Skip to content

Security: LimeChain/omarchy-web3

Security

docs/SECURITY.md

Security policy and operating boundary

Supported use

This project supports compilation, unit tests, fuzzing, static analysis, local account-free EVM RPC execution, offline local Solana RPC execution, guarded keypair-free Anchor compilation, credential-free local forks, and read-only EVM, Solana, and Hedera inspection.

It does not support keys, seed phrases, signing, transaction submission, wallets, exchanges, or mainnet deployment. Do not report the absence of those features as a vulnerability; report any path that unexpectedly performs one of those actions.

Reporting

Report vulnerabilities privately through the security-advisory feature of the GitHub repository. Do not include real credentials, wallet files, seed phrases, or private keys in a report or test fixture.

Controls

  • Artifact URLs, versions, exact byte sizes, redirect/final-origin allowlists, and SHA-256 digests are locked. Downloads are streamed with byte and free-disk limits into exclusive non-symlink temporary files.
  • Archive preflight rejects absolute/traversal paths, duplicates, symlinks, hardlinks, devices, FIFOs, encrypted ZIP entries, unexpected top-level entries, excessive file counts, oversized files, and excessive uncompressed totals before writing a member. Extraction is manual and uses exclusive O_NOFOLLOW outputs.
  • The two upstream archives that contain links (Node and SBF platform-tools) are transformed reproducibly into link-free derived archives. Any required internal platform-tool links are declared in the lock and materialized only after regular-file extraction; extracted links are never followed for chmod or binary installation.
  • Python dependencies are fully resolved with hashes.
  • The tool wrapper rejects known signing, broadcast, wallet, and credential arguments.
  • RPC configuration rejects URL user information, query strings, and fragments.
  • The managed Anvil service binds to loopback, runs silently, and creates zero accounts.
  • The managed Surfpool service is fixed to offline mode, loopback, in-memory state, no deployment, no startup airdrop, and no home-directory access.
  • Solana CLI runs with an isolated empty home and only fixed read-only commands against the configured loopback RPC.
  • Anchor builds require Localnet, /dev/null as the wallet path, a committed Cargo.lock, no build hooks, no automatic client generation, and no program-keypair files.
  • The guarded Anchor command injects --ignore-keys, --no-idl, and --skip-tools-install, requires Anchor's pinned compatible SBF platform-tools tree, and reserves every expected *-keypair.json output as a temporary /dev/null symlink so cargo-build-sbf cannot generate a program keypair. The sentinels are removed after every build outcome.
  • The Quickshell plugin invokes only the status command, fixed Anvil/Surfpool controls, and validated explorer opening.
  • The Hedera profile uses only fixed official Mirror Node and HashScan bases, GET requests, bounded responses, curated output fields, and validated identifiers; it installs no runtime and never invokes Solo.
  • Configuration is stored with mode 0600 and rejected if it contains sensitive-looking fields.
  • Application, configuration, state, cache, copied-plugin, service, and optional-skill ownership are explicit. Existing unmarked paths, foreign owners, symlink components, and unmanaged service files are refused.
  • Installation builds the complete replacement under a private staging directory. The active app, state, services, CLI link, and menu are committed together and restored from local backups on failure.
  • Coding-agent behavioral instructions are never installed by the marketplace or profile installer. Their fixed-path installer and uninstaller require a separate explicit command and an exact managed-tree manifest.

These are defense-in-depth controls, not a sandbox. The underlying tools are powerful developer software, and Quickshell plugins run with the user's access.

Cargo dependencies and project build scripts are executable code. Anchor compilation therefore runs with a stripped environment and isolated home, but users must still review project dependencies before building them. See SOLANA_SECURITY_REVIEW.md and HEDERA_SECURITY_REVIEW.md.

There aren't any published security advisories