aimask custodies a user's OpenRouter credential and meters their spend, so security reports are treated as high priority.

Please do not open a public issue for a security problem. Instead, report it privately:

• Preferred: open a draft advisory at https://github.com/gantrydev/aimask/security/advisories/new
• Alternative: reach the maintainers via https://gantryops.dev

Include the affected component (extension background worker, the page ↔ background bridge, the @aimask/sdk package, or the site), a description, reproduction steps, and the impact. Expect an acknowledgement within 3 business days, and a fix or mitigation plan within 14 days for confirmed issues.

In scope:

• The extension: credential storage, the inpage ↔ content ↔ background bridge, and consent / budget enforcement.
• The @aimask/sdk package.
• The wire protocol and its trust boundaries: see SPEC.md §2 (design principles, especially key custody and untrusted outputs) and §10 (iframe / origin rules).

Out of scope: vulnerabilities in OpenRouter, in the browser itself, or in a website that consumes window.aimask. Per SPEC.md §2, model outputs are untrusted; a site that mishandles a completion is the site's bug, not aimask's.

The credential never leaves the background worker and is stored encrypted (AES-GCM-256). Any path by which a page, content script, or the SDK can read the credential, spend without a matching grant, or exceed a granted per-origin budget is the highest severity.