fix: harden credential and runtime trust boundaries

.github/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -66,8 +66,9 @@ jobs:
   # only one available here. GitHub's own guidance is to avoid self-hosted
   # runners on public repositories for this reason.
   #
-  # So read the routing below as a COST control that keeps honest pull requests
-  # on GitHub-hosted runners, not as a guarantee about hostile ones.
+  # So read the routing below as a STABILITY/OPERATIONS control that keeps
+  # honest pull requests on GitHub-hosted runners and lets trusted branch runs
+  # avoid the hosted-Windows Bun crashes. It is not the security boundary.
   #
   # `push` on dev/main/preview requires the push permission, and
   # `workflow_dispatch` requires write access, so both carry a trusted author.

bin/ocx.mjs

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
  * src/cli/index.ts — only the published npm `bin` routes through here.)
  */
 import { spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
+import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
 import { createRequire } from "node:module";
 import { existsSync, readFileSync, readdirSync } from "node:fs";
 import { homedir } from "node:os";
@@ -22,6 +23,8 @@ const PKG = "@bitkyc08/opencodex";
 const require = createRequire(import.meta.url);
 const here = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
 const cliPath = join(here, "..", "src", "cli", "index.ts");
+const NODE_LAUNCH_CONTEXT_ENV = "OCX_NODE_LAUNCH_CONTEXT";
+const NODE_LAUNCH_PROOF_PREFIX = "--ocx-internal-launch-proof=";
 
 function isNodeModulesInstall() {
   return here.split(/[\\/]/).includes("node_modules");
@@ -407,22 +410,28 @@ const bun = bunRuntime.path;
 // Provenance seam for issue #701: THIS launcher runs under Node, which does not
 // auto-load a project `.env`/`.env.local`; the Bun child does, before any opencodex
 // code evaluates. So this is the last point that can still tell a real shell export
-// from a working-directory dotenv value, and we record which Anthropic credential
-// slots already existed. `src/cli/claude.ts` then treats anything present in the Bun
-// child but missing from this list as ambient project pollution rather than user auth,
+// from a working-directory dotenv value, and we record which Anthropic credential or
+// destination slots already existed. The context is paired with a random proof carried
+// in argv, which project dotenv cannot modify during an ordinary `ocx` invocation.
+// `src/cli/claude.ts` treats anything present in the Bun child but missing from this
+// list as ambient project pollution rather than user auth or destination,
 // which stopped a project dotenv from silently moving a claude.ai subscriber onto API
-// billing. An EMPTY value is meaningful (the launcher ran and saw no slots) and is
-// distinct from the variable being absent (no launcher at all — change nothing), so
-// this must stay a plain assignment and never be collapsed to a falsy check.
+// billing and prevents it from redirecting the subscriber's OAuth bearer.
 // Disabling Bun's dotenv wholesale with --no-env-file is NOT an option: config
 // interpolation and provider settings legitimately read the project environment.
-const preBunAnthropicSlots = ["ANTHROPIC_API_KEY", "ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN"]
+const preBunAnthropicSlots = ["ANTHROPIC_API_KEY", "ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN", "ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL"]
   .filter(name => typeof process.env[name] === "string" && process.env[name] !== "");
-const child = spawn(bun, [cliPath, ...process.argv.slice(2)], {
+const launchProof = randomBytes(32).toString("base64url");
+const launchContext = JSON.stringify({
+  version: 1,
+  proof: launchProof,
+  anthropicEnvSlots: preBunAnthropicSlots,
+});
+const child = spawn(bun, [cliPath, `${NODE_LAUNCH_PROOF_PREFIX}${launchProof}`, ...process.argv.slice(2)], {
   stdio: "inherit",
   env: {
     ...process.env,
-    OCX_PRE_BUN_ANTHROPIC_ENV: preBunAnthropicSlots.join(","),
+    [NODE_LAUNCH_CONTEXT_ENV]: launchContext,
     [BUN_RUNTIME_SOURCE_ENV]: bunRuntime.source,
     [BUN_RUNTIME_PATH_ENV]: bunRuntime.path,
   },

src/adapters/google.ts

@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ import { compileGoogleWireBody } from "./google-wire-compiler";
 import { identifyRoutedModel } from "./identity";
 import { antigravityUsesReplayCache, applyAntigravityReplay, clearAntigravityReplay, observeAntigravityReplay } from "./google-antigravity-replay";
 import { resolveAntigravityEffortWireModel } from "../providers/antigravity-models";
+import { googleVertexLocationConfigError } from "../providers/google-vertex-location";
 import {
   isTranslatorBudgetExceededError,
   retainTranslatedEventBatch,
@@ -404,6 +405,8 @@ export function createGoogleAdapter(provider: OcxProviderConfig): ProviderAdapte
         if (!project) throw new Error("Vertex AI requires a project id (provider.project or GOOGLE_CLOUD_PROJECT/GCLOUD_PROJECT).");
         const location = provider.location || process.env.GOOGLE_CLOUD_LOCATION;
         if (!location) throw new Error("Vertex AI requires a location (provider.location or GOOGLE_CLOUD_LOCATION).");
+        const locationError = googleVertexLocationConfigError(location);
+        if (locationError) throw new Error(locationError);
         const host = location === "global" ? "aiplatform.googleapis.com" : `${location}-aiplatform.googleapis.com`;
         const url = `https://${host}/v1/projects/${project}/locations/${location}/publishers/google/models/${parsed.modelId}:${method}${streamParam}`;
         const token = await getVertexAccessToken();

src/cli/claude.ts

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ import { configuredAdminToken } from "../lib/admin-secrets";
 import { PROXY_MARKER, ownAdmissionTokens, defaultAuthDetectDeps, detectClaudeAuth, type AuthDetectDeps } from "../claude/auth-detect";
 import { resolveClaudeAuthMode } from "../claude/auth-mode";
 import { withProcessRuntimeProvenance } from "../lib/bun-runtime";
+import { ANTHROPIC_PARENT_ENV_SLOTS, trustedNodeLauncherContext, type AnthropicParentEnvSlot } from "./launcher-context";
 
 export interface ClaudeLaunchEnv {
   [key: string]: string | undefined;
@@ -27,13 +28,18 @@ export interface ClaudeLaunchEnv {
  * Injectable IO for tests. `env` is deliberately NOT injectable: it is bound to the
  * launch base so detection and the spawned process can never disagree (audit R3-3).
  */
-export type ClaudeEnvDeps = { authDetect?: Omit<Partial<AuthDetectDeps>, "env" | "ownTokens"> };
+export type ClaudeEnvDeps = {
+  authDetect?: Omit<Partial<AuthDetectDeps>, "env" | "ownTokens">;
+  /** Test seam; production uses the authenticated Node-launcher context. */
+  preBunAnthropicSlots?: readonly AnthropicParentEnvSlot[] | null;
+};
 
 /**
  * Pure env assembly (unit-tested): never sets ANTHROPIC_API_KEY (setting both
  * token vars triggers Claude Code's auth-conflict warning, 003 E1), and never
- * overrides variables the user already exported, apart from stale loopback
- * ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL values owned by a previous opencodex launch.
+ * preserves Anthropic variables proven to exist in the parent Node launcher,
+ * apart from stale loopback ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL values owned by a previous
+ * opencodex launch. Unproven ambient values fail closed as project dotenv.
  */
 export function buildClaudeEnv(
   config: OcxConfig,
@@ -49,27 +55,24 @@ export function buildClaudeEnv(
   // leaving the child with no token at all (audit R2-1). It is opencodex state, never
   // user auth, so dropping it unconditionally is safe.
   if (env.ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN === PROXY_MARKER) delete env.ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN;
-  // Step 1b — drop Anthropic credentials that the bundled Bun runtime synthesized from a
-  // project `.env`/`.env.local` (issue #701). Claude Code disables claude.ai connectors the
-  // moment either token slot is populated, so an ambient project file silently moved a
-  // subscriber onto API billing while their OAuth login stayed healthy. The npm launcher
-  // runs under Node, which does NOT auto-load dotenv, so it records the slots that existed
-  // before Bun started; anything populated now but absent then came from the working
-  // directory, not from the user. A genuine shell export is still honored, which keeps
-  // auto-mode API-key auth working. An ABSENT marker means provenance is unknowable
-  // (a direct `bun src/cli/index.ts` run, a test, or an older launcher), and then we
-  // change nothing rather than guess — an EMPTY marker is different: the launcher ran
-  // and saw no pre-existing slots.
-  const preBunSlots = base.OCX_PRE_BUN_ANTHROPIC_ENV;
-  if (preBunSlots !== undefined) {
-    const exported = new Set(preBunSlots.split(",").filter(name => name.length > 0));
-    for (const name of ["ANTHROPIC_API_KEY", "ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN"] as const) {
-      const value = env[name];
-      if (value !== undefined && value !== "" && !exported.has(name)) delete env[name];
-    }
+  // Step 1b — drop Anthropic credentials AND destinations that Bun synthesized from a
+  // project `.env`/`.env.local`. Preserving a dotenv-only ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL while
+  // selecting subscription auth sends Claude's OAuth bearer and prompt to that host.
+  // The plain-Node launcher records genuine parent exports before Bun starts and pairs
+  // that context with an argv proof. Without a trusted context (direct Bun or an older
+  // launcher) we fail closed and treat all three ambient slots as project-controlled.
+  const explicitSlots = deps.preBunAnthropicSlots;
+  const trustedSlots = explicitSlots === undefined
+    ? trustedNodeLauncherContext()?.anthropicEnvSlots ?? []
+    : explicitSlots ?? [];
+  const exported = new Set<AnthropicParentEnvSlot>(trustedSlots);
+  for (const name of ANTHROPIC_PARENT_ENV_SLOTS) {
+    const value = env[name];
+    if (value !== undefined && value !== "" && !exported.has(name)) delete env[name];
   }
-  // Never forward the seam itself to Claude Code.
+  // Never forward old or current provenance seams to Claude Code.
   delete env.OCX_PRE_BUN_ANTHROPIC_ENV;
+  delete env.OCX_NODE_LAUNCH_CONTEXT;
   const setDefault = (name: string, value: string | undefined) => {
     if (value === undefined || value.length === 0) return;
     if (env[name] !== undefined && env[name] !== "") return; // user wins

src/cli/index.ts

@@ -45,7 +45,10 @@ import { normalizeUpdateChannel, runGuiUpdateWorker } from "../update/job";
 import { collectOrcaCodexHomeDiagnostic } from "../codex/home";
 import { removeOwnedConfigState } from "../lib/config-ownership";
 import { withProcessRuntimeProvenance } from "../lib/bun-runtime";
+import { initializeNodeLauncherContext } from "./launcher-context";
+import { createLocalAttestationSecret } from "../lib/local-management-attestation";
 
+initializeNodeLauncherContext();
 const args = process.argv.slice(2);
 const command = args[0];
 
@@ -194,9 +197,10 @@ async function handleStart(options: { block?: boolean } = {}) {
   // the same port only (never hop — that was the remaining PR #152 gap).
   let port = await chooseListenPort(requestedPort);
   let server: ReturnType<typeof startServer>;
+  const localAttestationSecret = createLocalAttestationSecret();
   for (let attempt = 0; ; attempt++) {
     try {
-      server = startServer(port);
+      server = startServer(port, localAttestationSecret);
       // Prewarm the live provider model cache as soon as the port is bound so the
       // first GUI /v1/models (and syncModelsToCodex below) share one discovery flight
       // instead of racing duplicate upstream /models fetches.
@@ -224,7 +228,7 @@ async function handleStart(options: { block?: boolean } = {}) {
   writePid(process.pid);
 
   const config = loadConfig();
-  writeRuntimePort({ pid: process.pid, port, hostname: config.hostname });
+  writeRuntimePort({ pid: process.pid, port, hostname: config.hostname, attestationSecret: localAttestationSecret });
   // No pre-emptive snapshot here. `injectCodexConfig` journals the exact bytes it
   // is about to transform; snapshotting earlier only captured a baseline that could
   // already be stale by the time injection ran (#477).

src/cli/launcher-context.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+/**
+ * Trusted facts captured by the plain-Node npm launcher before Bun auto-loads
+ * project dotenv files. The random proof travels in argv while the context
+ * travels in the environment, so a project `.env` cannot forge the pair during
+ * an ordinary `ocx ...` invocation.
+ */
+export const NODE_LAUNCH_CONTEXT_ENV = "OCX_NODE_LAUNCH_CONTEXT";
+export const NODE_LAUNCH_PROOF_PREFIX = "--ocx-internal-launch-proof=";
+
+export const ANTHROPIC_PARENT_ENV_SLOTS = [
+  "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY",
+  "ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN",
+  "ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL",
+] as const;
+
+export type AnthropicParentEnvSlot = typeof ANTHROPIC_PARENT_ENV_SLOTS[number];
+
+export type TrustedNodeLaunchContext = {
+  anthropicEnvSlots: readonly AnthropicParentEnvSlot[];
+};
+
+let trustedContext: TrustedNodeLaunchContext | null = null;
+
+function isLaunchProof(value: string): boolean {
+  return /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$/.test(value);
+}
+
+/** Consume the internal proof before normal CLI argument parsing. */
+export function initializeNodeLauncherContext(
+  argv: string[] = process.argv,
+  env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env,
+): TrustedNodeLaunchContext | null {
+  const proofArgs: string[] = [];
+  for (let index = argv.length - 1; index >= 2; index -= 1) {
+    const value = argv[index];
+    if (!value?.startsWith(NODE_LAUNCH_PROOF_PREFIX)) continue;
+    proofArgs.push(value.slice(NODE_LAUNCH_PROOF_PREFIX.length));
+    argv.splice(index, 1);
+  }
+
+  const raw = env[NODE_LAUNCH_CONTEXT_ENV];
+  delete env[NODE_LAUNCH_CONTEXT_ENV];
+  // Older launchers used this unauthenticated marker. Never let a project
+  // dotenv resurrect it as a trusted provenance channel.
+  delete env.OCX_PRE_BUN_ANTHROPIC_ENV;
+  trustedContext = null;
+
+  if (proofArgs.length !== 1 || !raw || raw.length > 2048) return null;
+  const proof = proofArgs[0]!;
+  if (!isLaunchProof(proof)) return null;
+
+  try {
+    const parsed = JSON.parse(raw) as {
+      version?: unknown;
+      proof?: unknown;
+      anthropicEnvSlots?: unknown;
+    };
+    if (parsed.version !== 1 || parsed.proof !== proof || !Array.isArray(parsed.anthropicEnvSlots)) {
+      return null;
+    }
+    const allowed = new Set<string>(ANTHROPIC_PARENT_ENV_SLOTS);
+    const slots = parsed.anthropicEnvSlots.filter(
+      (slot): slot is AnthropicParentEnvSlot => typeof slot === "string" && allowed.has(slot),
+    );
+    if (slots.length !== parsed.anthropicEnvSlots.length || new Set(slots).size !== slots.length) {
+      return null;
+    }
+    trustedContext = { anthropicEnvSlots: slots };
+    return trustedContext;
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
+export function trustedNodeLauncherContext(): TrustedNodeLaunchContext | null {
+  return trustedContext;
+}

src/config.ts

@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ import {
 } from "./lib/windows-secret-acl";
 import { recordOwnedConfigPath } from "./lib/config-ownership";
 import { assertNotRealHomeUnderTest } from "./lib/test-home-guard";
+import { isLocalAttestationSecret } from "./lib/local-management-attestation";
 import { providerDestinationConfigError } from "./lib/destination-policy";
 import { openRouterRoutingConfigError } from "./providers/openrouter-routing";
 import {
@@ -2150,18 +2151,22 @@ export type RuntimePortState = {
   pid: number;
   port: number;
   hostname?: string;
+  /** Per-process proof key; protected by the config directory and never served. */
+  attestationSecret?: string;
 };
 
 function isValidRuntimePortState(value: unknown): value is RuntimePortState {
   if (!value || typeof value !== "object") return false;
   const state = value as Record<string, unknown>;
   const hostnameOk = state.hostname === undefined || typeof state.hostname === "string";
+  const attestationOk = state.attestationSecret === undefined || isLocalAttestationSecret(state.attestationSecret);
   return Number.isSafeInteger(state.pid)
     && Number(state.pid) > 0
     && Number.isInteger(state.port)
     && Number(state.port) > 0
     && Number(state.port) <= 65535
-    && hostnameOk;
+    && hostnameOk
+    && attestationOk;
 }
 
 export function writeRuntimePort(state: RuntimePortState): void {

src/lib/bun-runtime.ts

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
  */
 import { createRequire } from "node:module";
 import { realpathSync } from "node:fs";
-import { dirname, join, resolve } from "node:path";
+import { dirname, join } from "node:path";
 import { isRealBunBinary } from "./bun-binary-validator.mjs";
 
 export { isRealBunBinary };
@@ -108,19 +108,23 @@ export function withProcessRuntimeProvenance(
  * exact executable, otherwise what this executable actually is.
  */
 function currentRuntimeProvenance(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv): DurableBunRuntime {
-  const claimed = reportedBunRuntimeSource(env);
-  const claimedPath = env[BUN_RUNTIME_PATH_ENV]?.trim();
-  if (claimed && claimedPath && samePath(claimedPath, process.execPath)) {
-    return { path: process.execPath, source: claimed, overrideEnv: BUN_OVERRIDE_ENV };
-  }
+  const recorded = recordedCurrentRuntime(env);
+  if (recorded) return recorded;
   // No marker that describes this binary: report what is running. One resolution
   // supplies both halves so the pair can never disagree.
-  const runtime = durableBunRuntime();
+  const runtime = unmarkedDurableBunRuntime();
   return samePath(runtime.path, process.execPath)
     ? runtime
     : { path: process.execPath, source: "process", overrideEnv: BUN_OVERRIDE_ENV };
 }
 
+function recordedCurrentRuntime(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv): DurableBunRuntime | null {
+  const source = reportedBunRuntimeSource(env);
+  const path = env[BUN_RUNTIME_PATH_ENV]?.trim();
+  if (!source || !path || !samePath(path, process.execPath)) return null;
+  return { path, source, overrideEnv: BUN_OVERRIDE_ENV };
+}
+
 /**
  * Same file, allowing for the aliases a path can pick up between launch and relaunch:
  * symlinks/junctions, mapped drives, and Windows case differences. Falls back to a
@@ -154,21 +158,21 @@ export function bundledBunPath(): string | null {
   }
 }
 
-export function overrideBunPath(): string | null {
-  const value = process.env[BUN_OVERRIDE_ENV]?.trim();
-  if (!value) return null;
-  const resolved = resolve(value);
-  return isRealBunBinary(resolved) ? resolved : null;
-}
-
-export function durableBunRuntime(): DurableBunRuntime {
-  const override = overrideBunPath();
-  if (override) return { path: override, source: "override", overrideEnv: BUN_OVERRIDE_ENV };
+function unmarkedDurableBunRuntime(): DurableBunRuntime {
   const bundled = bundledBunPath();
   if (bundled) return { path: bundled, source: "bundled", overrideEnv: BUN_OVERRIDE_ENV };
   return { path: process.execPath, source: "process", overrideEnv: BUN_OVERRIDE_ENV };
 }
 
+export function durableBunRuntime(): DurableBunRuntime {
+  // A durable artifact must use the runtime selected BEFORE Bun auto-loaded a
+  // project dotenv. The Node launcher and owned service/shim launchers stamp the
+  // selected source/path pair; it is accepted only when it names this exact
+  // running executable. Re-reading OPENCODEX_BUN_PATH here would let a project
+  // `.env` persist an arbitrary executable into a shim or service.
+  return recordedCurrentRuntime(process.env) ?? unmarkedDurableBunRuntime();
+}
+
 /**
  * Bun path to bake into durable artifacts (launchd/systemd/Task Scheduler and
  * the Codex auto-start shim). Prefer the bundled binary — it lives under the