fix(broker): scope credentials passed to spawned workers - #1854
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Workers inherit the broker's environment so harness CLIs keep PATH, HOME, model API keys and proxies. Relay-owned credentials in that environment are now removed from one centralized list on every worker spawn path before the worker's own credentials are applied. Workspace credentials still reach a worker only through the broker's explicit worker environment. Adds broker unit tests and a fleet e2e that checks the credential variable names a spawned worker can see. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Included review availability: Your plan provides up to 4 included reviews per hour; 1 remains after this review. 📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughBroker and worker spawn paths remove inherited Relay credentials before applying worker-specific environment values. Unit and end-to-end tests check which credentials reach spawned workers. The end-to-end probe records variable names, not values. ChangesWorker credential isolation
Priority: ➖ Normal Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~20 minutes Change: Bug fix Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to The described spawn paths retain delegated worker credentials while excluding inherited broker credentials. No issue is established that should prevent merging after normal checks. Security Architecture ReviewSecurity architecture risk: 🔵 Low · up to The reviewed spawn paths remove inherited broker credentials before assigning worker-specific credentials. No newly exposed credential path was established, but the change affects several process-launch paths and the available tests do not establish coverage of every runtime and failure path. Retained concerns Security review detailsSecurity Blast Radius
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| // Every runtime (PTY, headless provider, app-server, native sidecar) | ||
| // reaches this point with a command that inherits the broker's | ||
| // environment. Drop relay-owned credentials from it; the worker's own | ||
| // credentials are injected below. | ||
| remove_inherited_relay_credentials(&mut command); |
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When spawning Grok, Gemini, or Droid, build_mcp_args runs their mcp remove/add subprocesses in snippets.rs, while Codex can run its app-server or model probe, all before execution reaches this scrub. Those provider processes therefore still inherit RELAY_BROKER_API_KEY, RELAY_NODE_TOKEN, and RELAY_AGENT_IDENTITY_KEY, exposing the credentials this patch intends to withhold even though the final worker command is clean. Apply the same scrub to every spawn-time Command, or sanitize the environment passed into these helpers before invoking them.
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Fixed in 30fc1af. The credential list moved into relay_pty::credentials, with a scrubbed_command(program) constructor. Every spawn-time helper now builds its command through it:
- the grok and gemini/droid
mcp add/mcp removesubprocesses (snippets.rs) codex debug models(worker.rs)- codex session pre-creation via
app-server(relay-pty/codex_session.rs)
The broker re-exports the same helper, so worker spawns and helpers share one list. A new unit test asserts that scrubbed_command removes every key and that an explicit value set afterwards still wins. Results: relay-pty 253 passed, broker 1309 passed, clippy -D warnings clean on both libs.
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Inline comments:
In `@tests/e2e/fleet/worker-env.test.ts`:
- Around line 65-68: Update the `invokeAction` call in the worker environment
test to pass the `spawn:claude` capability explicitly, so the broker routes the
spawn to the `env-probe` sidecar instead of handling the generic `spawn` action
locally.
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CHANGELOG.mdcrates/broker/src/snippets.rscrates/broker/src/spawner.rscrates/broker/src/worker.rstests/e2e/fleet/README.mdtests/e2e/fleet/harness.tstests/e2e/fleet/nodes/env-probe.cjstests/e2e/fleet/nodes/env-probe.tstests/e2e/fleet/worker-env.test.ts
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MCP registration (grok/gemini/droid mcp add/remove), the codex model probe and codex session pre-creation now build their commands through relay_pty::credentials::scrubbed_command, the same list worker spawns strip. The list moves into relay-pty so both crates share one source. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Summary
Workers inherit the broker's process environment so harness CLIs keep
PATH,HOME, model API keys and proxies. Relay-owned credentials in that environment are now removed from one centralized list (INHERITED_RELAY_CREDENTIAL_ENV_KEYSincrates/broker/src/spawner.rs) on every worker spawn path, before the worker's own credentials are applied.Commandinspawn_with_generationsnippets.rs)runtime/init.rs), which the relay MCP tools inside the worker use.Test plan
tests/e2e/fleet/worker-env.test.ts: spawns a stub worker through the real broker and asserts the exact set of credential variable names it sees. It fails with the stripping disabled.tests/e2e/fleet/: 24/25. The failure is the known local-only flake "resume: a resumable spawn re-binds to the agent ORIGIN node", which passes in CI.cargo fmtclean;cargo clippy -D warningsclean on the library. The pre-existing--all-targetsfindings inpty_worker.rstest code are untouched.🤖 Generated with Claude Code
Note
High Risk
Changes credential propagation for every worker and spawn-time subprocess; incorrect scrubbing or delegation could break spawns or widen secret exposure.
Overview
Stops broker-owned secrets from leaking into spawned agent processes by stripping a shared list of relay credential environment variables before every worker launch, then re-applying only that worker’s agent token and workspace keys the broker deliberately delegates.
The scrubbing lives in new
relay-ptymodulecredentials(INHERITED_RELAY_CREDENTIAL_ENV_KEYS,remove_inherited_relay_credentials,scrubbed_command), re-exported from the broker spawner. It runs on all worker spawn paths inworker.rs/spawner.rs, on MCP preflight andmcp add/removehelpers insnippets.rs, Codex session bootstrap incodex_session.rs, and Codex model probes. Non-relay env (e.g.PATH, provider API keys) is unchanged.Coverage adds broker unit tests (command env scrub + integration spawn recording variable names only) and fleet E2E
worker-env.test.tswith anenv-probeharness that asserts workers never see broker API key, node token, or identity key. CHANGELOG documents the fix.Reviewed by Cursor Bugbot for commit 30fc1af. Bugbot is set up for automated code reviews on this repo. Configure here.