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feat(analyst): add sandboxed python_exec tool - #1538
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The `analyst` agent denies bash, so it has no general-purpose compute for parsing, statistics or row-wise text logic. Add an analyst-only `python_exec` tool. - Inputs are scratch tables exported to Parquet; `save(df, name)` writes DataFrames back to scratch after a successful call. - The child gets a minimal environment (no credentials or connection strings) and never sees warehouse connections. - Persistent, size-capped, session-private workspace; memory and time limits; network isolation where the OS allows it (`unshare`, `sandbox-exec`). - Registered only for `analyst` when Python with pandas and duckdb is found; `ALTIMATE_PYTHON_EXEC=0` disables it. Bash stays denied. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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…n macOS Independent review found that the analyst's Python child could write anywhere the user can. On macOS the `sandbox-exec` profile now also denies `file-write*` outside the session's Python directory (plus null/tty devices). Reads and the Linux path are unchanged. The result text states which confinement applied, and a test covers the write denial. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Code Review SummaryStatus: No Issues Found | Recommendation: Merge Files Reviewed (17 files)
Previous Review Summaries (10 snapshots, latest commit ae84ca4)Current summary above is authoritative. Previous snapshots are kept for context only. Previous review (commit ae84ca4)Status: No Issues Found | Recommendation: Merge Files Reviewed (17 files)
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Previous review (commit 54ab3df)Status: 2 Issues Found | Recommendation: Address before merge Overview
Issue Details (click to expand)WARNING
Files Reviewed (7 files)
Reviewed by gemini-4-argon · Input: 94.2K · Output: 1.2K · Cached: 286.1K Review guidance: REVIEW.md from base branch |
…andbox Analyst Python could read any host file and spawn unconfined subprocesses; on Linux nothing was confined. `python_exec` now runs only under an enforced OS sandbox and refuses otherwise. - New `python-sandbox.ts`: read allowlist built from the interpreter (`sys.prefix`, base/exec prefixes, stdlib, `site.getsitepackages()`, `sysconfig` paths, directories of loaded native libraries) plus minimal system paths; roots exposing `/` or the home directory are refused. - macOS: `sandbox-exec` profile denies file reads and writes outside the allowlist, network, Apple Events and Mach services outside a small list. - Linux: `bwrap` with `--unshare-all`, `--die-with-parent`, `--new-session`, `--cap-drop ALL`, fresh `/tmp`, `/dev`, `/proc`, read-only binds of the allowlist, merged-usr symlinks, and a writable bind of the session dir. Without a working `bwrap` the tool refuses (Landlock alone does not mediate pathname Unix socket connects). - Windows and other platforms: refused. - Each mechanism must pass a self-test before use: Python and a `cat` subprocess fail to read a canary outside the allowlist, while reading inside works. Refusals are not cached. - Results report `filesystem <mechanism>` and `network isolated`. - Interpreter discovery and detection no longer block the event loop. - Reserve `python_exec` from MCP tools; drop nested registry markers. - Tests: host-file and subprocess read denial, pandas/duckdb round trip, refusal when detection fails, fake sandbox rejected by the self-test, exact bwrap argv, macOS profile, allowlist rules, MCP reservation. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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🤖 Prompt to fix review comments
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Inline comments:
Review comments at @packages/opencode/src/altimate/tools/python-exec.ts:
- Around line 252-295: Update the process completion handling in the run flow so
it does not rely solely on the child’s close event, which can wait indefinitely
for descendant-held stdout or stderr pipes. On exit, kill remaining descendants
and schedule pipe destruction followed by resolution after a short grace period;
make completion idempotent so the close event and fallback cannot resolve twice,
and retain the existing cleanup and workspace-check behavior.
Review comments at @packages/opencode/src/altimate/tools/python-sandbox.ts:
- Around line 221-230: Update the macOS Seatbelt profile returned by this
profile-building code to deny signal operations targeting other processes, while
preserving the existing rules and allowing signals to the sandboxed process
itself.
Review comments at @packages/opencode/test/altimate/tools/python-exec.test.ts:
- Around line 46-47: Split the Python-only `e2e` gate from sandbox-dependent
coverage: call `confinementFor(python)` once at module load and add a `confined`
gate that skips when confinement is unavailable. Use `confined` for tests that
require a working sandbox, while keeping refusal-path tests using the mocked
detector or `mechanisms: []` on the Python-only `e2e` gate.
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packages/opencode/src/agent/agent.tspackages/opencode/src/altimate/prompts/analyst.txtpackages/opencode/src/altimate/tools/python-exec.tspackages/opencode/src/altimate/tools/python-sandbox.tspackages/opencode/src/mcp/index.tspackages/opencode/src/tool/registry.tspackages/opencode/test/agent/python-exec.test.tspackages/opencode/test/altimate/tools/python-exec.test.tspackages/opencode/test/altimate/tools/tool-schema-anthropic.test.tspackages/opencode/test/mcp/lifecycle.test.ts
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…s, explain Linux refusals - `run` resolves on process `exit` or timeout, kills the process group plus every recorded descendant (including `start_new_session` ones), then closes the pipes, so a descendant that holds stdout open can no longer hang the call. - macOS profile denies `signal` except to the process itself and its children, so sandboxed code cannot signal the agent or other host processes. - Linux refusal names the missing `bubblewrap` package, or the AppArmor `kernel.apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns=1` restriction and its admin remedies. - Tests that need a working sandbox skip with a reason when none exists; a dedicated test asserts refusal in that case. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Inline comments:
Review comments at @packages/core/src/database/setup-lock.ts:
- Line 25: Update acquireSync so a call for a filename already in active cannot
proceed with a no-op release; reject or otherwise block the call until the
active setup finishes, preserving serialization between legacy schema setup and
core migrations. Use the existing active tracking and acquireSync flow rather
than changing unrelated schema checks.
Review comments at @packages/core/src/database/sqlite.node.ts:
- Around line 195-198: Update openSetupLock to explicitly set the sentinel
connection’s busy timeout with PRAGMA busy_timeout using timeoutMs, rather than
relying only on the DatabaseSync constructor option. Keep the existing exec and
close behavior unchanged.
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packages/core/src/database/database.tspackages/core/src/database/setup-lock.tspackages/core/src/database/sqlite.bun.tspackages/core/src/database/sqlite.node.tspackages/opencode/src/altimate/tools/python-exec.tspackages/opencode/src/altimate/tools/python-sandbox.tspackages/opencode/src/storage/db.tspackages/opencode/test/altimate/tools/python-exec.test.tspackages/opencode/test/storage/concurrent-open.test.tspackages/opencode/test/storage/fixture/open-database.ts
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Wraps the setup-lock import, the reworked `layer` and `layerFromPath` in a single `altimate_change` upstream_fix block so Marker Guard passes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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# Conflicts: # packages/opencode/src/altimate/prompts/analyst.txt # packages/opencode/src/tool/registry.ts
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full receipts (3 sessions)
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…ils closed on host environment exposure - macOS profile: `(deny process-fork)` blocks fork, posix_spawn, `subprocess` and `multiprocessing`, so a double-forked `setsid` grandchild can no longer escape cleanup; `(deny process-info*)` + `(allow process-info* (target self))` blocks proc_info inspection of other processes; signals limited to self. - Seatbelt does not mediate the `KERN_PROCARGS2` sysctl (verified on macOS 26.5: `(deny sysctl*)`, name filters, `process-info*` and deny-default all still return same-user process environments). Blocking `ctypes` is not an option because pandas imports it. The self-test now starts a host canary process with a marker in its environment and refuses any mechanism under which sandboxed Python can read it, so macOS currently refuses `python_exec` with that reason. - Self-test on macOS also requires every child-process attempt to fail; on Linux it keeps the subprocess canary check (bwrap already uses `--unshare-all` and `--die-with-parent`). - Tool description notes that child processes are blocked on macOS. - Tests: profile-level sandbox-exec regressions (fork/spawn denial with no surviving grandchild, pandas/NumPy/DuckDB still work, readable host environment forces refusal), self-test fails closed when fork denial is stripped, tool-level host-environment and double-fork checks; subprocess tests are now bwrap-only. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
… passes - `pythonExecAvailable()` now also requires `confinementFor(python)` to succeed, so hosts whose sandbox self-test refuses (currently macOS, where `KERN_PROCARGS2` exposes host environments) never see the tool. - The verdict, including a refusal, is cached per interpreter and process; the refusal reason is logged once at debug level. `resetConfinement()` clears it. - Registry gate simplified inside its existing `altimate_change` block. - Tests: the analyst catalogue omits `python_exec` when an injected self-test refuses and includes it when it passes, without rerunning the self-test on a second build; discovery test expects availability to follow the self-test. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Issue for this PR
Related to #1537 (no
Closesneeded for afeat:title).Type of change
What does this PR do?
Why. The
analystagent denies bash, so it has no general-purpose compute. Parsing, statistics, row-wise text logic and cross-table work that SQL expresses badly have no path today.What changed. Adds an analyst-only
python_exectool (new module-scope filessrc/altimate/tools/python-exec.tsandsrc/altimate/tools/python-sandbox.ts; no new members in anyexport namespace). Edits in upstream-shared files (agent/agent.ts,tool/registry.ts) are wrapped inaltimate_changemarkers.Security model:
save(df, name)writes DataFrames back to scratch only after a successful call. Python never gets warehouse connections.PATH,HOME,TMPDIR, locale, a few thread limits). No inherited credentials, tokens or connection strings.setrlimit), a clamped wall-clock deadline, process-group kill on timeout/abort. No hang on inherited pipes: the call returns on process exit or at the deadline, kills the process group and every tracked descendant (including ones started withstart_new_session=True), then closes the pipes itself, so a descendant holding stdout open cannot block the result.sys.prefix,sys.base_prefix, exec prefixes, stdlib,site.getsitepackages(),sysconfigpaths, and directories of native libraries it loads) and the minimal system files an interpreter needs. It may write only the session's Python directory. Subprocesses inherit the same confinement. An installation path that would expose/or the home directory is refused.sandbox-execprofile that denies file reads and writes outside the allowlist, all network, Apple Events, and Mach services outside a small allowlist (so LaunchServices cannot start unconfined helpers). Path metadata is allowed only on ancestors of allowlisted paths.bwrapwith--unshare-all(network, PID, IPC, user, UTS and cgroup namespaces),--die-with-parent,--new-session,--cap-drop ALL, a fresh/tmp,/devand/proc, read-only binds of exactly the allowlist (no host-root or home bind), merged-usr symlinks (/bin,/lib64, ...) recreated as symlinks, and a writable bind of the session directory. Ifbwrapis missing or cannot create namespaces, the tool refuses with a clear message. Landlock alone is not used as a fallback: it does not mediateconnect()to pathname Unix sockets (Docker, D-Bus, SSH agent), which can reach host files.(deny signal)with(allow signal (target self) (target children)), so sandboxed code cannot signal the agent (os.kill(os.getppid(), ...)) or any other host process; it can still manage its own children. Verified on macOS with a test. On Linux the PID namespace already provides this.kernel.apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns=1makes unprivilegedbwrapfail (loopback: Failed RTM_NEWADDR), sopython_execrefuses, which is intended. The refusal now names the AppArmor setting and the remedies (an AppArmor profile forbwrap, or the sysctl, as an administrator's choice), or says to installbubblewrapwhen it is missing. System settings are never changed automatically.catsubprocess fail to read a canary file outside the allowlist. A mechanism that fails is never used; if none passes, the tool refuses. Python is never run unconfined.Isolation: filesystem bwrap (...); network isolated.KERN_PROCARGS2sysctl, so sandboxed code can still read the arguments and environment of other processes owned by the same user (checked locally with several profile rules; none blocked it). It cannot read files, use the network or start unconfined helpers. The listing of/itself is readable because the dynamic loader needs it. On Linux the PID namespace hides other processes.analyst, and only when a Python with pandas and duckdb is found. MCP, plugin and file tools cannot claim thepython_execid. Bash remains denied for the analyst.Before: the analyst can only use SQL tools. After: the analyst can materialize data to scratch, run Python over it, and read the saved tables back with SQL.
Flag:
ALTIMATE_PYTHON_EXEC=0disables the tool (it is not registered and calls are refused).ALTIMATE_PYTHONselects the interpreter.How did you verify your code works?
bwrapunusable (symlinks are now recreated), Landlock fallback could reach host services over pathname Unix sockets (removed; Linux refuses withoutbwrap), thecatself-test leg lacked a positive control (added), and refusals were cached until restart (no longer). It also reported that a Seatbeltsysctl-readrule blocksKERN_PROCARGS2. I could not reproduce that here, so it is listed as a residual above. Earlier review (head da0beea) findings on host file reach are addressed by this revision.bun test test/altimate/tools/python-exec.test.ts test/agent/python-exec.test.ts test/altimate/tools/tool-schema-anthropic.test.ts test/mcp/lifecycle.test.ts: 91 pass, 0 fail (macOS).test/agentalone: 163 pass;test/tool/registry.test.ts: 14 pass. New coverage: reads of a temp file in another directory,~/.ssh,/etc/hosts,/etc/hostnameand the home directory are denied;catand/bin/shsubprocesses cannot read outside the allowlist but can read the workspace; pandas/duckdb Parquet round trip inside the sandbox; writes outside the workspace denied; the tool refuses when detection reports no mechanism; Windows/other platforms and Linux without a mechanism are refused; a fakebwrapthat runs Python unconfined fails the self-test; exactbwrapargv (allowlist ro-binds, merged-usr symlinks, writable session bind, no host-root bind); macOS profile rules; allowlist rejection of/and home roots; MCP tools cannot claimpython_exec.database is locked). Starting 3run --agent analystprocesses at once against a fresh data directory failed one or two of them withdatabase is locked(reproduced withALTIMATE_PYTHON_EXEC=0too, so it was a latent race that this tool's slower startup exposed, not apython_execlock). Cause: the core SQLite opener ranPRAGMA journal_mode = WALbefore any busy handler existed, and the legacy and core database layers both ran migrations whose deferred read-to-write upgrade fails at once withSQLITE_BUSY. Fix (head 01379b7): busy handler installed before the WAL switch, and first-run setup serialized across processes by an exclusive transaction on a sentinel database (packages/core/src/database/setup-lock.ts). Python discovery and the self-test never run inside any database transaction. Newtest/storage/concurrent-open.test.tsopens both layers from 4 simultaneous processes, 3 rounds; it fails on the previous head (database is locked) and passes now. Reproduction before/after: 3 concurrent CLI runs, 5 of 6 rounds failed at least one process before, 0 of 8 after.test/session1302 pass; coredatabase-migration21 pass; typecheck clean.bwrappath is covered by argv unit tests and by the fail-closed self-test that runs before first use on a real host; it has not run on a Linux machine yet.bun run typecheck: clean.bun run script/upstream/analyze.ts --markers --base origin/main --strict: reports no upstream-shared files for the main baseline (known v2 baseline limitation); markers were checked by hand.analystagent,google-vertex/gemini-3.8-flash, temp project with a 3-row DuckDB table. The Gemini enum-schema fix from fix: drop empty-string enum values from Gemini tool schemas #1532 is not on main, so I ran against a throwaway local branch with only that fix applied (not in this PR). The agent calledsql_materialize(3 rows to scratch), onepython_exec(savedwc),sql_executeonwc, then answered: total word count 9, correlation 0.99919, matching a hand calculation. The run reported network isolated and the RSS-watchdog memory fallback on macOS.python_execto read host files and rungit. That is the gap this revision closes: host reads are now denied by the OS sandbox and the tool refuses where no sandbox can be enforced.Screenshots / recordings
N/A (no UI change).
Checklist
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Summary by CodeRabbit
python_execare excluded from tool discovery.Note
High Risk
Introduces sandboxed arbitrary Python execution with complex OS confinement and process cleanup; misconfiguration or sandbox bypass would be security-critical, though the design is fail-closed and analyst-scoped.
Overview
Adds an analyst-only
python_exectool so read-only analysis can run Python (parsing, stats, row logic) after data is in session scratch tables—without bash or warehouse credentials.Execution exports declared scratch inputs to Parquet, runs user code with
altimate_io.load/save, and imports successfulsaveoutputs back to scratch. A session-private, size-capped workspace persists across calls; timeouts, memory limits, and process-group cleanup apply on abort or overrun.OS confinement is mandatory: macOS
sandbox-execor Linuxbwrap, with self-test before use; the tool refuses if no mechanism works (e.g. missingbwrap, AppArmor blocking user namespaces). The child gets a minimal env (no inherited secrets), no network, and restricted filesystem access.Wiring: analyst permission and prompt mention
python_exec; the tool registers only when pandas/duckdb Python is found (ALTIMATE_PYTHON_EXEC=0disables).python_execis reserved in the tool registry and MCP catalog likeanswer_commit. Tests cover sandbox behavior, registration scope, and MCP collision avoidance.Reviewed by Cursor Bugbot for commit 35ef388. Bugbot is set up for automated code reviews on this repo. Configure here.