Add Compromised flag restricting a seed to multisig co-signing only - #14
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New optional boolean 'Compromised' in the per-fingerprint MF_* config (backward compatible: absent field deserializes to false). When set, the function refuses to sign any input that is not a true multisig requiring at least 2 signatures, so the seed's signature alone can never move funds. The check runs against the input's signable coin (NBitcoin only resolves it when the witness/redeem script is consistent with the UTXO's scriptPubKey) and extracts the multisig threshold from the script code. Intended for retired seeds after an internal wallet rotation: it contains Lambda-mediated misuse (compromised caller draining legacy single-sig wallets); it is not protection against a party holding the seed plaintext. Also extracts GetConfig() so env-var config parsing is shared between the signing loop and DecryptSeed, and documents the flag + the jq flip procedure in the README and seed-ceremony manifest checks.
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New optional boolean 'Compromised' in the per-fingerprint MF_* config
(backward compatible: absent field deserializes to false). When set, the
function refuses to sign any input that is not a true multisig requiring
at least 2 signatures, so the seed's signature alone can never move funds.
The check runs against the input's signable coin (NBitcoin only resolves
it when the witness/redeem script is consistent with the UTXO's
scriptPubKey) and extracts the multisig threshold from the script code.
Intended for retired seeds after an internal wallet rotation: it contains
Lambda-mediated misuse (compromised caller draining legacy single-sig
wallets); it is not protection against a party holding the seed plaintext.
Also extracts GetConfig() so env-var config parsing is shared between the
signing loop and DecryptSeed, and documents the flag + the jq flip
procedure in the README and seed-ceremony manifest checks.
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