Beam is in active development and has not shipped a stable release yet.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
main |
Yes |
| Stable releases | None exist yet - the first release will be supported from publication |
We take security bugs seriously and appreciate responsible disclosure.
Please do not report security vulnerabilities through public GitHub issues.
Report them privately instead, via either channel:
- GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting - go to the Security tab of the repository and click Report a vulnerability. This is the preferred channel.
- Email — if private reporting is unavailable, email greenbugx@proton.me with details of the issue.
Include as much of the following as you can:
- The type of issue (e.g., authentication bypass, path traversal, malformed payload handling)
- Full steps or a proof of concept for reproducing the issue
- affected component (protocol, discovery, transfer, storage)
- Android versions / devices where you observed it, if relevant
- Any potential impact you have identified
You can expect an acknowledgment within 72 hours. If confirmed, we will work on a fix, coordinate disclosure with you, and credit the report in the advisory unless you prefer to remain anonymous.
Beam's attack surface is deliberately small. What is security-relevant:
- The Beam transfer protocol - all message parsing between devices (file offers, metadata, chunk data). Malformed or malicious payloads from a peer within a Beam room are in scope.
- Room authentication/joining - preventing unauthorized devices from silently joining a room.
- File writing - received files must never escape the intended storage location (path traversal, filename sanitization, MIME/size spoofing).
- Runtime permissions - the app must not request or use permissions beyond what the current feature requires.
- Third-party dependencies - known CVEs in dependencies used by a shipped release.
What is out of scope:
- Attacks requiring physical access to an unlocked device
- Social engineering, phishing, or intercepting shares made in public places by design (Beam rooms are open by intent - anyone nearby with the code can join)
- Vulnerabilities in Google Play Services / the Nearby Connections API itself (report those to Google)
- Denial of service via radio-layer interference (jamming Wi-Fi/Bluetooth)
- Unreleased, in-development features that are clearly marked incomplete in TODO.md
Honest status, so you know what to expect:
- Transfers happen device-to-device over the local network - no cloud servers, no accounts, no telemetry, no analytics. Beam collects nothing and sends nothing anywhere except between the devices you connect.
- Transfers are not yet encrypted or authenticated beyond the transport provided by Nearby Connections. Room-level authentication, key exchange, and transfer encryption are planned as a dedicated milestone (M12 — Security in TODO.md). Treat current builds as experimental and do not use them to share sensitive material in untrusted environments.
- File transfer itself is not implemented yet - today only small text payloads are exchanged. Once file saving lands, its hardening (filename sanitization, path confinement, size validation) is security-critical and will be listed here.