Please do not open a public issue for a security problem. Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting instead, or email the maintainer if that is unavailable to you.

Include what makes the report actionable: affected version, Pi version, steps to reproduce, and the impact you believe it has. I'll acknowledge as soon as I see it. This is a side project maintained by one person, so please be patient rather than assuming it has been ignored.

This extension is a Pi package, which means it runs with the same trust as any other Pi package: extensions execute arbitrary code, so review the source before installing — including this one.

The design decisions that matter here:

• The extension never stores your API key. /login command-code hands the key to Pi, which persists it in ~/.pi/agent/auth.json. The extension reads it back on demand through Pi's credential API, or from COMMAND_CODE_API_KEY in the environment.
• The key is never logged. Error and message paths are covered by the secret-hygiene tests in src/core.test.mjs; a regression there is a security bug, not a cosmetic one.
• Outbound requests are limited to Command Code. The extension calls api.commandcode.ai for the model catalog and reads Command Code's published GOAT plan page for pricing metadata. COMMAND_CODE_ENRICHMENT_URL can redirect the latter; if you set it, you choose where that traffic goes.
• CMD_ZDR=1 is opt-in. It sends an x-cmd-zdr: 1 header to request zero data retention. It is off unless you set it.
• No install scripts and no runtime dependencies. The package has no preinstall/postinstall hooks and ships no third-party code.

The latest published version is the supported one. Fixes go into a new release rather than a backport.