security(backend): make audit records tamper-evident and queryable

[arisu6804]

Problem

Sensitive transfer investigations are unreliable if audit records can be changed silently or cannot be correlated to a request.

Objective

Deliver a production-quality improvement to transfer and administrative audit storage that creates measurable value for correctness, security, reliability, performance, or maintainability.

Implementation scope

• Add append-only or hash-chained integrity metadata; include actor, scope, target, correlation ID, outcome, and redacted changes; restrict queries.

Acceptance criteria

• Tampering is detectable; every privileged mutation has one outcome event; authorized operators can filter without exposing secrets.

Required validation

• Integrity-chain, redaction, duplicate-event, query authorization, and correlation tests.
• Existing tests and CI remain passing.
• Add regression coverage for the original failure mode.
• Do not weaken, delete, or skip unrelated tests to obtain a green build.

PR quality bar

• Keep the PR focused and explain design tradeoffs, compatibility impact, and test evidence.
• Avoid typo-only, documentation-only, cosmetic-only, or unrelated refactor submissions.

Out of scope

• Broad rewrites not required by the acceptance criteria.
• Changes to unrelated services, contracts, or user flows.

[rupesh-kumar-sah]

Hello @maintainers,

I would love to take this on. My planned approach:

• Structure backend handlers for security(backend): make audit records tamper-evident and queryable with strict input validation, proper HTTP error codes, and idempotent execution.
• Cover implementation with end-to-end integration tests for standard and edge-case inputs.

Looking forward to contributing—please feel free to assign!