diff --git a/cmd/daemon/main.go b/cmd/daemon/main.go
index 2d87514b..0848b8ce 100644
--- a/cmd/daemon/main.go
+++ b/cmd/daemon/main.go
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ import (
 	// L11 plugin imports — cmd/daemon (L12) is the only place these
 	// are allowed. The daemon proper imports only pkg/coreapi
 	// interfaces.
+	"github.com/pilot-protocol/app-store/pkg/manifest"
 	"github.com/pilot-protocol/app-store/plugin/appstore"
 	"github.com/pilot-protocol/dataexchange"
 	"github.com/pilot-protocol/eventstream"
@@ -346,6 +347,22 @@ func main() {
 	if home, herr := os.UserHomeDir(); herr == nil {
 		appstoreInstallRoot = filepath.Join(home, ".pilot", "apps")
 	}
+	if r := os.Getenv("PILOT_APPSTORE_ROOT"); r != "" {
+		appstoreInstallRoot = r
+	}
+	// Trust anchor (G4′): the supervisor refuses to spawn a non-sideloaded app
+	// whose publisher is not on manifest.TrustedPublishers. Nothing populated it
+	// before, so enforcement skipped every catalogue app. Wire it from
+	// PILOT_TRUSTED_PUBLISHERS (comma-separated ed25519:<b64> ids) — in
+	// production this list is the reviewed publisher registry.
+	if tp := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("PILOT_TRUSTED_PUBLISHERS")); tp != "" {
+		for _, p := range strings.Split(tp, ",") {
+			if p = strings.TrimSpace(p); p != "" {
+				manifest.TrustedPublishers = append(manifest.TrustedPublishers, p)
+			}
+		}
+		log.Printf("appstore: %d trusted publisher(s) loaded from PILOT_TRUSTED_PUBLISHERS", len(manifest.TrustedPublishers))
+	}
 	// The app-usage telemetry emitter shares the daemon's identity file
 	// and telemetry URL. When consent is off (empty URL) the client is
 	// a permanent no-op — no goroutines, no dials, no buffering.
diff --git a/cmd/pilotctl/appstore.go b/cmd/pilotctl/appstore.go
index 70bffe69..686a19c2 100644
--- a/cmd/pilotctl/appstore.go
+++ b/cmd/pilotctl/appstore.go
@@ -1184,6 +1184,34 @@ func cmdAppStoreInstall(args []string) {
 			"staged binary sha256 mismatch: manifest=%s staged=%s", m.Binary.SHA256, got)
 	}
 
+	// Carry the native-delivery install spec (and its human-readable script) into
+	// $APP when the bundle ships them. A cli adapter with assets reads
+	// $APP/install.json at startup to fetch + verify + stage its binaries from the
+	// R2 artifact registry. These files are covered by the bundle's sha (verified
+	// above at the tarball level), so copying them adds no new trust surface.
+	for _, aux := range []string{"install.json", "install.sh"} {
+		// Resolve both ends through the same containment guard the binary copy
+		// uses: aux is a constant allow-list entry, and resolveUnder cleans the
+		// join and verifies it stays under the root — so neither path can escape.
+		src, serr := resolveUnder(bundleDir, aux)
+		dst, derr := resolveUnder(stagingDir, aux)
+		if serr != nil || derr != nil {
+			_ = os.RemoveAll(stagingDir) // #nosec G703 -- stagingDir is appStoreRoot()/<m.ID>.staging (m.ID reverse-DNS validated), confined to the install root; cleanup of our own dir
+			fatalHint("internal_error", "aux install file path escaped the bundle/staging root", "resolve %s: %v / %v", aux, serr, derr)
+		}
+		if _, err := os.Stat(src); err != nil { // #nosec G703 -- src is resolveUnder(bundleDir, <const aux>), proven to stay under the bundle root above; no traversal
+			continue // not an asset-delivering app
+		}
+		mode := os.FileMode(0o644)
+		if aux == "install.sh" {
+			mode = 0o755
+		}
+		if err := copyFile(src, dst, mode); err != nil { // #nosec G703 -- src/dst are resolveUnder-confined (bundle/staging roots); aux is a constant allow-list entry, so neither can escape
+			_ = os.RemoveAll(stagingDir) // #nosec G703 -- stagingDir is the confined install-root staging dir; cleanup of our own dir
+			fatalHint("io_error", "check install root permissions", "copy %s: %v", aux, err)
+		}
+	}
+
 	if source == installSourceLocal {
 		// Plant the sentinel before the atomic rename so the moment
 		// the dir appears under InstallRoot it's already tagged
diff --git a/cmd/pilotctl/zz_procexec_test.go b/cmd/pilotctl/zz_procexec_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..fd50e16e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cmd/pilotctl/zz_procexec_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
+
+package main
+
+import (
+	"encoding/json"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/pilot-protocol/app-store/pkg/manifest"
+)
+
+// TestProcExecCapabilityAccepted pins that this daemon's pinned app-store knows
+// the proc.exec capability. CLI apps ship a proc.exec grant scoped to one
+// command; before the app-store bump the daemon validated every manifest with a
+// vocabulary that lacked proc.exec and would reject them as "not a known
+// capability". This is the regression guard for the bump.
+func TestProcExecCapabilityAccepted(t *testing.T) {
+	mk := func(grants []any) *manifest.Manifest {
+		raw, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]any{
+			"id":               "io.pilot.gh",
+			"app_version":      "0.1.0",
+			"manifest_version": 1,
+			"binary":           map[string]any{"runtime": "go", "path": "bin/app", "sha256": strings.Repeat("a", 64)},
+			"grants":           grants,
+			"protection":       "guarded",
+			"store":            map[string]any{"publisher": "ed25519:AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQDXX0000000", "signature": "deadbeef"},
+		})
+		m, err := manifest.Parse(raw)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("parse: %v", err)
+		}
+		return m
+	}
+
+	// A CLI app's manifest (proc.exec scoped to the command) must validate.
+	ok := mk([]any{
+		map[string]any{"cap": "proc.exec", "target": "gh"},
+		map[string]any{"cap": "audit.log", "target": "*"},
+	})
+	if errs := ok.Validate(); len(errs) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("proc.exec manifest must validate against the pinned app-store: %v", errs)
+	}
+
+	// The hardened target still rejects a wildcard ("run anything").
+	bad := mk([]any{
+		map[string]any{"cap": "proc.exec", "target": "*"},
+		map[string]any{"cap": "audit.log", "target": "*"},
+	})
+	if errs := bad.Validate(); len(errs) == 0 {
+		t.Fatal("proc.exec target '*' must be rejected by the pinned app-store (hardened target)")
+	}
+}
diff --git a/go.mod b/go.mod
index f682a659..86aa6476 100644
--- a/go.mod
+++ b/go.mod
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ go 1.25.11
 
 require (
 	github.com/coder/websocket v1.8.15
-	github.com/pilot-protocol/app-store v1.0.1-beta.1.0.20260616142430-8edfed7efa72
+	github.com/pilot-protocol/app-store v1.0.1-beta.1.0.20260622180016-07b4170265dc
 	github.com/pilot-protocol/beacon v0.2.6
 	github.com/pilot-protocol/common v0.5.5
 	github.com/pilot-protocol/dataexchange v0.2.1-beta.1.0.20260615113607-fac933edea98
diff --git a/go.sum b/go.sum
index 6add17d3..aac950b7 100644
--- a/go.sum
+++ b/go.sum
@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@ github.com/coder/websocket v1.8.15 h1:6B2JPeOGlpff2Uz6vOEH1Vzpi0iUz20A+lPVhPHtNU
 github.com/coder/websocket v1.8.15/go.mod h1:NX3SzP+inril6yawo5CQXx8+fk145lPDC6pumgx0mVg=
 github.com/expr-lang/expr v1.17.8 h1:W1loDTT+0PQf5YteHSTpju2qfUfNoBt4yw9+wOEU9VM=
 github.com/expr-lang/expr v1.17.8/go.mod h1:8/vRC7+7HBzESEqt5kKpYXxrxkr31SaO8r40VO/1IT4=
-github.com/pilot-protocol/app-store v1.0.1-beta.1.0.20260616142430-8edfed7efa72 h1:vDiQ7ZheKIzlNqfviu5zeQzGVTMP63k1hC5HodEuyeQ=
-github.com/pilot-protocol/app-store v1.0.1-beta.1.0.20260616142430-8edfed7efa72/go.mod h1:leZPtX43gE2JB7xeljexXri81g6qhdZfYExLtzI+bhg=
+github.com/pilot-protocol/app-store v1.0.1-beta.1.0.20260622180016-07b4170265dc h1:Ze7h3rEPMhFaAyjNH9riySBs8HEeeoB3wODwtoLQ4Eo=
+github.com/pilot-protocol/app-store v1.0.1-beta.1.0.20260622180016-07b4170265dc/go.mod h1:leZPtX43gE2JB7xeljexXri81g6qhdZfYExLtzI+bhg=
 github.com/pilot-protocol/beacon v0.2.6 h1:grxwaVyPRUT0W6coyjYfNkO0rpzOIrwrKn94S21DuVE=
 github.com/pilot-protocol/beacon v0.2.6/go.mod h1:I/UhEv097g1z/qtAVDZbEhf3R5tzM0Dp71vGHah52A4=
 github.com/pilot-protocol/common v0.5.5 h1:mnv3q84alVaotGD+Qxfo4ECFEquqsUwrI3mjKIGUKFY=