `docker compose up`
      # for every self-hoster not using this profile (same reasoning as BROWSERLESS_TOKEN below). Unset means
      # REES fails closed (503) on every /v1/enrich call instead of running unauthenticated.
      REES_SHARED_SECRET: ${REES_SHARED_SECRET:-}
    # Never published to the host -- reached only over the internal docker network at http://rees:8080, same
    # in-network-only posture as postgres/redis/qdrant/browserless.
    expose:
      - "8080"
    deploy:
      resources:
        limits:
          memory: "${REES_MEM_LIMIT:-512m}"
    # /health and /ready are both unconditional no-ops (REES has no DB/queue to probe), so unlike the
    # loopover service above there's no deeper readiness signal to prefer here; /health also matches
    # Railway's own healthcheckPath for this service. `node -e fetch(...)` avoids assuming curl/wget exist --
    # review-enrichment/Dockerfile's runtime stage is node:22-slim, which installs neither.
    healthcheck:
      test:
        [
          "CMD",
          "node",
          "-e",
          "fetch('http://127.0.0.1:8080/health').then(r=>process.exit(r.ok?0:1)).catch(()=>process.exit(1))",
        ]
      interval: 30s
      timeout: 5s
      start_period: 20s
      retries: 3

  # ── discovery-index (--profile discovery-index) ────────────────────────────
  # Local orchestration only, for testing against the hosted discovery-index service (#4250, #7164) before
  # it exists anywhere public -- the actual public hosting/DNS/TLS decision is separate (#7167), not this.
  # Unlike rees above, the build context is the repo root: this service depends on the @loopover/engine
  # workspace package, so its Dockerfile installs via npm workspaces rather than a self-contained `npm ci`.
  discovery-index:
    build:
      context: .
      dockerfile: packages/discovery-index/Dockerfile
    restart: unless-stopped
    <<: *default-logging
    profiles: ["discovery-index"]
    environment:
      PORT: "8080"
      # Soft defaults, not ":?required" -- compose interpolates every service's env vars for the whole file
      # even when --profile discovery-index isn't active (same reasoning as REES_SHARED_SECRET above). Unset
      # DISCOVERY_INDEX_SHARED_SECRET means the service fails closed (503) on every query call; unset
      # DISCOVERY_INDEX_GITHUB_TOKEN means /ready reports not-ready.
      DISCOVERY_INDEX_SHARED_SECRET: ${DISCOVERY_INDEX_SHARED_SECRET:-}
      DISCOVERY_INDEX_GITHUB_TOKEN: ${DISCOVERY_INDEX_GITHUB_TOKEN:-}
    # Never published to the host -- reached only over the internal docker network, same in-network-only
    # posture as rees above.
    expose:
      - "8080"
    deploy:
      resources:
        limits:
          memory: "${DISCOVERY_INDEX_MEM_LIMIT:-512m}"
    healthcheck:
      test:
        [
          "CMD",
          "node",
          "-e",
          "fetch('http://127.0.0.1:8080/health').then(r=>process.exit(r.ok?0:1)).catch(()=>process.exit(1))",
        ]
      interval: 30s
      timeout: 5s
      start_period: 20s
      retries: 3

  # ── Litestream (--profile litestream) ─────────────────────────────────────
  # Continuous WAL backup of the SQLite DB to S3/B2/R2. Copy litestream.yml.example
  # → litestream.yml and fill in your bucket. Set LITESTREAM_* secrets in .env.
  litestream:
    image: litestream/litestream:0.5.12
    restart: unless-stopped
    <<: *default-logging
    profiles: ["litestream"]
    command: replicate
    depends_on:
      loopover:
        condition: service_healthy
    volumes:
      - loopover-data:/data
      - ./litestream.yml:/etc/litestream.yml:ro
    environment:
      LITESTREAM_ACCESS_KEY_ID: ${LITESTREAM_ACCESS_KEY_ID:-}
      LITESTREAM_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY: ${LITESTREAM_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY:-}
      LITESTREAM_ENDPOINT: ${LITESTREAM_ENDPOINT:-}
      LITESTREAM_REGION: ${LITESTREAM_REGION:-us-east-1}

  # ── n8n workflow automation (--profile workflows) ─────────────────────────
  # Optional no-code automation: webhook fan-out (Slack/Teams/email), scheduled gate summaries,
  # GitHub issue auto-triage from review signals. Import bundled templates from n8n/workflows/
  # via http://localhost:5678/workflows/import. Set N8N_WEBHOOK_URL to your public URL when
  # receiving webhooks from outside the host. Zero impact on the review engine when inactive.
  n8n:
    image: n8nio/n8n:2.31.0
    restart: unless-stopped
    <<: *default-logging
    profiles: ["workflows"]
    ports:
      - "${N8N_PORT:-5678}:5678"
    volumes:
      - n8n-data:/home/node/.n8n
    environment:
      N8N_BASIC_AUTH_ACTIVE: "true"
      N8N_BASIC_AUTH_USER: ${N8N_USER:-admin}
      # Soft default, not ":?required" -- compose interpolates every service's env vars for the whole file
      # even when --profile workflows isn't active, so a hard-required var here would break `docker compose up`
      # for every self-hoster not using this profile (same reasoning as BROWSERLESS_TOKEN / REES_SHARED_SECRET).
      # The entrypoint below fails closed at container start when the profile is active but N8N_PASSWORD is unset.
      N8N_BASIC_AUTH_PASSWORD: ${N8N_PASSWORD:-}
      WEBHOOK_URL: ${N8N_WEBHOOK_URL:-http://localhost:5678}
      N8N_ENCRYPTION_KEY: ${N8N_ENCRYPTION_KEY:-}
      GENERIC_TIMEZONE: ${TZ:-UTC}
    deploy:
      resources:
        limits:
          memory: "${N8N_MEM_LIMIT:-512m}"
    entrypoint:
      - /bin/sh
      - -ec
      - |
        if [ -z "$${N8N_BASIC_AUTH_PASSWORD:-}" ]; then
          echo >&2 "Set N8N_PASSWORD in .env before using --profile workflows."
          exit 1
        fi
        exec /docker-entrypoint.sh

  # ── MinIO S3-compatible object storage (--profile storage) ──────────────
  # Local blob store: Litestream backup destination (set LITESTREAM_ENDPOINT=http://minio:9000),
  # visual-review screenshot artifacts, Orb event archive. Console UI at http://localhost:9001.
  # S3 API: http://minio:9000 from other containers, http://localhost:9000 from the host.
  minio:
    image: minio/minio:RELEASE.2025-09-07T16-13-09Z
    restart: unless-stopped
    <<: *default-logging
    profiles: ["storage"]
    ports:
      - "${MINIO_API_PORT:-9000}:9000"
      - "${MINIO_CONSOLE_PORT:-9001}:9001"
    volumes:
      - minio-data:/data
    environment:
      # Soft defaults for the same whole-file interpolation reason as N8N_PASSWORD above. MinIO itself
      # refuses to start without credentials when this profile is active -- fail closed, not open.
      MINIO_ROOT_USER: ${MINIO_ROOT_USER:-}
      MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD: ${MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD:-}
    command: server /data --console-address ":9001"
    deploy:
      resources:
        limits:
          memory: "${MINIO_MEM_LIMIT:-1g}"
    # No healthcheck: minio/minio is scratch/distroless (no shell, curl, wget, or mc), so an
    # in-container probe cannot run -- same constraint as grafana/loki above. Readiness is observable
    # at GET /minio/health/live on :9000 once the server binds.

  # ── Caddy (--profile caddy) ────────────────────────────────────────────────
  # Auto-TLS via Let's Encrypt. Set DOMAIN=reviews.yourcompany.com in .env, then
  # remove the plain `ports:` entry from the loopover service above.
  caddy:
    image: caddy:2-alpine
    restart: unless-stopped
    <<: *default-logging
    profiles: ["caddy"]
    ports:
      - "80:80"
      - "443:443"
      - "443:443/udp" # HTTP/3 QUIC
    volumes:
      - ./caddy/Caddyfile:/etc/caddy/Caddyfile:ro
      - caddy-data:/data
      - caddy-config:/config
    environment:
      DOMAIN: ${DOMAIN:-localhost}
    depends_on:
      loopover:
        condition: service_healthy

  # ── Observability (--profile observability) ────────────────────────────────
  # Prometheus scrapes /metrics; Alertmanager routes alerts; Loki+Promtail collect logs;
  # Grafana visualises metrics AND logs. Grafana UI: http://localhost:3000 (admin / $GRAFANA_ADMIN_PASSWORD).
  prometheus:
    image: prom/prometheus:v3.12.0
    restart: unless-stopped
    <<: *default-logging
    profiles: ["observability"]
    volumes:
      - ./prometheus/prometheus.yml:/etc/prometheus/prometheus.yml:ro
      - ./prometheus/rules:/etc/prometheus/rules:ro
      - prometheus-data:/prometheus
    command:
      - "--config.file=/etc/prometheus/prometheus.yml"
      - "--storage.tsdb.path=/prometheus"
      # 90d, not the 336h/14d of Loki or 168h/7d of Tempo below (#1828): that gap is deliberate, not an
      # oversight — Prometheus's TSDB compresses numeric samples to ~1-2 bytes each after compaction, so
      # metrics cost far less disk per retained day than Loki's raw log lines or Tempo's full span trees,
      # and the self-hosting-operations docs' own capacity-planning guidance wants a multi-week/month
      # trend window for metrics specifically. That said, 180d (six months) had no sizing rationale of
      # its own — it silently replaced a deliberate 30d default when this became an override-able var in
      # #1678 — so 90d is the considered number here: a full quarter of history for trend/capacity
      # review, without defaulting a small self-host box to open-ended, unbounded-looking retention.
      - "--storage.tsdb.retention.time=${PROMETHEUS_RETENTION_TIME:-90d}"
    deploy:
      resources:
        limits:
          memory: "${PROMETHEUS_MEM_LIMIT:-1g}"

  # Routes Prometheus alerts to your notification channel. Ships SILENT: alerts go to a
  # null receiver until you fill in a receiver in alertmanager/alertmanager.yml.
  alertmanager:
    image: prom/alertmanager:v0.33.0
    restart: unless-stopped
    <<: *default-logging
    profiles: ["observability"]
    depends_on: [prometheus]
    expose:
      - "9093" # in-network only; reach the UI/API via `docker compose port` or a tunnel
    volumes:
      # Mounts the whole host directory (not just the yml) so an operator's private overrides are visible
      # inside the container at the same paths, with no docker-compose.yml edit needed per file added:
      # a real receiver config (e.g. ./alertmanager/alertmanager.local, gitignored via the *.local rule
      # above -- point docker-compose.override.yml's alertmanager `command:` at it) and/or a secret file a
      # local config's webhook_url_file /etc/alertmanager/<name> references.
      - ./alertmanager:/etc/alertmanager:ro
      - alertmanager-data:/alertmanager
    command:
      - "--config.file=/etc/alertmanager/alertmanager.yml"
      - "--storage.path=/alertmanager"
    deploy:
      resources:
        limits:
          memory: "${ALERTMANAGER_MEM_LIMIT:-256m}"

  grafana:
    image: grafana/grafana:13.1.0
    restart: unless-stopped
    <<: *default-logging
    profiles: ["observability"]
    depends_on:
      prometheus:
        condition: service_started
      loki:
        condition: service_started
      reporting-exporter:
        condition: service_healthy
    ports:
      - "${GRAFANA_PORT:-3000}:3000"
    volumes:
      - grafana-data:/var/lib/grafana
      - ./grafana/provisioning:/etc/grafana/provisioning:ro
      - ./grafana/dashboards:/var/lib/grafana/dashboards:ro
      # Maintainer dashboards query only the redacted reporting export, never the live app DB.
      - grafana-reporting-data:/reporting:ro
    environment:
      # Compose interpolates every service even when --profile observability is inactive, so the required-password
      # check lives in entrypoint below. Runtime still fails closed unless the operator sets GRAFANA_ADMIN_PASSWORD.
      GF_SECURITY_ADMIN_PASSWORD: ${GRAFANA_ADMIN_PASSWORD:-${GRAFANA_LOCAL_SMOKE_PASSWORD:-}}
      GF_USERS_ALLOW_SIGN_UP: "false"
      GF_INSTALL_PLUGINS: frser-sqlite-datasource,grafana-github-datasource
      # Read-only fine-grained PAT for the GitHub data source provisioning ($GITHUB_TOKEN expansion). From .env.
      GITHUB_TOKEN: "${GITHUB_TOKEN:-}"
    deploy:
      resources:
        limits:
          memory: "${GRAFANA_MEM_LIMIT:-512m}"
    entrypoint:
      - /bin/sh
      - -ec
      - |
        if [ -z "$${GF_SECURITY_ADMIN_PASSWORD:-}" ]; then
          echo >&2 "Set GRAFANA_ADMIN_PASSWORD in .env before using --profile observability, or set GRAFANA_LOCAL_SMOKE_PASSWORD for local-only smoke tests."
          exit 1
        fi
        exec /run.sh

  reporting-exporter:
    image: alpine:3.20
    restart: unless-stopped
    <<: *default-logging
    profiles: ["observability"]
    depends_on:
      loopover:
        condition: service_healthy
    volumes:
      # The exporter needs live DB read access to build the redacted snapshot. Grafana does not get this mount.
      - loopover-data:/appdb:ro
      - grafana-reporting-data:/reporting
      # A DIRECTORY bind mount, not a single-file one (#reporting-exporter-stale-bind-mount): a single-file
      # bind mount pins the container to the file's INODE at container-creation time. `git pull` replaces a
      # file by writing a new blob then renaming it over the old path -- the old inode still exists on disk
      # until every reference (including this bind mount) is dropped, so the running container keeps reading
      # the pre-pull script forever, silently, with no error. Confirmed live: a script change survived
      # multiple `git pull`s with zero effect until the container was force-recreated. Directory bind mounts
      # don't have this problem -- they resolve the path fresh on every access, exactly like dashboard
      # provisioning below already does.
      - ./scripts:/scripts:ro
    environment:
      # Default SQLite app DB path maps app /data/loopover.sqlite to exporter /appdb/loopover.sqlite.
      # If you override DATABASE_PATH, set this to the matching /appdb/<file> path. When DATABASE_URL points at
      # Postgres, the exporter reads Postgres with psql and still writes the same redacted SQLite reporting DB
      # for Grafana. Set LOOPOVER_REPORTING_SOURCE_DATABASE_URL only if the reporting reader uses a different URL.
      LOOPOVER_REPORTING_SOURCE_DB: "${LOOPOVER_REPORTING_SOURCE_DB:-/appdb/loopover.sqlite}"
      LOOPOVER_REPORTING_SOURCE_DATABASE_URL: "${LOOPOVER_REPORTING_SOURCE_DATABASE_URL:-}"
      DATABASE_URL: "${DATABASE_URL:-}"
      LOOPOVER_REPORTING_DIR: /reporting
      LOOPOVER_REPORTING_DB: "${LOOPOVER_REPORTING_DB:-/reporting/loopover-reporting.sqlite}"
      GRAFANA_REPORTING_EXPORT_INTERVAL_SECONDS: "${GRAFANA_REPORTING_EXPORT_INTERVAL_SECONDS:-30}"
    command:
      - /bin/sh
      - -c
      - >-
        apk add --no-cache sqlite postgresql16-client >/dev/null 2>&1 &&
        while true; do
          sh /scripts/export-grafana-reporting-db.sh || echo '[reporting] export failed';
          interval="$${GRAFANA_REPORTING_EXPORT_INTERVAL_SECONDS:-30}";
          case "$$interval" in ''|*[!0-9]*) interval=30;; esac;
          sleep "$$interval";
        done
    healthcheck:
      test:
        [
          "CMD-SHELL",
          "db=\"$${LOOPOVER_REPORTING_DB:-/reporting/loopover-reporting.sqlite}\"; test -s \"$$db\" && sqlite3 \"$$db\" 'PRAGMA quick_check;' | grep -q '^ok$'",
        ]
      interval: 30s
      timeout: 5s
      start_period: 30s
      retries: 3

  # Redacted AMS (loopover-miner) ledger export -- a DEDICATED profile, not bundled into `observability`: unlike
  # the engine's own reporting-exporter above, this only does anything useful when a miner is ALSO running on this
  # same host with its ledgers under LOOPOVER_MINER_CONFIG_DIR (an engine-only maintainer deployment has nothing
  # for it to read). Grafana must never mount that directory directly -- attempt_log_events.reason/.payload_json
  # are free-form and can carry arbitrary internal detail (#5184 follow-up / PR #5471's flagged confidentiality
  # gap) -- so this exporter reads the live ledgers read-only and writes a redacted snapshot into the SAME shared
  # `grafana-reporting-data:/reporting` volume the engine's own exporter already writes to; only Grafana's
  # ams-ledgers.yml datasources (pointed at /reporting/ams-*.sqlite) ever read from there.
  ams-reporting-exporter:
    image: alpine:3.20
    restart: unless-stopped
    <<: *default-logging
    profiles: ["ams-observability"]
    volumes:
      # Read-only live-ledger access for the exporter only -- Grafana does not get this mount (mirrors the
      # /appdb:ro pattern above). Point this at the SAME host directory your miner uses as LOOPOVER_MINER_CONFIG_DIR.
      # LAPTOP mode already writes there. FLEET mode (packages/loopover-miner/docker-compose.miner.yml) keeps state
      # in a named volume, so it needs the opt-in bind-mount override + combined command -- see "Running fleet mode
      # alongside ORB's ams-observability profile" in packages/loopover-miner/DEPLOYMENT.md (#5805).
      - "${LOOPOVER_MINER_CONFIG_DIR:-~/.config/loopover-miner}:/ams-ledgers:ro"
      - grafana-reporting-data:/reporting
      # Directory bind mount, not a single-file one -- see reporting-exporter's own comment above for why
      # (a single-file mount pins to the pre-`git pull` inode and silently never picks up a script update).
      - ./scripts:/scripts:ro
    environment:
      LOOPOVER_AMS_ATTEMPT_LOG_SOURCE_DB: "${LOOPOVER_AMS_ATTEMPT_LOG_SOURCE_DB:-/ams-ledgers/attempt-log.sqlite3}"
      LOOPOVER_AMS_PREDICTION_LEDGER_SOURCE_DB: "${LOOPOVER_AMS_PREDICTION_LEDGER_SOURCE_DB:-/ams-ledgers/prediction-ledger.sqlite3}"
      LOOPOVER_REPORTING_DIR: /reporting
      LOOPOVER_AMS_ATTEMPT_LOG_REPORTING_DB: "${LOOPOVER_AMS_ATTEMPT_LOG_REPORTING_DB:-/reporting/ams-attempt-log.sqlite}"
      LOOPOVER_AMS_PREDICTION_LEDGER_REPORTING_DB: "${LOOPOVER_AMS_PREDICTION_LEDGER_REPORTING_DB:-/reporting/ams-prediction-ledger.sqlite}"
      LOOPOVER_AMS_REPORTING_EXPORT_INTERVAL_SECONDS: "${LOOPOVER_AMS_REPORTING_EXPORT_INTERVAL_SECONDS:-30}"
    command:
      - /bin/sh
      - -c
      - >-
        apk add --no-cache sqlite >/dev/null 2>&1 &&
        while true; do
          sh /scripts/export-ams-reporting-db.sh || echo '[ams-reporting] export failed';
          interval="$${LOOPOVER_AMS_REPORTING_EXPORT_INTERVAL_SECONDS:-30}";
          case "$$interval" in ''|*[!0-9]*) interval=30;; esac;
          sleep "$$interval";
        done
    healthcheck:
      test:
        [
          "CMD-SHELL",
          "db=\"$${LOOPOVER_AMS_ATTEMPT_LOG_REPORTING_DB:-/reporting/ams-attempt-log.sqlite}\"; test -s \"$$db\" && sqlite3 \"$$db\" 'PRAGMA quick_check;' | grep -q '^ok$'",
        ]
      interval: 30s
      timeout: 5s
      start_period: 30s
      retries: 3

  # ── Log pipeline (--profile observability) ─────────────────────────────────
  # Loki stores logs; Promtail discovers every container in this compose project via the read-only
  # docker-proxy (NOT a raw socket) and ships their logs to Loki. Browse in Grafana → Explore →
  # Loki, e.g. {service="loopover"} | json | level="error".
  loki:
    image: grafana/loki:3.7.3
    restart: unless-stopped
    <<: *default-logging
    profiles: ["observability"]
    command: ["-config.file=/etc/loki/loki-config.yml"]
    volumes:
      - ./loki/loki-config.yml:/etc/loki/loki-config.yml:ro
      - loki-data:/loki
    deploy:
      resources:
        limits:
          memory: "${LOKI_MEM_LIMIT:-1g}"
    # No healthcheck: grafana/loki:latest is distroless (no shell/wget/curl), so an in-container probe
    # can't run — a CMD-SHELL check would leave the container stuck "starting". Readiness is observable
    # at GET /ready; Promtail retries/backs off until Loki accepts pushes and Grafana retries the
    # datasource, so nothing depends on a Docker health gate here.

  # Read-only Docker-API proxy that fronts the socket for Promtail's service discovery. Promtail must
  # NOT be given the raw /var/run/docker.sock: a `:ro` socket bind-mount only protects the socket inode,
  # it does NOT restrict the Docker API, so socket access is effectively host root (enumerate containers,
  # read env/secrets + all container logs, create a privileged container and escape to the host — the
  # same risk the `runner` service notes below). This proxy is the ONLY container touching the socket; it
  # allows just the read-only `/containers/*` endpoints docker_sd needs (list/inspect/logs) and blocks
  # every mutating call (POST=0 → no create/exec/start). Even read-only, GET /containers/{id}/json still
  # returns each container's Config.Env, so the proxy is isolated on a dedicated `docker-proxy` network
  # shared ONLY with Promtail (publishing no host port is not enough — the default network is reachable by
  # every service). No other container can reach :2375 to harvest secrets from peers' environments.
  docker-proxy:
    image: tecnativa/docker-socket-proxy:0.3.0
    restart: unless-stopped
    <<: *default-logging
    profiles: ["observability"]
    environment:
      CONTAINERS: "1" # GET /containers/* (list, inspect, logs)
      NETWORKS: "1" # GET /networks/* — docker_sd computes per-target network labels
      POST: "0" # deny every mutating call; strictly read-only (no create/exec/start)
    volumes:
      - /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock:ro
    networks: [docker-proxy] # isolated — only Promtail joins this network
    deploy:
      resources:
        limits:
          memory: "${DOCKER_PROXY_MEM_LIMIT:-64m}"

  promtail:
    image: grafana/promtail:3.6.11
    restart: unless-stopped
    <<: *default-logging
    profiles: ["observability"]
    command:
      [
        "-config.file=/etc/promtail/promtail-config.yml",
        "-config.expand-env=true",
      ]
    depends_on: [loki, docker-proxy]
    environment:
      # Promtail expands this into its Docker label filter so discovery stays inside this Compose project.
      COMPOSE_PROJECT_NAME: ${COMPOSE_PROJECT_NAME:-loopover}
    volumes:
      - ./promtail/promtail-config.yml:/etc/promtail/promtail-config.yml:ro
      # Persist read positions so restarts don't re-ship the whole log history.
      - promtail-data:/tmp/positions
    # `default` reaches Loki for pushes; `docker-proxy` reaches the socket proxy for discovery. Promtail is
    # the only service on `docker-proxy`, so the inspect endpoint (and the env it exposes) is unreachable
    # from any other container. No Docker-socket mount — discovery goes through the proxy's read-only API.
    networks: [default, docker-proxy]
    deploy:
      resources:
        limits:
          memory: "${PROMTAIL_MEM_LIMIT:-256m}"

  # ── OTEL collector (--profile observability) ──────────────────────────────
  # Receives OTLP metrics from the Claude Code review CLI and re-exposes them on :8889 for Prometheus to
  # scrape — powering the Claude usage analytics (cost / tokens / sessions / models). Enable by setting
  # CLAUDE_CODE_ENABLE_TELEMETRY=1 in .env. Pinned to a known-good version (image layers are reproducible).
  otel-collector:
    image: otel/opentelemetry-collector-contrib:0.155.0
    restart: unless-stopped
    <<: *default-logging
    profiles: ["observability"]
    depends_on:
      tempo:
        condition: service_healthy
    # Mount our config at the image's default path so the stock entrypoint picks it up (no command override).
    volumes:
      - ./otel/otel-collector-config.yml:/etc/otelcol-contrib/config.yaml:ro
    deploy:
      resources:
        limits:
          memory: "${OTEL_COLLECTOR_MEM_LIMIT:-512m}"

  # ── Tempo (--profile observability) — trace store for Claude review spans ─────
  # Receives traces forwarded by the OTEL collector and serves them to Grafana (the Tempo data source).
  # Local-storage single binary; needs no extra config beyond ./tempo/tempo.yaml.
  tempo:
    image: grafana/tempo:2.6.1
    restart: unless-stopped
    <<: *default-logging
    profiles: ["observability"]
    command: ["-config.file=/etc/tempo/tempo.yaml"]
    volumes:
      - ./tempo/tempo.yaml:/etc/tempo/tempo.yaml:ro
      - tempo-data:/var/tempo
    deploy:
      resources:
        limits:
          memory: "${TEMPO_MEM_LIMIT:-1g}"
    healthcheck:
      test: ["CMD", "wget", "-qO-", "http://127.0.0.1:3200/ready"]
      interval: 10s
      timeout: 5s
      start_period: 20s
      retries: 12

  # ── Tailscale (--profile tailscale) ───────────────────────────────────────
  # Joins your tailnet so the stack is accessible via Tailscale IP/hostname — no
  # public ports exposed. Generate an auth key at tailscale.com/settings/keys and
  # set TS_AUTHKEY= in .env. The loopover service is reachable at the tailnet IP on port 8787.
  tailscale:
    # Kept on the `stable` release channel rather than a version tag: tailscale's ghcr tags use a
    # non-obvious scheme and the client is happiest tracking the current stable. For a fully immutable
    # pin, resolve a digest once: docker pull ghcr.io/tailscale/tailscale:stable && docker inspect \
    #   --format='{{index .RepoDigests 0}}' ghcr.io/tailscale/tailscale:stable
    image: ghcr.io/tailscale/tailscale:stable
    restart: unless-stopped
    <<: *default-logging
    profiles: ["tailscale"]
    # Set TAILSCALE_HOSTNAME in .env when running a second named instance on the same tailnet --
    # network_mode: host below means this collides on the tailnet's OWN hostname namespace regardless
    # of COMPOSE_PROJECT_NAME, since the container never joins the Compose-managed default network.
    hostname: ${TAILSCALE_HOSTNAME:-loopover}
    cap_add:
      - NET_ADMIN
      - SYS_MODULE
    environment:
      TS_AUTHKEY: ${TS_AUTHKEY:-}
      TS_STATE_DIR: /var/lib/tailscale
      TS_EXTRA_ARGS: ${TS_EXTRA_ARGS:-}
    volumes:
      - tailscale-state:/var/lib/tailscale
      - /dev/net/tun:/dev/net/tun
    network_mode: host # Tailscale needs host networking to advertise the host's address

  # ── Self-hosted GitHub Actions runner (--profile runners) ─────────────────
  # NOT part of the default recommended stack -- purely optional. Three deployment modes (see .env.example
  # for the full explanation): (1) app-only VPS + GitHub-hosted CI (recommended default, no runner here at
  # all), (2) a separate dedicated runner host, (3) co-located runners on this SAME box (this profile).
  # Runs `runs-on: self-hosted` jobs on this machine. Set RUNNER_TOKEN= (or ACCESS_TOKEN=)
  # and RUNNER_REPO_URL= (e.g. https://github.com/your-org/your-repo) in .env.
  # Get a token at: https://github.com/<owner>/<repo>/settings/actions/runners/new
  # Running this alongside the main `loopover` app on the SAME host? A burst of CI jobs can starve the
  # app of CPU with no limits set (the default below) -- confirmed in production: 3 uncapped runner
  # containers on an 8-vCPU box left the app starved under load. See docker-compose.override.yml.example
  # for a proven CPU-priority pattern (relative cpu_shares + a per-container cpus ceiling) before scaling
  # this up, and ./scripts/selfhost-docker-prune.sh for reclaiming the disk space CI builds accumulate.
  # One-shot bootstrap for the runner's TMPDIR (below): guarantees /tmp/runner/tmp exists (and is
  # world-writable, matching real /tmp's mode -- the runner image's runtime user isn't guaranteed to be
  # root) on the runner-work volume BEFORE the runner container starts. A fresh named volume has nothing
  # at that path otherwise, and pointing TMPDIR at a directory that doesn't exist yet would break every
  # job step that shells out expecting $TMPDIR to be usable. `mkdir -p` is idempotent, so this safely
  # no-ops on every subsequent `docker compose up`; it never touches the runner image's own entrypoint.
  runner-tmp-init:
    image: alpine:3.20
    <<: *default-logging
    profiles: ["runners"]
    volumes:
      - runner-work:/tmp/runner
    command: ["sh", "-c", "mkdir -p /tmp/runner/tmp && chmod 1777 /tmp/runner/tmp"]

  runner:
    # Pin to a specific version tag — `latest` is mutable. Find a digest via:
    # docker pull myoung34/github-runner:ubuntu-jammy && docker inspect --format='{{index .RepoDigests 0}}' myoung34/github-runner:ubuntu-jammy
    image: myoung34/github-runner:ubuntu-jammy
    restart: unless-stopped
    <<: *default-logging
    profiles: ["runners"]
    depends_on:
      runner-tmp-init:
        condition: service_completed_successfully
    environment:
      <<: *runner-tmp-env
      RUNNER_SCOPE: ${RUNNER_SCOPE:-repo}
      REPO_URL: ${RUNNER_REPO_URL:-}
      RUNNER_TOKEN: ${RUNNER_TOKEN:-}
      ACCESS_TOKEN: ${RUNNER_ACCESS_TOKEN:-}
      RUNNER_NAME: ${RUNNER_NAME:-loopover-runner}
      LABELS: ${RUNNER_LABELS:-self-hosted,linux,x64}
      RUNNER_WORKDIR: /tmp/runner
      # Docker builds are disabled by default. To enable DinD (Docker-in-Docker) for workflows that
      # need `docker build/push`, add a `dind` sidecar service and set DOCKER_HOST here. Mounting
      # /var/run/docker.sock grants container-escape risk and is intentionally omitted.
    volumes:
      - runner-work:/tmp/runner
    # A memory ceiling so a single runaway CI job can't exhaust host RAM and take down the app alongside
    # it (#3893) -- same universal-default treatment every other service in this file already has. This
    # is independent of the CPU-priority tuning above: that's host-specific (vCPU count, replica count)
    # and stays an opt-in docker-compose.override.yml pattern, but a memory cap needs no host-specific
    # sizing to be a safe default.
    deploy:
      resources:
        limits:
          memory: "${RUNNER_MEM_LIMIT:-2g}"

  # ── Backups (--profile backup) ────────────────────────────────────────────
  # Active database backup (Postgres pg_dump or WAL-safe SQLite online backup) + a Qdrant snapshot, on a loop
  # (default daily), kept in the loopover-backups volume with retention. Run on demand:
  #   docker compose --profile backup run --rm backup sh /scripts/backup.sh
  # Verify the newest backup is restorable (pg_restore --list / SQLite integrity_check; opt-in scratch restore):
  #   docker compose --profile backup run --rm backup sh /scripts/verify-backup.sh
  backup:
    image: alpine:3.20
    restart: unless-stopped
    <<: *default-logging
    profiles: ["backup"]
    environment:
      DATABASE_PATH: /data/loopover.sqlite
      DATABASE_URL: "${DATABASE_URL:-}"
      LOOPOVER_BACKUP_SOURCE_DATABASE_URL: "${LOOPOVER_BACKUP_SOURCE_DATABASE_URL:-}"
      QDRANT_URL: ${QDRANT_URL:-http://qdrant:6333}
      BACKUP_RETAIN: ${BACKUP_RETAIN:-7}
      # Opt-in restore drill (verify-backup.sh): restore the newest dump into a THROWAWAY database, never the
      # live one. Both must be set, and the scratch URL must differ from the backup source.
      VERIFY_RESTORE_SCRATCH: "${VERIFY_RESTORE_SCRATCH:-}"
      LOOPOVER_VERIFY_SCRATCH_DATABASE_URL: "${LOOPOVER_VERIFY_SCRATCH_DATABASE_URL:-}"
    volumes:
      # RW (not :ro) so SQLite's online-backup can use the WAL index; the script only ever reads the DB.
      - loopover-data:/data
      - loopover-backups:/backups
      # A DIRECTORY bind mount, not individual-file mounts (#reporting-exporter-stale-bind-mount): a
      # single-file bind mount pins the container to that file's INODE at container-creation time, so a
      # later `git pull` (which replaces a file via write-new-then-rename, not an in-place edit) leaves the
      # running container reading the pre-pull script forever with no error -- confirmed live on the
      # reporting-exporter service, which had exactly this mount shape. Mounting the directory also
      # naturally satisfies backup.sh/verify-backup.sh's own `. "$(dirname "$0")/selfhost-pg-url.sh"`
      # dirname-relative sourcing: invoked as /scripts/backup.sh, dirname resolves to /scripts, finding
      # /scripts/selfhost-pg-url.sh right alongside it -- the same layout a bare repo checkout already has.
      - ./scripts:/scripts:ro
    # `docker compose run --rm backup sh /backup.sh` (or /verify-backup.sh) REPLACES `command:`, not
    # `entrypoint:`, so the package install must live in the entrypoint or an on-demand run gets a bare
    # container with no pg_restore/sqlite3/psql. The entrypoint installs packages once, then `exec "$@"`
    # runs whatever command is in effect — the default loop below, or a `run` override. The trailing `sh`
    # entrypoint arg is a placeholder $0 so the real payload lands in "$@" starting at $1, not $0.
    entrypoint:
      - /bin/sh
      - -ec
      - |
        apk add --no-cache sqlite postgresql16-client curl >/dev/null 2>&1
        exec "$@"
      - sh
    command:
      - sh
      - -c
      - "while true; do sh /scripts/backup.sh || echo '[backup] run failed'; sleep ${BACKUP_INTERVAL_SECONDS:-86400}; done"

  # Read-only backup freshness exporter. It serves file-age metrics from the retained backup volume so
  # Prometheus can alert on missing or stale database backups without Grafana reading the live app DB.
  backup-exporter:
    image: alpine:3.20
    restart: unless-stopped
    <<: *default-logging
    profiles: ["backup"]
    volumes:
      - loopover-backups:/backups:ro
      # Directory mount, not a single-file one -- same #reporting-exporter-stale-bind-mount rationale as
      # the backup service above.
      - ./scripts:/scripts:ro
    expose:
      - "9101"
    command:
      - /bin/sh
      - -c
      - "apk add --no-cache busybox-extras && sh /scripts/backup-metrics.sh"
    healthcheck:
      test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget -qO- http://127.0.0.1:9101/metrics | grep -q '^loopover_backup_latest_timestamp_seconds'"]
      interval: 30s
      retries: 5

# Native Docker Compose secrets: file-mounted (at /run/secrets/<name>), never
# exposed via `docker inspect`/`docker compose config` the way a plain `environment:`/`env_file` value is.
# Read by the app's existing generic <NAME>_FILE loader (src/selfhost/load-file-secrets.ts) via the
# `environment:` defaults set below on the loopover service. Every file here is created empty (a no-op --
# an inline .env value always wins, see secrets/README.md) by `scripts/selfhost-init-secrets.sh`, which
# every deploy runs before `docker compose build/up` so a missing file source can never break a deploy for
# an operator who has not opted into this convention. Scoped to the always-on loopover service's own
# highest-value secrets for now -- the same convention extends to any other service the same way.
secrets:
  github_app_private_key:
    file: ./secrets/github_app_private_key.pem
  github_webhook_secret:
    file: ./secrets/github_webhook_secret.txt
  loopover_api_token:
    file: ./secrets/loopover_api_token.txt
  loopover_mcp_token:
    file: ./secrets/loopover_mcp_token.txt
  loopover_mcp_admin_token:
    file: ./secrets/loopover_mcp_admin_token.txt
  redeploy_companion_token:
    file: ./secrets/redeploy_companion_token.txt
  internal_job_token:
    file: ./secrets/internal_job_token.txt
  selfhost_setup_token:
    file: ./secrets/selfhost_setup_token.txt
  token_encryption_secret:
    file: ./secrets/token_encryption_secret.txt
  draft_token_encryption_secret:
    file: ./secrets/draft_token_encryption_secret.txt
  orb_enrollment_secret:
    file: ./secrets/orb_enrollment_secret.txt
  pagerduty_routing_key:
    file: ./secrets/pagerduty_routing_key.txt
  claude_code_oauth_token:
    file: ./secrets/claude_code_oauth_token.txt

volumes:
  loopover-data:
  loopover-pg:
  qdrant-data:
  ollama-models:
  caddy-data:
  caddy-config:
  prometheus-data:
  alertmanager-data:
  grafana-data:
  grafana-reporting-data:
  loki-data:
  promtail-data:
  tailscale-state:
  runner-work:
  loopover-backups:
  tempo-data:
  n8n-data:
  minio-data:

networks:
  # The implicit project network every service joins by default (declared so it can be referenced
  # explicitly where a service also needs the isolated proxy network below).
  default:
  # Isolated network for the Docker-socket proxy. `internal: true` blocks external/internet egress, and
  # only docker-proxy + promtail join it — so the proxy's inspect endpoint (which exposes every
  # container's Config.Env) is unreachable from any other service. See the docker-proxy service notes.
  docker-proxy:
    internal: true