Summary
Harden install-source materialization across its network, download, and archive boundaries while preserving supported authenticated providers and configured proxy behavior.
Security-sensitive findings and reproduction details are intentionally omitted from this public issue. The implementation PR will carry the reviewed fix and regression evidence.
Scope
- Validate every remote destination and redirect before connection.
- Keep the validated destination bound to the actual request transport.
- Bound downloaded and expanded artifact data with shared lower-layer primitives.
- Apply one safe archive-entry policy across platform, Apple, and daemon callers.
- Preserve cleanup, supported providers, proxy semantics, public SDK types, and documented limits.
Acceptance criteria
- Remote materialization fails closed when destination approval cannot be established.
- Download and archive budgets are enforced by actual streamed bytes and entries.
- Rejected materialization leaves no partial extraction output.
- Supported GitHub, EAS, local archive, IPA, daemon-upload, and proxy flows retain their public behavior.
- Focused boundary regressions and the repository's affected gates pass.
Summary
Harden install-source materialization across its network, download, and archive boundaries while preserving supported authenticated providers and configured proxy behavior.
Security-sensitive findings and reproduction details are intentionally omitted from this public issue. The implementation PR will carry the reviewed fix and regression evidence.
Scope
Acceptance criteria