Add ci-workflow-review and iac-review skills#52
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ci-workflow-review (0.1.0) reviews CI/CD pipeline changes, classified against the OWASP Top 10 CI/CD Security Risks (CICD-SEC-1..10) with concrete patterns from GitHub's "security hardening for GitHub Actions" guide: untrusted github.event interpolation into run: steps, pull_request_target/workflow_run + PR-head checkout, token permissions and credential hygiene, mutable-tag third-party actions, artifact and cache poisoning, self-hosted runner exposure. Severity keys off who can trigger the workflow and what the job can reach. iac-review (0.1.0) reviews Terraform/CloudFormation/Kubernetes/Docker changes against CIS benchmark baselines, the Kubernetes Pod Security Standards (baseline/restricted), and the OWASP Docker Security Cheat Sheet: world-open ingress and public storage, wildcard IAM/RBAC, secrets in code/state/ENV, missing encryption and backups, privileged containers and host namespaces, and stateful-resource replacement hidden in a diff. Defers to project IaC scanners rather than re-flagging their rules. Both follow the standard skill template (enforced by the structural lint) and land with golden-diff eval fixtures: a fork-triggerable title injection in a pull_request_target workflow, and a security group opened to 0.0.0.0/0 on port 22. Plugin tree regenerated. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Adds the two skills discussed, grounded in reputable sources fetched before writing:
ci-workflow-review— classified against the OWASP Top 10 CI/CD Security Risks (CICD-SEC-1–10, the deck's ASVS-equivalent for pipelines), with concrete patterns from GitHub's Actions hardening guide: script injection fromgithub.eventfields,pull_request_target+ head checkout,GITHUB_TOKENscope, SHA-pinning, secrets hygiene, artifact/cache poisoning, self-hosted runner exposure. Severity keys off who can trigger the job and what it can reach — the same interpolation is critical in a fork-triggerable workflow and low in a maintainer-dispatched one.iac-review— anchored to CIS Benchmarks, the Kubernetes Pod Security Standards (baseline/restricted control lists), and the OWASP Docker Security Cheat Sheet: network exposure, wildcard IAM/RBAC, secrets in code/state, encryption/backup regressions, container/pod hardening, stateful-resource change safety. Explicitly defers to project scanners (Checkov/tfsec/kube-score) per the deck's respect-existing-tooling convention.Both follow the standard template (structural lint passes), support all five agents, and land with golden-diff eval fixtures per the new house rule: a fork-triggerable PR-title injection, and an SSH ingress opened to
0.0.0.0/0. Plugin tree regenerated (freshness guard green). 123 tests pass.🤖 Generated with Claude Code