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Fix: a `department` approver on a seeded business unit no longer routes the approval to another organization's members.
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`ApprovalService.expandBusinessUnitUsers` screened the `sys_business_unit` rows with the null-inclusive tenant predicate (#3807 — a seeded unit carries no organization and is admitted on purpose) but read `sys_business_unit_member` with no organization predicate at all, under a system context that carries no tenant either. A seeded unit id exists identically in every tenant, so a `department:<id>` approver on tenant A's request resolved the shared unit and then collected every tenant's membership rows hanging off it — approval authority over A's record, routed to B's users. The member read now carries a strict `organization_id` equality against the directory organization the approver resolves in: the same screen `plugin-sharing` applies to these rows, and the same posture this package already takes for `sys_team_member` and `sys_user_position`.
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The screen is strict rather than null-inclusive on purpose. `sys_business_unit_member.organization_id` is filled by REST/session writes but left NULL by seed replay and by elevated system-context writes (tracked in #14570), so a NULL on a membership row means unknown tenancy, not "platform-global", and routing fails closed on it. Declared cost: on a deployment whose membership rows (not merely its units) were seeded or system-written, a `department` approver on a request that carries an organization now expands to nobody — the slot falls to the `department:<id>` literal, the existing `expanded to nobody` warning (#3807) names it, and `onEmptyApprovers` governs the request as for any unstaffed target. The repair is to stamp those membership rows. A request that carries no organization is unchanged, and so is every unit-level screen.
**BREAKING**`os create <type> <name>` now refuses a project name that npm refuses, and refuses it before it writes anything.
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`os create plugin "My App"` used to exit 0 having written `./plugin-My App/`, carrying a manifest that read `name: "@objectstack/plugin-My App"`. Nothing failed at scaffold time, so the invalid name surfaced later at `npm publish`, in the terminal of whoever ran it next. `os init` has always refused that same input before touching the disk. The rule set is now shared between the two scaffolders rather than restated in one of them, so they answer the same way.
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`os create` also refuses a name whose composed scoped package name exceeds npm's 214-character ceiling. `@objectstack/plugin-` spends 20 of those characters before the name begins, so a name that `os init` accepts can still compose to one npm rejects; that check sits next to the composition rather than in the shared rule set.
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A scripted invocation that passed an invalid name now exits 1 with the reason on stderr, where it previously exited 0 and produced a project that could not be published.
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<!-- adr-0087: not-required (no-migration-prescription) The change narrows what a CLI argument accepts at invocation time. No metadata surface, stored row or spec declaration is touched, so `objectstack migrate meta` has nothing to carry and the ledger has nothing to record. -->
The runtime dispatcher door no longer admits a request on a tenancy posture it could not read.
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`resolveExecutionContext` reads the effective tenancy posture from the kernel's `tenancy` service, and both posture-conditional API-key refusals (`organization_required`, `organization_membership_ended`) run only when that posture is present. The read used to swallow every failure into "no posture", so a `tenancy` service that was **registered and failed to build** answered exactly like a deployment with no tenancy at all: the wall was skipped, and an API key stamped with an organization its owner had left — or carrying no organization — was admitted with full grants.
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The seam now carries the same discrimination the REST door already applies (#13906 decision 1, option A), by the registry's own brand rather than by message text:
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-**never registered** — the supported no-tenancy composition. Absorbed as before: no posture, no posture-conditional refusal, nothing changes for single-organization embedders.
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-**registered and failed to build** — re-raised as `AuthzStoreUnavailableError`, so the door answers `503 SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE` ("the authorization store could not be read"), which is an existing member of the closed error vocabulary. A posture that could not be read is not a posture that is absent.
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Two nets between the resolver and the transport envelope are told the same thing, in the one shape `@objectstack/core` already prescribes for such seams (`rethrowAuthzStoreUnavailable`): the dispatcher's service facade hands the resolver the classified rejection for `tenancy` instead of collapsing it to `undefined`, and the identity step's catch re-raises only the branded outage while every other fault still degrades to an anonymous request. A consequence worth knowing: an authorization-store read failure (`AuthzStoreUnavailableError` from the permission tables) now also reaches this door as 503 instead of being served as an anonymous request.
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@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ The largest single consumer — **17 of the 105 sites**.
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| 40 |**Approval record lock released** — a locked record is writable | plugin-approvals | Get: engine self-writes (the status mirror) pass. Lose: the lock that stops edits while an approval is live. Note there is deliberately **no admin exemption** here — only `isSystem`|`lifecycle-hooks.ts:347`|
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| 41 | Delegation write guard bypassed | plugin-approvals | Get: service / seed / import may write delegation rows naming another delegator |`lifecycle-hooks.ts:570`|
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| 42 | Approval actor / submitter / pending-approver checks bypassed (8 sites) | plugin-approvals | Get: approve, reject, recall, reassign without being a pending approver or the submitter |`plugin-approvals/src/approval-service.ts:963`, `:1072`, `:3248`, `:3396`, `:3564`, `:3635`, `:3824`, `:3864`|
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| 42 | Approval actor / submitter / pending-approver checks bypassed (8 sites) | plugin-approvals | Get: approve, reject, recall, reassign without being a pending approver or the submitter |`plugin-approvals/src/approval-service.ts:963`, `:1072`, `:3305`, `:3453`, `:3621`, `:3692`, `:3881`, `:3921`|
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| 43 | Saved-report ownership is **assignable**, and an update may reassign it | plugin-reports | Get: `ownerId` from input is honoured. A non-system caller always owns what it creates and can never reassign |`plugin-reports/src/report-service.ts:404`, `:425`|
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