Refactor multiagent authority and coding-agent runtime into Rust - #9
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areshand wants to merge 9 commits into
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Refactor multiagent authority and coding-agent runtime into Rust#9areshand wants to merge 9 commits into
areshand wants to merge 9 commits into
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Summary
completemust-notruleslaunch.shonly as the source-checkout compatibility entrypoint and remove obsolete shell/Python workflow implementationsSecurity and authority boundary
The orchestrator can read the repository and all worker/reviewer state, but cannot write the target repository or launch an unrestricted coding-agent process. Writers receive only supervisor-authorized owned paths. Reviewers are read-only and their finalized evidence is sealed to the current canonical diff.
The Linux malicious-orchestrator suite verifies that direct repository writes, direct completion transitions, unsafe state mutation, forged reviewer evidence, launch-authorization replay, owned-path breakout, and stale snapshot reuse are denied while valid scoped worker writes and supervisor-gated completion succeed.
Validation
cargo test— 31 passedcargo test --locked— 32 passed, including the broken-pipe supervisor regressionbash tests/run.sh— passedcargo fmt --check— passedtests/malicious-orchestrator.sh— passedgit diff --check— passedSWE-bench Pro first 10 rows
The earlier official-verifier run remained 7/10: rows 0–6 passed and rows 7–9 did not. There was no regression among the rows that were already solved before the Rust migration.
Row 8 was rerun after the contract and supervisor fixes. The clean one-shot run exercised the complete workflow correctly but scored 0 because the generated patch named a private credential cache
credentialCache; the official test patch requiredForwarder.clientCredentials, a private identifier not specified by the public task. This is retained as an honest one-shot failure rather than feeding hidden-test data into the generic solver prompt.An explicitly labeled iterative regression check then applied only that verifier-reported rename and reran the same official
run_script.shand parser. All 48 selected row-8 tests passed. This proves the task behavior and architecture patch are compatible with the official verifier after the one-field correction, but it is not represented as a clean benchmark score.The row-8 lifecycle reached
completeonly after the supervisor atomically validated the registered contract, exact diff hash, all review records, and closed todos. The persisted trace archive is available outside the task container.This is local official-verifier evidence, not an official leaderboard submission.