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Add structural validation for CrossChainMessage so a malformed message is rejected before it reaches the duplicate detector or a chain executor. - New message-validator module: validateCrossChainMessage, an accumulating validator covering normal, boundary and failure cases for every envelope field, plus per-chain address-format checks (EVM, Stellar/Soroban, Solana) that can be enabled per deployment. - MessageQueue.enqueue now validates before dedupe: a malformed message cannot consume a detector window slot, cannot be retried, and never emits a transaction. Rejections surface as a message-rejected event the way duplicates surface today, with getValidationStats() as the intake metric. - Backward compatible: existing callers using placeholder addresses are unaffected; validation can be disabled with validation: false and address format checks are opt-in. - 174 new tests (253 total in the package): validator unit coverage at 100% statements/branches/functions, queue intake rejection, detector isolation and an end-to-end pipeline proving malformed messages never reach the EVM executor. - Docs: new CROSS_CHAIN_MESSAGE_VALIDATION.md, cross-links from the duplicate-detection doc, and a CI step to run relayer-service tests. Closes MDTechLabs#1165
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…ion merge Merging upstream main brought in malformed-message validation (PR MDTechLabs#1241), which rejects messages whose sourceChainId equals destinationChainId. Our reconciler and pipeline fixtures used 'ethereum' for both. Point the fixtures at an 'arbitrum' source so they stay valid under the new intake validation while still exercising the EVM destination path. Full suite: 295 tests passing (11 suites).
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Reject structurally malformed cross-chain messages at intake so a bad message can never occupy a duplicate-detector window slot, be retried, or emit a transaction.
Closes #1165
What changed
message-validatormodule inapps/relayer-service(validateCrossChainMessage,isValidCrossChainMessage,assertValidCrossChainMessage) covering normal, boundary and failure scenarios for every envelope field, plus per-chain address-format checks (EVM, Stellar/Soroban, Solana) that deployers can enable.MessageQueue.enqueue()now validates before dedupe. Rejections emit amessage-rejectedevent ({ messageId?, reason: 'malformed', errors: [{ field, code, message }] }) and are tracked viagetValidationStats(), mirroring how duplicates are handled today.validation: falserestores previous behavior and address-format checks are opt-in.docs/CROSS_CHAIN_MESSAGE_VALIDATION.md(rules, events, ordering, config, troubleshooting); cross-linked fromdocs/CROSS_CHAIN_DUPLICATE_MESSAGE_DETECTION.md.Verification evidence
message-validator.spec.ts— validator unit tests, 100% statement/branch/function/line coverage.malformed-message-rejection.spec.ts— queue intake rejection, duplicate-detector isolation, observability/stats, config opt-out.message-delivery-pipeline.spec.ts— end-to-end: mixed indexer batch → queue → mockedEvmExecutor; malformed messages never reach the RPC (only 3eth_sendTransactioncalls, one per valid message).tsc --noEmitclean;npm run buildsucceeds inapps/relayer-service.retryFailedpaths.