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docs(changeset): record the two behaviour changes the strip reorder produces
Both measured on the reviewed order and on this one: the `readonly` `secret` forgery that used to survive the strip and reach the store, and the `readonly` `password` empty string whose refusal moves without the value ever reaching the store. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012zTkyNHJ7TkuN2oXtP5x37
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.changeset/insert-check-post-image.md

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@@ -22,6 +22,11 @@ Ruled 2026-09-07 (maintainer, verbatim 「同意」, director seat, summon #17,
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**Who is affected.** Only objects governed by a permission set that EXPLICITLY declares `check`, on single-row inserts by a non-system caller — the gate's existing scope, unchanged. Two behaviour changes to expect, and they are the two halves of the same correction: an insert that left a hook-stamped field off the payload now succeeds where it used to be refused, and an insert whose hook-stamped field lands outside the caller's scope is now refused where it used to be admitted. Callers that were duplicating the stamp to get past the gate keep working and may stop.
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**Two further behaviour changes the reorder produces, measured on both legs** (the reviewed order and this one), because moving the strips ahead of the seam also moves them ahead of the credential channel:
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- a caller-forged value on an author-declared `readonly` **`secret`** field is now stripped. Before, `encryptSecretFields` ran first and replaced the row's value with a `sys_secret` reference, so the strip's `Object.is` value test compared that reference against the caller's plaintext, read the difference as a hook's write, and KEPT the forgery — measured on 17.3.0's order as stored `token: "secret:sec_1"` with a `sys_secret` row minted. This is a narrowing, and it closes a hole that predates this card.
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- an empty string on a `readonly` **`password`** field is stripped instead of answering `VALIDATION_ERROR`. `""` reaches the store on neither order, so the 2026-08-13 empty-credential ruling's guarantee is unchanged; only which refusal a caller sees moves, on a payload a caller was never allowed to send. ⚠️ This is the one direction of the reorder that is not a narrowing, and it is recorded rather than left to be discovered.
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**The invariant this buys, stated to its real edge.** A stored row satisfies the insert `check` on every field the CALLER can steer, whatever the caller sent. Nothing offered any such guarantee before: the check read the payload, and the payload was entirely the caller's.
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⚠️ It is deliberately not "on every field", and the difference is a boundary rather than a hedge. Four engine-owned passes still run between the judgement and the driver, and each substitutes a platform value for whatever stands on the row: the tenant fill of an ABSENT organization column (`resolveSystemInsertOrganization` plus the driver's `injectTenantOnInsert`), `encryptSecretFields` replacing a `secret` field's plaintext with a `sys_secret` reference, `applyAutonumbers` issuing a record number, and `normalizeMultiValueFields` coercing a declared multi-value field to its stored shape. A policy whose `check` names an autonumber, a `secret` or the tenant column is therefore judging a value the platform is about to replace. None of those four is caller-steerable — which is exactly why the two passes that WERE (`stripRuntimeOwnedFields` and the static-`readonly` strip) moved above the seam instead of being explained away.

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