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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
{
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"id": "GHSA-4vv7-jj25-4gh6",
"modified": "2026-08-17T14:55:49Z",
"modified": "2026-08-17T14:55:50Z",
"published": "2026-07-24T16:12:14Z",
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-59866"
],
"summary": "Microsoft Kiota: Arbitrary file write + code-injection via x-ms-kiota-info clientClassName and clientNamespaceName",
"details": "### Summary\n\nMicrosoft Kiota emitted the `x-ms-kiota-info` extension's `clientClassName` or `clientNamespaceName` value\n**raw**, with no identifier or path sanitization, as **both** the generated client's class/namespace name\n**and** part of the generated output path. When `kiota generate` is run **without `-c/--class-name`** — the\nzero-config workflow that `x-ms-kiota-info` is explicitly designed for (the API provider supplies the names in\nthe description so consumers don't have to) — an attacker who controls or tampers with the OpenAPI description\ncould therefore:\n\n- **(CWE-22) write the generated source file to a path outside the `-o` output directory** — e.g.\n `clientClassName: \"/var/www/html/shell\"`; and\n- **(CWE-94) inject arbitrary text into the generated class/namespace declaration**, corrupting the generated\n client.\n\nConfirmed on Kiota **1.32.4** (the self-contained `linux-x64` release binary), i.e. **after** the earlier\nwriter-sink hardening — that fix escaped property/enum/default/serialization sinks but never sanitized the\nprovider-supplied `clientClassName` / `clientNamespaceName`.\n\n### Details\n\n`clientClassName` reached two unsanitized sinks (observed in the generated C#; the same raw emission occurred\nfor Java, Go, TypeScript, Python, and PHP):\n\n```\n# output FILENAME (CWE-22): clientClassName flows into the file path\nclientClassName: \"/abs/path/PWNED\" -> /abs/path/PWNED.cs (written outside -o)\n\n# class declaration (CWE-94): clientClassName flows verbatim into the type declaration\nclientClassName: 'Pwn { } public class INJECTED { } public partial class RealClient'\n -> public partial class Pwn { } public class INJECTED { } public partial class RealClient : ... { }\n```\n\n`clientNamespaceName` reached the analogous namespace/path sinks.\n\n### Impact\n\nA developer or CI host generating a client from an attacker-controlled or compromised OpenAPI description\n(without `-c`) could create/overwrite a generated source file at an attacker-influenced path and emit\nattacker-controlled text into the generated client.\n\nThis does **not** reach clean remote code execution: because `clientClassName` is reused verbatim at multiple\nsites (the class name **and** the constructor name), injected code cannot be made to compile — it breaks the\nbuild. So the code-injection vector is a generation/build-corruption (integrity/DoS), and the high-severity\nprimitive is the file write. CWE-22 / CWE-94.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in **1.29.1 and 1.32.5** (https://github.com/microsoft/kiota/pull/7884). `clientClassName` and\n`clientNamespaceName` sourced from `x-ms-kiota-info` are now sanitized before use:\n`GenerationConfiguration.SanitizeClientClassName` strips any character outside `[A-Za-z0-9_]` and any invalid\nleading character (falling back to `ApiClient`), and `SanitizeClientNamespaceName` restricts to\n`[A-Za-z0-9._-]`, collapses consecutive dots, strips invalid leading characters (falling back to `ApiSdk`).\nThis removes path separators, drive/colon, `..`, quotes, and braces, so the values can no longer influence\nthe output path or inject into the declaration.\n\n### Remediation\n\nUpgrade to Kiota **1.29.1, 1.32.5,** or later and regenerate affected clients.",
"details": "### Summary\n\nMicrosoft Kiota emitted the `x-ms-kiota-info` extension's `clientClassName` or `clientNamespaceName` value\n**raw**, with no identifier or path sanitization, as **both** the generated client's class/namespace name\n**and** part of the generated output path. When `kiota generate` is run **without `-c/--class-name`** — the\nzero-config workflow that `x-ms-kiota-info` is explicitly designed for (the API provider supplies the names in\nthe description so consumers don't have to) — an attacker who controls or tampers with the OpenAPI description\ncould therefore:\n\n- **(CWE-22) write the generated source file to a path outside the `-o` output directory** — e.g.\n `clientClassName: \"/var/www/html/shell\"`; and\n- **(CWE-94) inject arbitrary text into the generated class/namespace declaration**, corrupting the generated\n client.\n\nConfirmed on Kiota **1.32.4** (the self-contained `linux-x64` release binary), i.e. **after** the earlier\nwriter-sink hardening — that fix escaped property/enum/default/serialization sinks but never sanitized the\nprovider-supplied `clientClassName` / `clientNamespaceName`.\n\n### Details\n\n`clientClassName` reached two unsanitized sinks (observed in the generated C#; the same raw emission occurred\nfor Java, Go, TypeScript, Python, and PHP):\n\n```\n# output FILENAME (CWE-22): clientClassName flows into the file path\nclientClassName: \"/abs/path/PWNED\" -> /abs/path/PWNED.cs (written outside -o)\n\n# class declaration (CWE-94): clientClassName flows verbatim into the type declaration\nclientClassName: 'Pwn { } public class INJECTED { } public partial class RealClient'\n -> public partial class Pwn { } public class INJECTED { } public partial class RealClient : ... { }\n```\n\n`clientNamespaceName` reached the analogous namespace/path sinks.\n\n### Impact\n\nA developer or CI host generating a client from an attacker-controlled or compromised OpenAPI description\n(without `-c`) could create/overwrite a generated source file at an attacker-influenced path and emit\nattacker-controlled text into the generated client.\n\nThis does **not** reach clean remote code execution: because `clientClassName` is reused verbatim at multiple\nsites (the class name **and** the constructor name), injected code cannot be made to compile — it breaks the\nbuild. So the code-injection vector is a generation/build-corruption (integrity/DoS), and the high-severity\nprimitive is the file write. CWE-22 / CWE-94.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in **1.32.5** (https://github.com/microsoft/kiota/pull/7884). `clientClassName` and\n`clientNamespaceName` sourced from `x-ms-kiota-info` are now sanitized before use:\n`GenerationConfiguration.SanitizeClientClassName` strips any character outside `[A-Za-z0-9_]` and any invalid\nleading character (falling back to `ApiClient`), and `SanitizeClientNamespaceName` restricts to\n`[A-Za-z0-9._-]`, collapses consecutive dots, strips invalid leading characters (falling back to `ApiSdk`).\nThis removes path separators, drive/colon, `..`, quotes, and braces, so the values can no longer influence\nthe output path or inject into the declaration.\n\n### Remediation\n\nUpgrade to Kiota **1.32.5** or later and regenerate affected clients.",
"severity": [
{
"type": "CVSS_V4",
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.OpenApi.Kiota"
"name": "Microsoft.OpenApi.Kiota.Builder"
},
"ranges": [
{
Expand All @@ -75,7 +75,7 @@
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.OpenApi.Kiota.Builder"
"name": "Microsoft.OpenApi.Kiota"
},
"ranges": [
{
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