feat(sdk): isolate hosted Babysitter capability - #552
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This repository does not receive automatic reviews because it has fewer than 10 stars. ⚙️ Run configurationConfiguration used: Organization UI Review profile: CHILL Plan: Advanced Run ID: 📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe PR adds typed Babysitter cloud capability contracts, isolated Linux execution for verified hosted extensions, strict artifact and protocol validation, focused tests, and documentation of the boundary and its current exclusions. ChangesHosted Babysitter capability isolation
Priority: ➖ Normal Estimated code review effort: 4 (Complex) | ~45 minutes Change: Feature Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant HostedCaller
participant SDKIsolation
participant LinuxSandbox
participant CapabilityAdapter
HostedCaller->>SDKIsolation: load flow without extensions
HostedCaller->>SDKIsolation: resolve hosted artifacts
SDKIsolation->>LinuxSandbox: verify artifact and start isolated handler
LinuxSandbox->>CapabilityAdapter: queue normalized delivery
CapabilityAdapter-->>LinuxSandbox: queued or duplicate receipt
LinuxSandbox-->>SDKIsolation: validated completion
SDKIsolation-->>HostedCaller: success result
Suggested reviewers: Merge Risk: 🔵 Low · up to Some supported environments may report an unclear sandbox failure or fail the SDK test suite when bubblewrap prerequisites are absent. These bounded issues should be corrected before broad use. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1❌ Failed checks (1 warning)
✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
Full details: Docstring CoverageExplanation Docstring coverage is 15.38% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 26 functions across 10 files. (5 skipped: 5 unsupported.) ✨ Finishing Touches 💡 1📝 Generate docstrings 💡
🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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- 🪄 Fix CodeRabbit comments on this PR
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Inline comments:
In `@packages/sdk/src/hosted-extension-isolation.ts`:
- Around line 122-123: Before launching the child in the hosted extension
isolation flow, validate the current runtime when options.nodePath is undefined
and reject unsupported Node versions. Add a supportsSandboxFlags helper beside
executable that accepts Node 22.13+, 23.5+, and 24+, then return the existing
unsupported result with a clear runtime/version message when validation fails.
In `@packages/sdk/tests/hosted-extension-isolation.test.ts`:
- Line 77: Guard each test invoking runHostedCapabilityExtension with it.skipIf
based on Linux and /usr/bin/bwrap availability, adding the required existsSync
import and sandboxAvailable check. Keep the artifact-resolution test
unconditional, and update the CI environment to install bubblewrap and support
the user namespaces required by --unshare-all.
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ℹ️ Review info
⚙️ Run configuration
Configuration used: Organization UI
Review profile: CHILL
Plan: Advanced
Run ID: f7de7e4f-6ece-436a-aff8-b7dde688f342
📒 Files selected for processing (15)
docs/BABYSITTER-CATALOG-HANDOFF.mddocs/CLOUD.mdevidence/babysitter-gate8-isolation/README.mdevidence/babysitter-gate8-isolation/verification.txtextensions/babysitter/babysitter.flow.tspackages/sdk/src/flow-extension-loader.tspackages/sdk/src/hosted-extension-isolation.tspackages/sdk/src/hosted-extension-sandbox-source.tspackages/sdk/src/index.tspackages/sdk/tests/babysitter-native-extension.test.tspackages/sdk/tests/hosted-extension-isolation.test.tspackages/sdk/tsconfig.tests.jsonpackages/surface/src/cloud.tspackages/surface/src/context.tspackages/surface/src/index.ts
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Updated head Key changes: lock-backed installation and actual Deterministic regressions cover the reported FD3 case: descriptor 3 is treated as hostile transport. A direct exact frame can consume only the already-granted one-shot delivery call, while malformed/extra requests invoke the adapter zero times and premature/repeated completion fails. @codex security review |
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Independent review of Flows #552 at 72667b3: conditional NO-GO until Linux artifact CI completes and one deterministic hostile-child protocol gap is repaired. In hosted-extension-protocol.ts:100-146, after the child sends a valid capability frame, it can send an immediate type:error frame while the Cloud invoke promise is pending. The host settles generic plugin_unsupported and kills the child; when the adapter later returns a typed refusal or a successful side effect, the settled guard ignores that outcome. Existing tests cover premature result and normal typed refusal, not premature error. This is not a demonstrated privilege escalation with the current immutable pin, but it loses authoritative queue outcome and could cause an unsafe retry when future hosted dispatch is wired. Please defer the child error until the pending adapter call settles, preserve the typed refusal or in-doubt/success result, and add deterministic delayed-adapter regressions for both late reject and late success. Previous FD3/result, artifact, overlap, bubblewrap, public API and 2.0.26 issues appear addressed at this head, subject to exact-head CI. Keep the extension disabled under the #549 refusal boundary. |
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Updated head The parent now defers any hostile child terminal error while the one permitted adapter invocation is pending. A late typed Cloud rejection remains the authoritative rejection; a late success is observed before the child error settles the step; an in-doubt timeout still fails closed. Import-time FD3 regressions cover mismatched PR/delivery/event (0 calls), result-before-capability (0 calls), two calls (at most 1), and delayed reject/success. The GitHub Ubuntu job keeps @codex security review |
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Independent exact-head review of Flows #552 at 28d9c45: the premature child-error protocol race is fixed and covered by raw-FD3 late-reject and late-success regressions, but the PR remains NO-GO on an unpaired-authority P1. The runner accepts an installation authority and a base authority that are independently WeakSet-branded, checking name/version but not common project/root identity. A trusted multi-tenant host can pair installation A with same-name base B even if B never declared that extension. Existing tests reject fake authorities, not two genuine authorities from different roots. See inline #552 (comment) . Please bind both authorities to one opaque origin or load them as one combined authority, and add a cross-project A/B regression. No direct current remote exploit is demonstrated because #549 keeps hosted dispatch unwired. The revised Linux CI has only passed sandbox installation so far; full SDK/artifact proof remains pending. |
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Updated head The preceding exact head @codex security review |
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Independent exact-head review of Flows #552 at 818957f: cross-project installation/base pairing is fixed with shared realpath origin and a genuine A/B regression; premature child-error handling remains fixed. NO-GO on a new typed-refusal loss. In hosted-extension-protocol.ts:124-129, when the Cloud adapter rejects, the host records capabilityError but waits for the child to consume stdin or emit an error. A hostile child can send one valid capability request and then hang. At timeout the failed state returns generic plugin_unsupported instead of the authoritative typed Cloud refusal. See inline P1 #552 (comment) . Add a raw-FD3 child-hang regression with delayed typed adapter rejection and zero second calls; settle promptly from the adapter or preserve its typed error at timeout. This matters for refusal versus retry routing. Three review threads are still open, and exact-head Linux artifact CI was still running at review time. #549 keeps hosted dispatch disabled, so no live remote exploit is claimed. |
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Updated head Local gate: typecheck, build, test-typecheck, and 4 security/routing files — 148/148 tests. Exact-head Linux CI and fresh security review are running. #549 remains unchanged and nothing is enabled or merged. @codex security review |
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Independent exact-head security review of Flows #552 at e52bbb0: the typed Cloud refusal now survives a hanging child and has a raw-FD3 regression, but whole-PR NO-GO on a verified-bytes-to-executed-bytes race. verifiedManifest rehashes the mutable project .flows/plugins directory, then runHostedExtensionSandbox resolves and read-only bind-mounts that live directory later. Plugin files remain host-writable, and a same-host writer can replace an entry or directory after verification but before import; read-only bind protects the sandbox side, not the host source. The authority still reports the pinned digest for different executed bytes. See inline P1 #552 (comment) . Please materialize a private immutable snapshot from verified content, rehash that snapshot before binding, and add a deterministic post-verification mutation regression proving the old verified bytes execute or the run refuses. Four review threads are open; exact-head Linux artifact CI is still running. Keep #549 hosted refusal in force. |
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Updated head The deterministic regression wraps bubblewrap, atomically replaces the entire live artifact directory after snapshot creation and immediately before launch, then proves the original reviewed handler—not the hostile replacement—executes exactly once. Local gate: 4 files, 149/149 tests. Typed-refusal and shared-origin fixes remain intact. Exact-head Linux CI and security review are running; #549 remains unchanged and the extension remains disabled. @codex security review |
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Independent whole-PR review of Flows #552 at 882e7c7: the mutable live-store TOCTOU is repaired for the intended project-writer threat model by rehashing copied bytes, materializing a private snapshot, rechecking its digest, and bind-mounting that snapshot. The atomic live-store replacement regression confirms original bytes execute. NO-GO remains on a distinct stale-generation authority P1: installation and base authorities are paired by canonical flow path string only. A deployment can replace the flow/config at that same path; cached old installation A and freshly loaded base B then compare equal, allowing B to execute A extension even after B removed its declaration. See inline #552 (comment) . Bind both authorities to a shared opaque deployment snapshot/generation and add a same-path redeploy A/B regression. Also split or justify the 553-line isolation test module under the repo ~500-line reviewability standard (#552 (comment)). Exact-head Linux artifact CI remains in progress; #549 hosted refusal remains active. |
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Follow-up acceptance detail for the existing stale-generation P1 at head 882e7c7: test both (1) cached old installation plus a fresh base at the same path and (2) cached old installation plus cached old base on a fresh dispatch after redeploy removes the extension declaration. Rechecking stored bytes alone does not re-run declaration reconciliation. Also account for Node module caching: importing the same file URL after same-path replacement may return the old base graph, so generation proof must bind to the module actually imported. Exact-head Linux artifact CI also failed because the hostile-child typed-adapter-rejection test exceeded the default 5000 ms timeout (job 106757707719). This extends the existing NO-GO; it is not a separate finding. |
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Fresh independent exact-head review of e3a6990: the prior cached old-installation plus fresh/old base revocation cases now reject correctly, and the test module is split. NO-GO remains on four items. (1) hosted-extension-runtime.ts 209-214 imports the base before hashing file paths; a replacement between import and hash can label old executed bytes with the new disk digest (Bugbot r4072237577). (2) authored-flow-loader.ts 105-156 hashes root and header.use flow nodes but omits ordinary relative helper imports; a cached runtime can survive helper edits and a fresh direct-flow nonce can still import a cached helper. Bind generation to the complete graph actually executed. (3) hosted-extension-protocol.test.ts is missing from tsconfig.tests.json and is not test-typechecked (Bugbot r4072237587). (4) The moved hostile-child test still uses timeoutMs 100 then waits without a bound for invoked; cold bubblewrap startup can kill the child before its capability frame, repeating the prior Linux 5000 ms failure. Please add deterministic regressions, include the test in typecheck, bound the startup case, and rerun exact-head Linux CI before fresh review. |
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Correction to the earlier conditional review: independent exact-head audit of 6deb5d4 is NO-GO under the stated project-writer threat model. hosted-base-snapshot.ts 11,53-61,90-117 excludes node_modules from the generation digest but symlinks snapshot node_modules to the live project directory. authored-flow-loader.ts 180-206 then imports arbitrary ESM dependencies through that live path, while hosted-extension-runtime.ts 185-197 rechecks only the excluded-source view. A base importing local-identity can execute altered node_modules/local-identity/index.js bytes after snapshot/digest without changing the attested source or lockfile. Please add a deterministic mutation-during-import and after-load regression that refuses, then either snapshot/hash dependency bytes actually executed or prove an immutable host-owned integrity-pinned dependency boundary. The current handoff claim that mutable deployment paths cannot substitute identity is not established by this head. Exact-head CI success would not resolve this trust-boundary gap. |
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Cursor Bugbot has reviewed your changes using high effort and found 2 potential issues.
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Reviewed by Cursor Bugbot for commit d401cb8. Configure here.
| ]) || | ||
| entry.kind !== "flow-extension" || | ||
| typeof entry.name !== "string" || | ||
| typeof entry.version !== "string" || |
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Lock names escape plugin store path
Medium Severity
The hosted lock parser never requires name to be a single safe path component, but installationAt still joins that string into the plugin-store directory. A lock name containing .. or / resolves pluginStoreDirectory outside .flows/plugins, so generation load will open/read an attacker-chosen @sha256: path before the Babysitter pin runs.
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Reviewed by Cursor Bugbot for commit d401cb8. Configure here.
| let entry: FlowExtensionManifest['compat']['base'][number] | undefined; | ||
| for (let index = 0; index < manifest.compat.base.length; index += 1) { | ||
| if (manifest.compat.base[index]!.name === base.name) entry = manifest.compat.base[index]; | ||
| } |
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Base compat match uses last entry
Low Severity
assertBaseCompatible now keeps the last compat.base entry with a matching name instead of the first. The previous .find() used first-match, so duplicate names with different version ranges can now accept or refuse the opposite range on the shared compose and hosted paths.
Reviewed by Cursor Bugbot for commit d401cb8. Configure here.


Summary
f.capabilities.cloud.babysitterTurn.queue({ delivery })andf.done; the original verified dispatch and immutable extension provenance stay in the parentFail-closed boundary
The public path requires one opaque base/installation generation plus the symbol-branded verified delivery dispatch. It never executes tenant base code to derive identity: the parent requires the exact reviewed Software Factory flow SHA-256 and assigns the pinned
software-factory@2.0.22identity. Every dispatch rechecks current declarations and the complete project source generation, so caller-assembled, cross-project, cross-redeploy, stale, composed, lock-drift, and route-ambiguous inputs refuse before import.Every installed artifact and manifest is reverified against the base/runtime, and the selected artifact must equal the reviewed native pin:
github:AgentWorkforce/flows@8b33ebab8347514f80d9da5a81206a087f641714#extensions/babysitterbdf2187b9a242667d34bbc63e7a744753e146dc8cd6f4047047f2aed28f406ee5631a06bbdc8186f4ee0ff955610ead24d001c5197b59fb1fe81fe422c44f226The extension bytes are reread into bounded parent-owned buffers and rehashed. The six required Surface runtime files are independently SHA-256-pinned and read into parent-owned buffers. Bubblewrap receives every runner, extension, and Surface file over an inherited descriptor and
--ro-bind-data, which copies it into a read-only mount before Node starts; there is no mutable host staging path, and live project, plugin-store, and Surface paths are never mounted. The runtime generation is checked again after the buffers exist and immediately before spawn.The child runs beneath inherited hard limits of 16 GiB address space and 3 GiB data/anonymous memory (covering V8 reservations, heap, Buffer/native memory, mappings, and descendants); the separate 64 MiB old-space bound remains and receives a closed normalized GitHub descriptor and minimal Surface facade. It receives no workspace mount, inherited credentials, network, writable filesystem, subprocess permission, MCP, helpers, harnesses, base context, verified authority, or extension provenance. Descriptor 3 is hostile transport, not authority: every frame/request/receipt is validated in the parent, an exact direct frame can consume only the same one-shot delivery capability already granted, and premature/repeated/unknown frames fail.
The parent permits exactly one request and returns only
{ receiptId, status: 'queued' | 'duplicate' }. Typed Cloud refusals remain the parent rejection; the child sees only a fixed refusal marker. In-doubt timeout rejects without retry or fallback.Rollout coupling (not enabled here)
49c993220b9c34fab2d4b0e51911656f62b8b657f534d988691960d45bb9d9b6and assignssoftware-factory@2.0.22. Any Garden customization or source update refuses until a reviewed SDK pin is released, so fleet rollout must deploy those exact base bytes.github:AgentWorkforce/flows@8b33ebab8347514f80d9da5a81206a087f641714#extensions/babysitter, with digestbdf2187b9a242667d34bbc63e7a744753e146dc8cd6f4047047f2aed28f406ee. A new Babysitter version requires a reviewed SDK release, and the Cloud catalog must carry that exact ref and digest.babysitlabel before invoking this runner so unrelated PR events do not spawn sandboxes. The Cloud adapter still rechecks the live label, session, and head after dispatch.Remaining gate
workspaceId/activationId/listenerAgentIdinjection, live open-PR/exact-label/current-head checks, authorized existing-session resolution, lineage/head dedupe, and Relay native-turn delivery.Refs #442.
Verification
Literal command output:
evidence/babysitter-gate8-isolation/verification.txt.Note
High Risk
Introduces a security-critical sandbox and parent protocol for executing pinned extension code with host-verified dispatch; mistakes in generation binding, pinning, or frame validation could allow privilege escalation or unauthorized cloud turns.
Overview
Adds a Linux-only, capability-only path to run the pinned native Babysitter extension without lifting #549’s generic executor refusal. Hosted callers must
loadHostedExtensionRuntime(opaque base + installation in one generation, no extension JS import) and thenrunHostedCapabilityExtension, which re-verifies declarations, full project source, lock/store bytes, route uniqueness, and exact reviewed Software Factory + Babysitter ref/digest/manifest before import inside bubblewrap with a minimal Surface facade and a singlecapabilities.cloud.babysitterTurn.queueadapter call validated in the parent.Supporting work hardens trust boundaries: private base/plugin snapshots with bounded descriptor reads, hosted declaration/manifest/protocol validators that treat child IPC as hostile, intrinsic-only canonical/bundle hashing so tenant code cannot poison prototypes, and build-time embedded SDK/Surface versions for standalone CLI. Docs (
BABYSITTER-CATALOG-HANDOFF.md,CLOUD.md) andevidence/babysitter-gate8-isolation/document the contract, pins, and verification record; Cloud adapter, Relay, canary, and #442 remain out of scope.Reviewed by Cursor Bugbot for commit d401cb8. Bugbot is set up for automated code reviews on this repo. Configure here.