diff --git a/.changeset/repo-execute-elevated-context.md b/.changeset/repo-execute-elevated-context.md
index 67128a2df2..a8ce3a8e66 100644
--- a/.changeset/repo-execute-elevated-context.md
+++ b/.changeset/repo-execute-elevated-context.md
@@ -8,4 +8,8 @@ Before this change, the handler's `ctx` carried `params`, `userId`, `tenantId` a
 
 `ctx.api` is now a real `ScopedContext` bound to `{ ...callerContext, isSystem: true }` — the caller's own envelope, elevated — the same `sudo()`-shaped formula `buildActionExecutionContext` and `recomputeSummaries`'s `systemCtx` already use, so `userId`/`tenantId` still stamp the write and an open transaction still joins rather than escapes. `ctx.executionContext` carries the same elevated envelope, matching the REST/MCP shape exactly.
 
-**What widens**: a `readonly: true` field a handler writes through `ctx.api.object(x).update(y)` when reached via `repo.execute()` now lands instead of being silently stripped, matching REST `/actions` and MCP `run_action`. A repo-wide census (production + test, `examples/` and `apps/` included) found no existing caller of `ObjectRepository.execute()` — every hit in the tree was prose describing the shape, never an invocation — so no shipped write changes behaviour.
+**What widens**: `ctx.api` inside a `repo.execute()`-dispatched action handler now carries `isSystem: true`, and ObjectQL's registered security middleware reads that as a **total**, unconditional bypass (`plugin-security/src/security-plugin.ts:1614-1616`, "System operations bypass security" — `return next()` before every other gate in the middleware runs) — not only the static `readonly` strip named in earlier drafts of this note. Every `find`/`insert`/`update`/`delete` the handler drives through this `ctx.api` now also skips, in the same stroke: RLS read scoping (`security-plugin.ts:4344`) and field-level security (`:4495`); the CRUD/export permission checks in the same middleware (`:1616`, `canExport` at `:4573`); the ADR-0103 engine-owned/append-only write guard (`system-write-guard.ts:96,120`, called at `security-plugin.ts:1736`); the package-managed / system-row / curated-capability-name / audience-anchor write gates (`security-plugin.ts:1690-1724`); the referential-integrity check (`engine.ts:5892`) and the tenant-audit mute (`engine.ts:3773`); and the static `readonly`/runtime-owned strip on **both** UPDATE paths (`engine.ts:11290`, `:11473`) and the INSERT path (`:10025`), not the single call site named earlier. This matches the platform's own documented posture — `content/docs/permissions/system-context.mdx`: "Elevation is total, and it is not granular" — and REST `/actions` / MCP `run_action` already carry the identical exposure, so this widens an existing bypass to a third dispatch path rather than introducing a new one.
+
+Bounded on two sides: metadata-plane schema masking (`metadata-core/object-schema-fls.ts:228`) is a separate REST/GraphQL schema-serving dispatch path that this `ctx.api` surface (`find`/`insert`/`update`/`delete`/`count`/`aggregate`/`execute`) never calls into, so it is not reached here; and `plugin-sharing/rule-hooks.ts`'s insert/update `isSystem` materialisation skip was already retired by the maintainer's 2026-08-31 ruling on #13533 — a system write materialises sharing grants exactly as a user write does today, so nothing changes there either.
+
+A repo-wide census (production + test, `examples/` and `apps/` included) found no existing caller of `ObjectRepository.execute()` — every hit in the tree was prose describing the shape, never an invocation — so no shipped write changes behaviour today: the widening is total in kind, empty in measured blast radius.
diff --git a/content/docs/permissions/system-context.mdx b/content/docs/permissions/system-context.mdx
index 59a33e3f73..799a0d1907 100644
--- a/content/docs/permissions/system-context.mdx
+++ b/content/docs/permissions/system-context.mdx
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ a reader tracing where elevation travels needs them.
 | # | Site | Package | What it does |
 |:--|:---|:---|:---|
 | 62 | `objectql/src/engine.ts:3543` | objectql | Propagates `isSystem` into the hook session so hooks can tell engine self-writes from user writes |
-| 63 | `objectql/src/engine.ts:14496` | objectql | `ScopedContext.isSystem` getter — re-exposes the underlying execution context's flag |
+| 63 | `objectql/src/engine.ts:14523` | objectql | `ScopedContext.isSystem` getter — re-exposes the underlying execution context's flag |
 | 64 | `plugin-reports/src/report-service.ts:556` | plugin-reports | Threads the flag into the engine call that runs a report |
 | 65 | `body-runner.ts:279` | runtime | Rebuilds an `ExecutionContext` from a hook session, carrying the flag across |
 
diff --git a/packages/objectql/src/engine.ts b/packages/objectql/src/engine.ts
index 1a476fb09c..9e13e1778b 100644
--- a/packages/objectql/src/engine.ts
+++ b/packages/objectql/src/engine.ts
@@ -14099,9 +14099,36 @@ export class ObjectRepository implements IScopedObjectRepository {
    * and test) found ZERO existing callers of this method anywhere — every
    * `ObjectRepository.execute()` / `ScopedRepo.execute()` hit in the tree was
    * prose describing the shape, never an invocation — so this widens what a
-   * FUTURE caller's write is accepted to do (the static `readonly` strip now
-   * skips this path exactly as it already skips REST `/actions` and MCP
-   * `run_action`) without changing any write anyone ships today.
+   * FUTURE caller's write is accepted to do, without changing any write
+   * anyone ships today.
+   *
+   * [Disclosure completeness] What widens is larger than the static
+   * `readonly` strip named above. `isSystem: true` on `this.context` is read
+   * by ObjectQL's registered security middleware as a TOTAL, unconditional
+   * bypass — `plugin-security/src/security-plugin.ts:1614-1616`, "System
+   * operations bypass security" / `return next()` ahead of every other gate
+   * in that middleware — so every `find`/`insert`/`update`/`delete` this
+   * `ctx.api` drives also skips RLS read scoping (`:4344`) and field-level
+   * security (`:4495`); the CRUD/export permission checks in the same
+   * middleware (`:1616`, `canExport` at `:4573`); the ADR-0103 engine-owned/
+   * append-only write guard (`system-write-guard.ts:96,120`, called at
+   * `security-plugin.ts:1736`); the package-managed / system-row /
+   * curated-capability-name / audience-anchor write gates
+   * (`security-plugin.ts:1690-1724`); the referential-integrity check
+   * (`:5892` in this file) and the tenant-audit mute (`:3773`) — in addition
+   * to the static `readonly`/runtime-owned strip on BOTH update paths
+   * (`:11290`, `:11473`) and the insert path (`:10025`), not the single site
+   * an earlier draft of this note implied. Exactly what REST `/actions` and
+   * MCP `run_action` already give an action body — see
+   * `content/docs/permissions/system-context.mdx` ("Elevation is total, and
+   * it is not granular") for the full catalog this bypass belongs to.
+   *
+   * Bounded on two sides: metadata-plane schema masking
+   * (`metadata-core/object-schema-fls.ts:228`) is a separate REST/GraphQL
+   * dispatch path this `ctx.api` surface never calls into; and
+   * `plugin-sharing/rule-hooks.ts`'s insert/update materialisation skip was
+   * already retired by the maintainer's 2026-08-31 ruling on #13533 (system
+   * and user writes materialise sharing grants identically today).
    */
   async execute(actionName: string, params?: any): Promise<any> {
     if (this.engine.executeAction) {