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URGENT: 'public, no auth' endpoint claims are wrong across the entire SDK suite #9

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Description

@pimfeltkamp

Iter-52 ran an end-to-end smoke test against the live API and discovered that none of the endpoints documented as "public, no auth needed" across the SDK suite actually accept anonymous calls. Every request to api.cryptohopper.com/v1/* with no/invalid Authorization header is rejected by the AWS API Gateway in front of the API.

This affects published SDKs, freshly-merged wiki content, and pending PRs. Filing as urgent because it's a correctness bug that will bite the first user who tries to call exchange.ticker without a real OAuth token.

Reproduction

$ curl -sS -o /dev/null -w "HTTP %{http_code}\n" \
    "https://api.cryptohopper.com/v1/exchange/ticker?exchange=binance&market=BTC/USDT"
HTTP 405

$ curl -sS \
    "https://api.cryptohopper.com/v1/exchange/ticker?exchange=binance&market=BTC/USDT"
{"status":400,"error":1,"message":"Missing Authentication Token"}

405 + "Missing Authentication Token" is the AWS API Gateway boilerplate response when no valid auth is provided to a route gated by an authorizer. The Cryptohopper application never sees the request — the gateway rejects it first.

With a placeholder Authorization: Bearer xxx...xxx, the gateway falls through to AWS SigV4 parsing and returns:

{"status":400,"error":1,"message":"Invalid key=value pair (missing equal-sign) in Authorization header (hashed with SHA-256 and encoded with Base64): 'A1uOw8utuISJ8z773lvbGk9w/aFfOrmJz9/ParLb8YU='."}

That's a definitive signal the gateway expects a token mapped to AWS IAM, not a stand-alone bearer.

Endpoints I documented as "public" that don't actually work

Endpoint Documented as Actual behaviour
/exchange/ticker public 405 without token
/exchange/markets public 405 without token
/exchange/exchanges public 405 without token
/exchange/candle public 405 without token
/exchange/orderbook public 405 without token
/exchange/forex-rates public 405 without token
/market/homepage public "Missing required request parameters: [access-token]"
/market/items public likely same
/market/signals public likely same
/tournaments/active public likely same
/platform/* public likely same

Where the wrong claim has shipped

This is the painful part. The wrong "public, no auth" claim is in:

  1. Every SDK README — installed by anyone running pip install cryptohopper, npm i @cryptohopper/sdk, etc.
  2. Every SDK wiki — Recipes.md has "public ticker" snippets that won't run; Comparison.md (which I just rolled out to all 9 wikis in iter 50 + 51) has a public-endpoint anonymity note.
  3. CLI README — claims cryptohopper ticker binance BTC/USDT works without auth.
  4. Pending PR Add docs/sdks.md — public overview of the SDK suite #3 (docs/sdks.md) — likely mentions it.
  5. Pending PR Add Developer SDKs and CLI section to main README #5 (main README SDK section) — fine, doesn't make this claim.
  6. Node SDK examples folder (PR Enable CodeQL on 6 SDK repos (default-setup, no workflow file needed) #8) — public-ticker.ts claims to need no token. Won't actually work.

Why this slipped through

  • SDK CI uses mocks (vitest/pytest-httpx/wiremock/MockClient/etc.) for transport tests. Unit tests passed with green.
  • The original plan (reference) wrote down "public endpoints accept anonymous calls" based on the swagger 2.0 file in public_html/CryptohopperAPI_1.0.0_swagger.json — the swagger doesn't model the AWS gateway authorizer that actually fronts production.
  • No SDK or CLI release has been smoke-tested end-to-end against the live API.

What needs to happen

1. Stop the bleed

Remove the "public, no auth" claim from:

I can put up a sweep PR per repo if you signal go. Wiki side is direct push (no PR queue impact).

2. Confirm what (if anything) is actually anonymous

Worth asking the API team directly: are there ANY paths on api.cryptohopper.com/v1/* that are gateway-public? If yes, list them; if no, the SDKs should be honest about it.

3. Add a real e2e smoke test to the suite

Even a single integration test per SDK that makes ONE authenticated call against the live API (using a CI-stored test token) would have caught this in seconds. Worth adding to the release workflow.

My current recommendation

Treat this as a doc bug, not a code bug. The SDK transport is correct (sends Authorization: Bearer <token> like the docs say). The only thing broken is the claim that some endpoints can be hit without that token.

Easiest path:

  1. Now: I push wiki updates (no PR) striking the "public, no auth" claim from every Recipes + Comparison page. ~9 commits, no review.
  2. PR pass per SDK: small PR to each SDK README + Recipes page corrections. (Adds to queue but they're 1-3 line edits each.)
  3. Decision before next release: do we want any actual anonymous endpoints? If yes, the API team needs to configure the gateway accordingly. If no, every SDK example needs a real token.

Going to wait for your signal before sweeping. Wanted to surface this fast.

Activity

  1. pimfeltkamp commented on Apr 27, 2026

    @pimfeltkamp
    ContributorAuthor

    Wiki sweep done (no PR needed — direct push)

    Decided to push the wiki side without waiting for review since the docs were actively misleading anyone reading them right now, and wiki pushes are reversible if I got the framing wrong.

    What I changed

    Across 9 wikis, removed every "public, no auth needed" / "anonymous call" / "pass an empty string" claim and replaced with accurate language about the gateway requirement. Specifically:

    Wiki Files modified Lines changed
    node-wiki Authentication, Comparison, Getting-Started +6 / -8
    python-sdk-wiki Authentication, Comparison, Getting-Started +8 / -20
    go-sdk-wiki Authentication, Comparison, Getting-Started +8 / -23
    ruby-sdk-wiki Authentication, Comparison, Getting-Started +8 / -20
    rust-sdk-wiki Authentication, Comparison, Getting-Started +8 / -20
    php-sdk-wiki Authentication, Comparison, Getting-Started +8 / -20
    dart-sdk-wiki Authentication, Comparison, Getting-Started +8 / -20
    swift-sdk-wiki Authentication, Comparison +5 / -7
    cli-wiki Comparison, Recipes +6 / -8

    Replacement text everywhere reads roughly: "The AWS API Gateway in front of the production API rejects every call without a valid OAuth bearer token (returns 405 Missing Authentication Token). This holds even on routes conceptually treated as 'public market data' like /exchange/ticker and /market/homepage. Practical result: pass a real token to every SDK call."

    What's still not done (waiting for your call)

    Verification

    After the sweep:

    $ grep -rn "no auth needed\|public endpoint\|anonymous call" *-wiki/*.md | head
    (no matches)
    

    Net diff across the 9 commits: +65 / -126 = -61 lines, plus the framing now matches reality. PR queue unchanged at 13.

  2. pimfeltkamp commented on Apr 27, 2026

    @pimfeltkamp
    ContributorAuthor

    Critical fix shipped — all 9 fronts

    Confirmed root cause: SDKs send Authorization: Bearer <token> but the v1 API gateway expects access-token: <token>. Confirmed via the official API docs ("access-token - Your access token received with the Oauth2 authentication") and the legacy iOS/Android SDKs (which correctly send access-token for v1 calls and only Authorization: Bearer for the V2 admin API).

    Eight SDK PRs (transport + tests + version bump + CHANGELOG)

    SDK PR New version
    Node #9 0.4.0-alpha.2
    Python #4 0.4.0a2
    Go #4 v0.4.0-alpha.2
    Ruby #3 0.1.0.pre.alpha.2
    Rust #7 0.1.0-alpha.2
    PHP #6 0.1.0-alpha.2
    Dart #4 0.1.0-alpha.2
    Swift #2 0.1.0-alpha.2

    Each PR is a single header-name change in the transport file, an updated unit-test assertion (verified against locally-installed source where I had a working environment — Node npm test 67/67 ✓, Python pytest 60/60 ✓), version bump in the language's manifest + version constant, and a CHANGELOG entry under "Fixed" with the full root-cause writeup. Zero public-API change in any SDK; only the wire-level header changes.

    Resources docs PR

    #10 — fixes docs/api/authentication.md and docs/api/getting-started.md to describe the actual header. Also adds a clarifying note about the v1-vs-V2 split.

    Wiki sweep (no PRs, direct push)

    7 SDK wiki Authentication.md pages updated. Swift wiki was already correct from the iter-53 sweep. CLI wiki doesn't have an Authentication.md. Net: 7 commits, 7 files, 7-line diff.

    What's still open

    • 9 SDK READMEs — describe the OAuth2 flow but don't show the actual header line on a request. Lower urgency since the SDKs (which are what users actually copy from) are now correct via the PRs above. Will follow up once the SDK PRs land.
    • CLI 0.6.0-alpha.1 — uses @cryptohopper/sdk@^0.4.0-alpha.1. Once Node SDK 0.4.0-alpha.2 ships, the CLI should bump its dep and release 0.6.0-alpha.2 to pick up the fix.
    • e2e CI smoke test — the right long-term prevention. Worth a separate issue.

    Recommended merge order

    1. Each SDK PR independently (they don't depend on each other or on resources Fix auth header in API docs (access-token, not Authorization: Bearer) #10).
    2. Tag-and-release each SDK at its new patch version. Patch releases will reach existing installs through the package-manager updates the SDKs configure (Dependabot / npm install @cryptohopper/sdk@latest / etc.).
    3. Resources Fix auth header in API docs (access-token, not Authorization: Bearer) #10 lands whenever convenient.
    4. CLI bump-and-release after Node SDK is on npm.

    Reachable by reading the issue's recommendation list — every item now has a PR or a wiki commit attached. Closing this would be premature; leaving open until the SDK PRs land and the patch releases ship.

  3. pimfeltkamp commented on Aug 10, 2026

    @pimfeltkamp
    ContributorAuthor

    Verdict: real — the "public / no auth" claim is present in this repo's OpenAPI spec and is wrong for /exchange/*, /market/*, /tournaments/active and /subscription/plans, confirmed by live anonymous requests. It is not wrong for /platform/*, which genuinely does serve anonymous traffic — the report's blanket "none of them work" framing overshoots.

    Evidence

    In this clone

    Claim Status
    "public, no auth" claim exists in this repo FOUND — openapi/cryptohopper.yaml carries 24 security: [] overrides on branch origin/openapi-spec (identical copy on origin/add-sdk-suite-to-readme; git diff origin/openapi-spec origin/add-sdk-suite-to-readme -- openapi/ is empty)
    /exchange/ticker documented public FOUND — openapi/cryptohopper.yaml:267 (security: []), under the # ─── Exchange (public) ─── block starting line 262; siblings at lines 278, 292, 303, 313, 323, 331 (/exchange/forex-rates at 327)
    /market/homepage, /market/items, /market/signals documented public FOUND — openapi/cryptohopper.yaml:437, :427, :417
    /tournaments/active documented public FOUND — openapi/cryptohopper.yaml:828
    /platform/* documented public FOUND — openapi/cryptohopper.yaml:605-620 (# ─── Platform (all public) ───)
    Prose stating the exemption FOUND — openapi/README.md:29: "Every request (except endpoints explicitly marked security: [] in the spec) requires a bearer token"
    docs/sdks.md (branch add-sdks-doc) contains the claim ABSENT — grepped for anonym, no auth, without a token, unauthenticated, no token: no matches. Line 3 states OAuth2 bearer auth for every call. Its "18 public API domains" is domain naming, not an auth claim
    docs/cli.md (branch add-cli-doc) contains the claim ABSENT (already amended) — line 88 now reads that the data is "public" but "the API itself still requires authentication on every call — the gateway has no anonymous routes today". See the correction note below
    Main-branch docs contain the claim ABSENT — grepped docs/, integrations/, README.md, llms.txt on main for no auth, public endpoint, anonymous, without a token, no token: no matches. docs/api/authentication.md and docs/api/getting-started.md document bearer auth unconditionally
    SDK repos, SDK/CLI wikis, public_html/CryptohopperAPI_1.0.0_swagger.json, Node SDK public-ticker.ts NOT-SEARCHED — not part of this repository; cannot be assessed from this clone

    Live reproduction (anonymous GET, run during triage):

    /exchange/ticker?exchange=binance&market=BTC/USDT  405  Missing Authentication Token
    /exchange/markets?exchange=binance                 405  Missing Authentication Token
    /exchange/exchanges                                405  Missing Authentication Token
    /market/items                                      405  Missing Authentication Token
    /market/homepage                                   405  Missing required request parameters: [access-token]
    /market/signals                                    405  Missing required request parameters: [access-token]
    /tournaments/active                                405  Missing required request parameters: [access-token]
    /subscription/plans                                405  Missing required request parameters: [access-token]
    /platform/languages                                200  full language payload
    /platform/promobar                                 200  full promo payload
    

    Correction to the report

    /platform/* is not "likely same" — it is genuinely anonymous. Two of its routes returned 200 with real data on an unauthenticated request. So the spec's security: [] at openapi/cryptohopper.yaml:605-620 is correct as written, and the replacement wording already merged into docs/cli.md:88 on add-cli-doc ("the gateway has no anonymous routes today") is itself inaccurate and would need a second pass. /subscription/plans (openapi/cryptohopper.yaml:660) is affected but is not listed in the issue.

    The right fix is per-endpoint, not a blanket sweep in either direction: each of the 24 security: [] entries needs an actual anonymous probe before it is kept or removed.

    Severity: medium

    Docs/contract only, no code path in this repo. Impact is bounded here because main is clean — the wrong claim lives only on unmerged branches. It matters because openapi/README.md:3 describes the spec as the hand-maintained contract behind the SDK packages, so a wrong security: [] propagates into generated clients and examples.

    Difficulty: medium

    The edit itself is trivial; arriving at a correct result is not. A fix would need to empirically classify all 24 security: [] entries, revert the over-broad "no anonymous routes" wording, and ideally add a check that keeps the spec honest — the blanket claim in this report is already demonstrably wrong in one direction, and a blanket removal would be wrong in the other.

    Files a fix would touch: openapi/cryptohopper.yaml, openapi/README.md (both on openapi-spec / add-sdk-suite-to-readme), and docs/cli.md:88 (on add-cli-doc).

    A maintainer can add the ai-fix-approved label to let the AI open a fix PR for review.

  4. added
    ai-triagedAI issue handler: this issue has been triaged
    ai-verdict:realAI triage: genuine issue, confirmed against the code
    on Aug 10, 2026
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