objectstack-ai
diff --git a/‎.changeset/layer0-verdict-on-operation.md‎
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diff --git a/‎content/docs/permissions/system-context.mdx‎
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@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+---
+"@objectstack/spec": minor
+"@objectstack/objectql": minor
+"@objectstack/plugin-security": minor
+---
+
+feat(security): the Layer 0 tenant wall records its verdict on the operation, and the bulk data-event producer reads it instead of re-deriving the wall
+
+`BulkDataEventSchema.organizationId` is stamped on a `data.records.updated` / `data.records.deleted` event only when the Layer 0 tenant wall named exactly one organization for the whole predicate write. The producer (`publishBulkDataEvent`, `@objectstack/objectql`) used to decide that by re-deriving the wall's inputs — posture, context, and the object's own tenancy clauses. It could never see the third clause plugin-security folds into `tenancyDisabled`: the deployment-declared `platformGlobalObjects` carve-out (#12699). On such an object under an armed wall the producer stamped the caller's organization while Layer 0 had composed no wall at all — a wrong key asserting "every affected record belongs to this organization" over a batch that could span several, the #13566 leak shape reappearing on the bulk path (#15706).
+
+Ruled on #15706 (seam (i), ADR-0131 D8 「一道谓词，算一次」): the wall records what it decided, and the reader composes nothing.
+
+- **`@objectstack/spec`** — new export `TenantLayer0VerdictSchema` / `TenantLayer0Verdict` (`@objectstack/spec/security`): the four verdicts a Layer 0 wall can reach for one operation — `none`, `organization`, `organizations`, `deny`. Additive.
+- **`@objectstack/objectql`** — `OperationContext` gains an optional member `tenantLayer0Verdict`, written by the enforcement layer at the moment it composes the wall onto the operation's predicate. Additive widening of a published surface, hence `minor`. `publishBulkDataEvent` now reads that member and nothing else: a recorded `organization` (or a one-member `organizations`) verdict stamps the key; `none`, `deny`, a multi-member set, a malformed value, or NO recorded verdict all omit it. The engine no longer consults the enforced posture, the execution context or the object schema to answer the question — the mirror is deleted, not moved.
+- **`@objectstack/plugin-security`** — the engine middleware records `opCtx.tenantLayer0Verdict` on every operation whose predicate it composes the wall onto (reads and predicate writes); `computeTenantLayer0Filter` is now a projection of the new `computeTenantLayer0Verdict`, so the recorded verdict and the injected predicate come from one computation. An on-behalf-of write records the intersection of the caller's and the delegator's walls. System contexts and by-id writes record nothing (no wall is composed for them).
+
+What moves, and in which direction: a deployment-exempted object under an armed wall now publishes `organizationId` ABSENT (it was wrongly present); a `PLATFORM_ADMIN` rung on a PUBLIC tenant object now publishes it PRESENT (the wall stands there; it was conservatively absent); a hand-built context with no rung is answered by the plugin's capability probe rather than conservatively absent. Every population the previous producer answered correctly is unchanged.
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ the seed loader replaying package fixtures, a plugin's boot reconciler, a
 service self-write, a migration.
 
 This page is **the authority** for what that flag actually does. It exists
-because the flag is not one concept: it is a single boolean read at **106
+because the flag is not one concept: it is a single boolean read at **105
 distinct sites across 19 packages**, and knowing three of those behaviours gives
 no hint that the other hundred-and-three exist. Every documented app-side bug
 traced to `isSystem` had the same shape — the metadata was complete and correct,
@@ -87,14 +87,14 @@ that silently does not happen.
 
 | # | Behaviour when `isSystem` | Package | What you get / what you lose | Anchor |
 |:--|:---|:---|:---|:---|
-| 1 | **The whole security middleware short-circuits** before any gate runs | plugin-security | Get: every CRUD/FLS/tenant/owner gate below skipped in one branch. Lose: all of rows 2–6 at once — this is the single largest behaviour on the page | `security-plugin.ts:1615` |
-| 2 | **`owner_id` is not auto-stamped on INSERT** (the step 3.5 anchor guard is inside the block row 1 skips) | plugin-security | Lose: the row lands `owner_id = NULL`, so the default `owner_only_writes` policy hides it **from its own creator**. Get: nothing — this is a gap, not a capability | guard at `security-plugin.ts:2541` (the step 3.5 block), skipped by `:1615` |
-| 3 | Row-level read filter resolves to "no filter" | plugin-security | Get: unscoped reads. Lose: row-level scoping entirely | `security-plugin.ts:4344` |
-| 4 | Field-level security returns **all** fields | plugin-security | Get: every column readable. Lose: field masking | `security-plugin.ts:4495` |
-| 5 | Export permission granted unconditionally | plugin-security | Get: `canExport` is `true` | `security-plugin.ts:4573` |
-| 6 | Write bypass = `true`, effective write scope = `org` | plugin-security | Get: widest write scope without holding any capability | `security-plugin.ts:1442`, `:1464` |
+| 1 | **The whole security middleware short-circuits** before any gate runs | plugin-security | Get: every CRUD/FLS/tenant/owner gate below skipped in one branch. Lose: all of rows 2–6 at once — this is the single largest behaviour on the page | `security-plugin.ts:1620` |
+| 2 | **`owner_id` is not auto-stamped on INSERT** (the step 3.5 anchor guard is inside the block row 1 skips) | plugin-security | Lose: the row lands `owner_id = NULL`, so the default `owner_only_writes` policy hides it **from its own creator**. Get: nothing — this is a gap, not a capability | guard at `security-plugin.ts:2546` (the step 3.5 block), skipped by `:1620` |
+| 3 | Row-level read filter resolves to "no filter" | plugin-security | Get: unscoped reads. Lose: row-level scoping entirely | `security-plugin.ts:4374` |
+| 4 | Field-level security returns **all** fields | plugin-security | Get: every column readable. Lose: field masking | `security-plugin.ts:4525` |
+| 5 | Export permission granted unconditionally | plugin-security | Get: `canExport` is `true` | `security-plugin.ts:4603` |
+| 6 | Write bypass = `true`, effective write scope = `org` | plugin-security | Get: widest write scope without holding any capability | `security-plugin.ts:1447`, `:1469` |
 | 7 | Metadata-plane schema masking exempt (ADR-0106 D4) | metadata-core | Get: unmasked object schema. Note: the exemption is a **caller** property — it short-circuits before the security service is consulted | `object-schema-fls.ts:228` |
-| 8 | `explain()` may target a principal other than the caller | plugin-security | Get: no `manage_users` / delegated-admin check | `security-plugin.ts:3857` |
+| 8 | `explain()` may target a principal other than the caller | plugin-security | Get: no `manage_users` / delegated-admin check | `security-plugin.ts:3887` |
 | 9 | Anonymous-deny treats the caller as authenticated | core | Get: passes the 401 seam with no `userId` | `anonymous-deny.ts:154` |
 | 10 | Permission-set projection middleware skipped | plugin-security | Lose: projection of permission-set-derived columns | `permission-set-projection.ts:1015` |
 | 11 | Session-resolution middleware skipped | plugin-auth | Get: no session lookup attempted | `auth-plugin.ts:1427` |
@@ -109,22 +109,22 @@ that silently does not happen.
 
 | # | Behaviour when `isSystem` | Package | What you get / what you lose | Anchor |
 |:--|:---|:---|:---|:---|
-| 18 | **`readonly` strip bypassed — UPDATE, single row** | objectql | Get: a `readonly` field CAN be written. Lose: the protection that stops a caller seeding e.g. `approval_status` | `objectql/src/engine.ts:11718` |
-| 19 | **`readonly` strip bypassed — UPDATE, bulk/predicate** | objectql | Same, on the multi-row path | `objectql/src/engine.ts:11901` |
-| 20 | **`readonly` strip bypassed — INSERT** | objectql | Same, on create — one gate over BOTH create-side passes since the 2026-09-03 ruling moved the static-`readonly` strip in beside the runtime-owned one and deleted the DataProtocol ingress copy. `isSystem` is the **only** exemption on this path: `preserveAudit` is deliberately not read on create, so a non-system historical import is still stripped | `objectql/src/engine.ts:10366` |
-| 21 | Strict-drop refusal never fires | objectql | Lose: a caller that opted into loud refusal gets **silence** — strict refuses exactly what the strip would have taken, and the strip took nothing | `objectql/src/engine.ts:10499`, `readonly-strict-errors.ts:66` |
-| 22 | **Referential-integrity check skipped** | objectql | Get: writes proceed against unreachable/unresolvable targets. Lose: an `isSystem` caller can write a **dangling reference** | `objectql/src/engine.ts:6225` |
-| 23 | Tenant-audit warning silenced; `bypassTenantAudit` threaded to the driver | objectql | Get: unscoped system writes stop warning. Lose: the signal that would flag a genuine user-path scoping bug | `objectql/src/engine.ts:3936`, `:3946`, `:3973` |
+| 18 | **`readonly` strip bypassed — UPDATE, single row** | objectql | Get: a `readonly` field CAN be written. Lose: the protection that stops a caller seeding e.g. `approval_status` | `objectql/src/engine.ts:11675` |
+| 19 | **`readonly` strip bypassed — UPDATE, bulk/predicate** | objectql | Same, on the multi-row path | `objectql/src/engine.ts:11858` |
+| 20 | **`readonly` strip bypassed — INSERT** | objectql | Same, on create — one gate over BOTH create-side passes since the 2026-09-03 ruling moved the static-`readonly` strip in beside the runtime-owned one and deleted the DataProtocol ingress copy. `isSystem` is the **only** exemption on this path: `preserveAudit` is deliberately not read on create, so a non-system historical import is still stripped | `objectql/src/engine.ts:10323` |
+| 21 | Strict-drop refusal never fires | objectql | Lose: a caller that opted into loud refusal gets **silence** — strict refuses exactly what the strip would have taken, and the strip took nothing | `objectql/src/engine.ts:10456`, `readonly-strict-errors.ts:66` |
+| 22 | **Referential-integrity check skipped** | objectql | Get: writes proceed against unreachable/unresolvable targets. Lose: an `isSystem` caller can write a **dangling reference** | `objectql/src/engine.ts:6182` |
+| 23 | Tenant-audit warning silenced; `bypassTenantAudit` threaded to the driver | objectql | Get: unscoped system writes stop warning. Lose: the signal that would flag a genuine user-path scoping bug | `objectql/src/engine.ts:3913`, `:3923`, `:3950` |
 | 24 | Engine-owned / append-only write guard bypassed | plugin-security | Get: generic writes to `managedBy` engine-owned objects | `system-write-guard.ts:96`, `:120` |
 | 25 | Identity write guard bypassed (ADR-0092) | plugin-auth | Get: direct writes to identity tables through the generic data path | `identity-write-guard.ts:99` |
-| 26 | Search-companion column **kept** in a read's rows when it was explicitly requested | objectql | Get: the internal companion column is readable. Lose: nothing for app code — this is the engine reading its own index | `objectql/src/engine.ts:6924` |
-| 27 | Dependent-count disclosure on a blocked delete | objectql | Get: the count of blocking children. Nothing was elevated past the caller, so nothing is withheld | `objectql/src/engine.ts:12517` |
-| 28 | Reference-cleanup log attributes the write to `'system'` | objectql | Get: an honest actor label instead of `anonymous` when the context carries neither `userId` nor `actor` | `objectql/src/engine.ts:12446` |
-| 29 | **Bulk data event `organizationId` OMITTED** — the batch is published "not asserted" | objectql | Get: nothing — the `data.records.*` event still publishes. Lose: the per-organization attribution: the security middleware composed no tenant wall for a system write, so the producer cannot vouch that every row a predicate write affected belongs to one organization, and the key is omitted rather than filled from the caller's `tenantId`; a tenant-scoped consumer then does not deliver the event inside an organization wall (#15225) | `objectql/src/engine.ts:2371` |
+| 26 | Search-companion column **kept** in a read's rows when it was explicitly requested | objectql | Get: the internal companion column is readable. Lose: nothing for app code — this is the engine reading its own index | `objectql/src/engine.ts:6881` |
+| 27 | Dependent-count disclosure on a blocked delete | objectql | Get: the count of blocking children. Nothing was elevated past the caller, so nothing is withheld | `objectql/src/engine.ts:12477` |
+| 28 | Reference-cleanup log attributes the write to `'system'` | objectql | Get: an honest actor label instead of `anonymous` when the context carries neither `userId` nor `actor` | `objectql/src/engine.ts:12406` |
+| 29 | **Bulk data event `organizationId` OMITTED** — the batch is published "not asserted" | plugin-security | Get: nothing — the `data.records.*` event still publishes. Lose: the per-organization attribution: this exit is taken before the security middleware composes any tenant wall, so it records no Layer 0 verdict on the operation (`OperationContext.tenantLayer0Verdict`, #15813), and the engine's bulk producer — which reads that recorded verdict and nothing else — omits the key rather than filling it from the caller's `tenantId`; a tenant-scoped consumer then does not deliver the event inside an organization wall (#15225) | `security-plugin.ts:1620` |
 
 ### 3. Sharing (`plugin-sharing`)
 
-The largest single consumer — **17 of the 106 sites**.
+The largest single consumer — **17 of the 105 sites**.
 
 | # | Behaviour when `isSystem` | What you get / what you lose | Anchor |
 |:--|:---|:---|:---|
@@ -179,8 +179,8 @@ a reader tracing where elevation travels needs them.
 
 | # | Site | Package | What it does |
 |:--|:---|:---|:---|
-| 62 | `objectql/src/engine.ts:3743` | objectql | Propagates `isSystem` into the hook session so hooks can tell engine self-writes from user writes |
-| 63 | `objectql/src/engine.ts:14961` | objectql | `ScopedContext.isSystem` getter — re-exposes the underlying execution context's flag |
+| 62 | `objectql/src/engine.ts:3720` | objectql | Propagates `isSystem` into the hook session so hooks can tell engine self-writes from user writes |
+| 63 | `objectql/src/engine.ts:14923` | objectql | `ScopedContext.isSystem` getter — re-exposes the underlying execution context's flag |
 | 64 | `plugin-reports/src/report-service.ts:556` | plugin-reports | Threads the flag into the engine call that runs a report |
 | 65 | `body-runner.ts:279` | runtime | Rebuilds an `ExecutionContext` from a hook session, carrying the flag across |
 
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ assuming `isSystem` covers it is a documented source of bugs.
 |:---|:---|:---|
 | "It suppresses triggers / record-change automation" | **No.** Only `skipTriggers` does. A bare `{ isSystem: true }` on a seed write re-fired automation on freshly seeded rows and wedged first boot | `metadata-protocol/src/seed-loader.ts:2032` (rationale at `:1942`–`1944`, #3760), `flow.zod.ts:702` |
 | "It skips the state machine" | **No.** That is `skipStateMachine`, carried by seed replay and by `treatAsHistorical` imports | `objectql/src/engine.ts` FSM gate; see [State Machine](/docs/protocol/objectql/state-machine) |
-| "It skips validation rules" | **No.** Field shape, `format`, `script` and the rest still run. The `readonly` strip runs *before* validation precisely so a discarded value is not judged | `objectql/src/engine.ts:10349`–`10366` |
+| "It skips validation rules" | **No.** Field shape, `format`, `script` and the rest still run. The `readonly` strip runs *before* validation precisely so a discarded value is not judged | `objectql/src/engine.ts:10306`–`10323` |
 | "It preserves a supplied `updated_at` / `updated_by`" | **No.** That is `preserveAudit`, a separate opt-in — and an UPDATE-path exemption only | `field.zod.ts:1581` (#3493 / #6640) |
 | "It stamps `created_by`" | **No.** Audit stamping reads `userId` from the context. A user-less system write stamps nothing — that is today's behaviour, not an error | `runtime-identity.ts:280`–`281` |
 | "It bypasses every guard" | **No.** The last-admin guard applies to **every** context, `isSystem` included — the deprovision path that actually locks an org out is the system one | `last-admin-guard.ts:299` |
@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ Ownership injection, `readonly` bypass and sharing materialisation are
 independent decisions, and a seed loader plausibly wants the first two but not
 the third. The concept is nevertheless **staying as one boolean**:
 
-- **Shipped semantics.** `isSystem` is a published contract with 106 read sites
+- **Shipped semantics.** `isSystem` is a published contract with 105 read sites
   in 19 packages. Splitting it is a breaking contract change across all of them.
   (The ruling was taken when the census read 80 sites in 18 packages; the count
   has grown, which strengthens rather than weakens the argument.)
@@ -326,12 +326,12 @@ still holds equal to the census on every pull request:
 | Appearances of the bare identifier `isSystem` in non-test sources | 813 | — |
 | — parsed as a declaration | 22 | ✅ |
 | — parsed as an object-literal / type key (producers and option objects) | 310 | — |
-| — parsed as a property **read** | 112 | ✅ |
+| — parsed as a property **read** | 111 | ✅ |
 | — parsed in some other syntactic position (a local, a cast, a conditional) | 9 | ✅ |
 | — the remainder: text inside comments and string literals | 358 | — |
 | Of those reads: reads of one of the unrelated metadata fields | 6 | ✅ |
-| Of those reads: reads of `ExecutionContext.isSystem` | **106** | ✅ |
-| — behaviour-bearing (rows 1–61 above) | 102 | ✅ |
+| Of those reads: reads of `ExecutionContext.isSystem` | **105** | ✅ |
+| — behaviour-bearing (rows 1–61 above) | 101 | ✅ |
 | — carry the flag onward only (rows 62–65 above) | 4 | ✅ |
 | Packages containing at least one elevation read | **19** | ✅ |
 | Files containing at least one elevation read | 44 | ✅ |