Toril is a local-first desktop Markdown/HTML editor (Tauri + Rust + TypeScript). It has no backend, no cloud sync, no account system, and no telemetry — your notes are plain files on your own disk. That shapes the threat model below.
Toril is pre-1.0 (currently v1.0.0-beta.1). Security fixes land on the latest
release and main only; there are no maintained back-release branches yet.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
Latest release (v1.0.0-beta.x) + main |
✅ |
| Any older release | ❌ |
When Toril reaches a stable 1.0, this table will move to a real
supported-versions policy.
Please report security issues privately — do not open a public issue.
Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting: Security → Report a vulnerability (or the Report a vulnerability button on the repository's Security tab).
What to expect:
- Acknowledgement within ~7 days.
- An assessment (accepted / needs-more-info / declined, with reasoning) after that.
- For accepted reports, a fix on
mainand the next release, with credit in the release notes / advisory if you'd like it.
This is a hobby/beta project maintained in spare time, so timelines are best-effort — thank you for your patience, and for reporting responsibly.
These are the deliberate, load-bearing security properties (see CLAUDE.md §3 for the full data-safety contract):
- Opened files are untrusted. A
.md/.htmlfile — or pasted content — can carry hostile HTML. Everything rendered in the webview is sanitized (DOMPurify,src/sanitize.ts) so embedded markup cannot execute script. - Atomic saves. Writes go to a temp file, fsync, then atomic rename, so a crash mid-save can't corrupt an existing note.
- Filesystem access stays in Rust. The frontend never touches the disk directly; it goes through a fixed set of Tauri commands.
- Dependency hygiene. Dependencies are pinned (npm exact versions;
Cargo.lockcommitted) and only healthy/maintained packages are adopted. Dependabot security updates and secret scanning + push protection are enabled, and a security regression suite (tests/security.test.ts) guards the sanitize boundary. - One vendored exception is documented: a security-patched
glib(GHSA-wrw7-89jp-8q8g) wired in via[patch.crates-io]; rationale is insrc-tauri/Cargo.toml.
- Installers are unsigned. On first run, Windows SmartScreen ("Windows protected your PC") and macOS Gatekeeper will warn — this is expected for an unsigned build, not a compromise. Code signing (Azure Trusted Signing) is planned; see WINDOWS-SIGNING.md.
- Beta software. Expect rough edges; keep backups of important notes.