Please do not open a public issue for a security or privacy problem.

Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting on this repository (Security → Report a vulnerability), which reaches the maintainer without disclosing the report.

Expect an acknowledgement within seven days. This is maintained by one person, not a product with an on-call rotation — please size your expectations accordingly, and say in the report if you intend to disclose publicly on a deadline.

This software processes video of identifiable people at work. The privacy boundary matters more here than any conventional vulnerability class, because a leak is not a database of hashes — it is footage of named employees.

The design intent is that footage and analysis outputs never leave the machine that processes them:

• input/ and runs/ are gitignored, and .gitignore has excluded them since the first commit;
• nothing is uploaded, and no network call is made during analysis;
• model weights are downloaded once from the rtmlib project and cached locally;
• report.html is self-contained and opens offline.

Anything that breaks one of those is a genuine finding, and the most valuable report you can make. Concretely: a path by which a frame, a track, a worker name, or a report reaches the network; a way a generated report embeds a source frame you would not expect; a default that writes footage somewhere outside input/ or runs/.

• A credential, key, or token committed anywhere in the git history.
• A crafted video or config file that leads to code execution rather than a clean error.
• Path traversal via a config value — station names and paths from configs/*.yaml reach the filesystem and the generated HTML.
• HTML or script injection into report.html through a config value, worker name, or station label, since the report is rendered from a Jinja template and opened in a browser.

• Detection or tracking inaccuracy. Real-footage detection accuracy is explicitly not validated — the README says so. A missed worker is a known limitation, not a vulnerability.
• Dependency advisories with no exploit path in this usage.
• The absence of authentication. There is no server; this is a local command-line tool.

Filming people at work is regulated differently in different places, and consent, notice and works-council obligations are not optional. docs/RUNBOOK.md covers the practical side. If you find that this tool makes it easier to do something unlawful or covert — for example a default that hides the fact that recording is happening — please report that too. It is a design defect.