Please do NOT report security vulnerabilities through public GitHub issues.

Instead, please report them privately via email:

📧 security@labs.ai

• Description of the vulnerability
• Steps to reproduce the issue
• Potential impact assessment
• Any suggested fix (optional but appreciated)

We follow coordinated disclosure:

1. You report the vulnerability privately
2. We acknowledge and begin working on a fix
3. We release the fix and publish a security advisory
4. You may publish your findings after the fix is released

We will credit you in the security advisory unless you prefer to remain anonymous.

• EDDI Manager frontend application
• Authentication flows (Keycloak integration)
• API communication layer (ApiClient)
• Any XSS, CSRF, or injection vectors in the UI

• EDDI backend vulnerabilities (report to EDDI SECURITY.md)
• Third-party LLM API vulnerabilities (OpenAI, Anthropic, etc.)
• User configuration errors
• Vulnerabilities in dependencies (report upstream; we monitor via Renovate)

react-router — GHSA-qwww-vcr4-c8h2 (high, "RSC Mode CSRF Bypass")

Do not "fix" this by downgrading. npm audit fix --force proposes react-router-dom@7.11.0, which falls back inside the range of GHSA-wrjc-x8rr-h8h6 (open redirect via backslash in <Link>/useNavigate, leading to XSS) — an advisory that does apply to a client-side SPA.

The RSC advisory requires React Server Components mode. This app is a pure client SPA: BrowserRouter in src/main.tsx, declarative <Routes> only, no createBrowserRouter, no data-router loaders or actions, no server runtime and no @react-router/* server packages. The vulnerable code path is not reachable here, so we accept this finding.

The real fix is a v8 migration, not a version bump. The advisory covers 7.12.0 – 8.2.0, so react-router@8.3.0 is patched — but react-router-dom was discontinued at 7.18.2 (v8 consolidates everything into react-router). Adopting 8.3.0 therefore means repointing every react-router-dom import at react-router plus whatever else v8 changed, which is why this branch stayed on react-router-dom@7.18.2, the newest release of the package we actually depend on. Track the v8 migration separately; it removes this allowlist entry.

Re-evaluate if this app ever adopts the data router or any server rendering.

The remaining npm audit highs are dev-only toolchain transitives (eslint, @vitest/coverage-v8 → glob/minimatch/brace-expansion) and are not shipped in the built asset.

• Never commit API keys, tokens, or passwords
• Agent and user content is rendered through react-markdown without rehype-raw, so raw HTML stays escaped. The one opt-in HTML path (agent-response-card.tsx) sanitizes with DOMPurify first
• Never use dangerouslySetInnerHTML without sanitizing or HTML-escaping the input. Agent output is attacker-influenceable via prompt injection, so treat it as untrusted
• Prefer ApiClient for API calls (it injects the auth token). The raw-fetch call sites that exist for SSE, binary bodies and text/plain must spread api.getAuthHeader() explicitly