Context
Detonation is already behind a provider trait and CAPEv2 is optional, but the corpus needs a typed integration path for the EvalOps sandbox control plane without silently assuming that every provider supplies a hostile-malware boundary.
Proposal
Implement a SandboxwichProvider that advertises capabilities, submits only when policy and egress gates allow it, binds the job to an artifact digest and tenant, polls a bounded operation, and maps results into the existing analysis/finding contract.
Acceptance criteria
- Provider capability metadata distinguishes simulated, container, gVisor/Kata, and VM isolation.
- Sample egress is disabled by default and every submission is audited before bytes leave.
- Timeout, cancellation, provider loss, and incomplete reports produce explicit statuses.
- Integration tests use a fake provider and do not require a live hostile workload.
References
Context
Detonation is already behind a provider trait and CAPEv2 is optional, but the corpus needs a typed integration path for the EvalOps sandbox control plane without silently assuming that every provider supplies a hostile-malware boundary.
Proposal
Implement a
SandboxwichProviderthat advertises capabilities, submits only when policy and egress gates allow it, binds the job to an artifact digest and tenant, polls a bounded operation, and maps results into the existing analysis/finding contract.Acceptance criteria
References