Bump vm2 from 3.10.3 to 3.11.2 in /ui/changes

[dependabot]

Bumps vm2 from 3.10.3 to 3.11.2.

Release notes

Sourced from vm2's releases.

v3.11.2

What's Changed

Security fixes

• GHSA-9vg3-4rfj-wgcm — Sandbox-realm null-proto write-through via bridge.from() set trap (RCE)
• GHSA-2cm2-m3w5-gp2f — Internal state reachable via computed-key access on globalThis
• GHSA-9qj6-qjgg-37qq — Bridge saved-state leak via sandbox-installed Array.prototype[N] setter (RCE)

Documentation

• docs/ATTACKS.md updated through Category 28, plus a new Defense Invariant
  ("Bridge-internal containers must not invoke sandbox code").

Full Changelog: patriksimek/vm2@v3.11.1...v3.11.2

v3.11.1

Single advisory closed plus prominent documentation of an existing escape hatch. Patch release — no API changes for valid configurations.

Embedders running untrusted code with nesting: true should read the new README section.

What's Changed

Security fix

• GHSA-8hg8-63c5-gwmx — nesting: true bypassed require: false, allowing sandbox-to-host RCE via inner NodeVM construction. The contradictory option pair { nesting: true, require: false } now throws VMError at new NodeVM(...) time citing the advisory. Same shape as the GHSA-cp6g eager FileSystem-contract probe — surface contradictory configuration at the API surface, not silently produce an unsandboxed sandbox.

Documentation

• New README section "nesting: true is an escape hatch" under Hardening recommendations. Spells out the inner-VM independence: a nested VM's require config is chosen by the sandbox code that constructs it, not constrained by the outer VM. Do not enable nesting: true for untrusted code.
• JSDoc on the nesting option (lib/nodevm.js) upgraded to match.
• docs/ATTACKS.md gains Category 25 documenting the configuration trap, plus a matching row in the "How The Bridge Defends" table.

Upgrade Notes

• If you set { nesting: true, require: false } anywhere in your codebase, new NodeVM(...) now throws. Either drop nesting: true (if you wanted deny-all), or replace require: false with an explicit require config (e.g. require: { builtin: [] }) to acknowledge that vm2 will be requireable. The error message is actionable and links to the README section.
• No other configurations are affected. Bare new NodeVM({ nesting: true }) continues to work as documented; this is the documented escape hatch and is not closed by this patch (out of scope — would change nesting: true semantics substantially).

What This Fix Does NOT Close

nesting: true itself remains an escape hatch for any non-trivial require config. The fix closes the specific contradictory pair flagged by the advisory; the broader recommendation is in the new README section: do not enable nesting: true when running untrusted code. Constraint propagation from outer to inner NodeVM (where the outer's require config would constrain inner construction) was considered and deferred — it would change the documented semantics of nesting: true and is a major-version-shaped change.

Full Changelog: patriksimek/vm2@v3.11.0...v3.11.1

v3.11.0

Coordinated security release closing 13 advisories, plus a new bufferAllocLimit option and a realpath() method on the FileSystem adapter contract. Minor version bump because of the new public option and the FileSystem contract addition; no incompatible changes to the existing public API surface.

Embedders running untrusted code should upgrade. Several of the advisories close full sandbox-escape RCE primitives.

What's Changed

... (truncated)

Changelog

Sourced from vm2's changelog.

[3.11.2]

Three advisories closed. Patch release — no API changes.

Security fixes

• GHSA-2cm2-m3w5-gp2f — Internal state reachable via computed property access on globalThis. The previous fix (GHSA-wp5r-2gw5-m7q7) tightened the transformer's identifier-rejection but left globalThis['VM2_INTERNAL_STATE_DO_NOT_USE_OR_PROGRAM_WILL_FAIL'] and every reflective probe of the global object (bracket access, Reflect.get, Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor, Object.getOwnPropertyNames enumeration) returning the live state object — the transformer is a syntactic gate and cannot see through dynamic property keys. Structural fix: the bootstrap script (vm.js's setupSandboxScript source) now declares let VM2_INTERNAL_STATE_DO_NOT_USE_OR_PROGRAM_WILL_FAIL at the script's top level, which lands the binding in the context's [[GlobalLexicalEnvironment]] — reachable as a bare identifier from every script (so transformer-emitted catch handlers still resolve), but absent from globalThis's own-property table (so every computed-key probe returns undefined). The defineProperty install in setup-sandbox.js is removed entirely; the bootstrap IIFE assigns into the outer let instead. Supersedes GHSA-wp5r-2gw5-m7q7's identifier-only mitigation by closing the entire computed-key class. ATTACKS.md Category 27.
• GHSA-9vg3-4rfj-wgcm — Sandbox breakout via null-proto throw / handleException. The post-GHSA-mpf8 hardening switched handleException and globalPromise.prototype.then onFulfilled to wrap caught/resolved values with bridge.from() for "symmetry". from() builds a sandbox-side proxy whose target the bridge treats as host-realm; calling it on a sandbox-realm null-proto value ({__proto__: null} thrown or Promise.resolve-d by sandbox JS) produced a proxy whose set trap unwrapped sandbox proxies of host references (e.g. Buffer.prototype.inspect) back to their raw host originals and stored them on the underlying sandbox object — readable via the original sandbox reference and pivot to host Function constructor → RCE. Three callsites in lib/setup-sandbox.js reverted to ensureThis() semantics; the host-Promise rejection sanitizer composes from() outside handleException so the GHSA-mpf8 invariant (host null-proto rejection values must reach sandbox callbacks bridge-wrapped) is preserved. ATTACKS.md Category 26.
• GHSA-9qj6-qjgg-37qq — sandbox breakout via the species-defense helper neutralizeArraySpeciesBatch. The helper appended saved-state records to a fresh [] literal that — being allocated by the sandbox-side bridge closure — inherited sandbox Array.prototype. A sandbox-installed setter on Array.prototype[N] therefore captured the next saved[saved.length] = c write and exposed c.arr (a host-realm proxy) directly to attacker code, leading to host Function extraction and RCE. Fixed in lib/bridge.js by writing every saved-state entry through thisReflectDefineProperty so the appended slot is an own data property and no Array.prototype[N] setter is ever invoked while the bridge holds raw saved state. ATTACKS.md gains a new Defense Invariant ("Bridge-internal containers must not invoke sandbox code") codifying the cross-cutting principle.

[3.11.1]

Single advisory closed plus prominent documentation of an existing escape hatch. Patch release — no API changes for valid configurations.

Security fix

• GHSA-8hg8-63c5-gwmx — nesting: true bypassed require: false, allowing sandbox-to-host RCE via inner NodeVM construction. The contradictory option pair { nesting: true, require: false } now throws VMError at new NodeVM(...) time citing the advisory. Same shape as the GHSA-cp6g eager FileSystem-contract probe — surface contradictory configuration at the API surface, not silently produce an unsandboxed sandbox. ATTACKS.md Category 25.

Documentation

• New README section "nesting: true is an escape hatch" under Hardening recommendations. Explains that nesting: true lets sandbox code require('vm2') and construct nested NodeVMs whose require config is chosen by the sandbox (not constrained by the outer config — by design of nesting). Do not enable nesting: true for untrusted code.
• JSDoc on the nesting option (lib/nodevm.js) upgraded to spell out the escape-hatch semantics and the GHSA-8hg8 contradictory-pair rejection.
• ATTACKS.md gains Category 25 documenting the configuration trap and a matching row in the "How The Bridge Defends" table.

Upgrade notes

• If you set { nesting: true, require: false } anywhere in your codebase, new NodeVM(...) now throws. Either drop nesting: true (if you wanted deny-all), or replace require: false with an explicit require config (e.g. require: { builtin: [] }) to acknowledge that vm2 will be requireable. The error message is actionable and links to the README section.
• No other configurations are affected. Bare new NodeVM({ nesting: true }) continues to work as documented; this is the documented escape hatch and is not closed by this patch (out of scope — would change nesting: true semantics substantially).

What this fix does NOT close

nesting: true itself remains an escape hatch for any non-trivial require config. The fix closes the specific contradictory pair flagged by the advisory; the broader recommendation is in the new README section: do not enable nesting: true when running untrusted code. Constraint propagation from outer to inner NodeVM (where the outer's require config would constrain inner construction) was considered and deferred — it would change the documented semantics of nesting: true and is a major-version-shaped change.

[3.11.0]

Coordinated security release closing 13 advisories, plus a new bufferAllocLimit option and a realpath() method on the FileSystem adapter contract. Minor version bump because of the new public option and the FileSystem contract addition; no incompatible changes to the existing public API surface. Embedders running untrusted code in memory-constrained environments should review the new bufferAllocLimit option and the README's Hardening recommendations section.

Upgrade notes

• Custom fs adapters with require.root must implement realpathSync (or realpath() on a fully custom FileSystem class). Without it, new NodeVM({require: {root, fs: customAdapter}}) now throws a VMError at construction, citing GHSA-cp6g-6699-wx9c. The eager probe converts what was previously silent deny-by-default at every later require() into a single, clearly-labelled construction-time error. Default fs users are unaffected — DefaultFileSystem and VMFileSystem ship realpath() out of the box.
• Embedders running untrusted async code should install a host-side unhandledRejection handler. The GHSA-hw58 fix closes synchronous executor throws but cannot reach async-function / async-generator / await using rejection paths (V8 creates rejection promises via the realm's intrinsic Promise). See README's Hardening recommendations and ATTACKS.md Category 22.
• Embedders running untrusted code in memory-constrained environments should opt into a finite bufferAllocLimit (e.g. 32 * 1024 * 1024) as part of layered DoS defense. Default remains Infinity for backwards compatibility.

Security fixes

• GHSA-grj5-jjm8-h35p — Array species self-return sandbox escape. Bridge apply and construct traps now neutralise host-array constructor and Symbol.species before every host call (and restore in a finally block). Direct write, Object.assign, non-configurable defineProperty, and prototype-level constructor variants all blocked.
• GHSA-v37h-5mfm-c47c — Handler reconstruction via util.inspect leak. Three-layer defense: closure-scoped construction token, getHandlerObject WeakMap guard, and .constructor sentinel rebind on every handler-class prototype (including BufferHandler).
• GHSA-qcp4-v2jj-fjx8 — Trap method on leaked handler with forged target. New handlerToTarget WeakMap pairs every handler with its canonical proxy target at construction; validateHandlerTarget(this, target) at the entry of every trap method rejects forged-this and forged-target invocations with VMError(OPNA).
• GHSA-47x8-96vw-5wg6 — Cross-realm symbol extraction from host objects. Two-layer defense: dangerous cross-realm symbols (nodejs.util.inspect.custom, nodejs.rejection, nodejs.util.promisify.custom) are filtered at the bridge boundary; structural identity collapse pre-populates the bridge identity caches for every built-in intrinsic prototype + constructor pair so prototype walks land on sandbox primordials.
• GHSA-55hx-c926-fr95 — Promise structural-leak / SuppressedError / AggregateError sanitisation. handleException now recurses into AggregateError.errors[] (in addition to SuppressedError.error/.suppressed); the bridge-level apply-trap recognises calls to host Promise.prototype.{then,catch,finally} by cached identity and pipes every sandbox callback through the same sanitiser.

... (truncated)

Commits

• 7a552e8 chore: bump to 3.11.2
• ca195f0 fix(GHSA-9qj6-qjgg-37qq): bridge saved-state leak via Array.prototype[N] setter
• 99d410b fix(GHSA-2cm2-m3w5-gp2f): bind internal state in GlobalLexicalEnvironment
• c33c2bb fix(GHSA-9vg3-4rfj-wgcm): null-proto throw write-through via bridge from()
• 46cbbdd fix(GHSA-8hg8-63c5-gwmx): reject contradictory { nesting: true, require: fals...
• fc0da54 fix: enhance CallSite path leak tests for Node 14+ and Node 16+ compatibility
• fca270d fix: ensure compatibility with Node 8 by replacing recursive mkdir with expli...
• 5cc3037 fix: update test pipeline
• 4e9fa06 chore: update mocha
• 865439d chore: bump to 3.11.0
• Additional commits viewable in compare view

Dependabot will resolve any conflicts with this PR as long as you don't alter it yourself. You can also trigger a rebase manually by commenting @dependabot rebase.

---

Dependabot commands and options

You can trigger Dependabot actions by commenting on this PR:

• @dependabot rebase will rebase this PR
• @dependabot recreate will recreate this PR, overwriting any edits that have been made to it
• @dependabot show <dependency name> ignore conditions will show all of the ignore conditions of the specified dependency
• @dependabot ignore this major version will close this PR and stop Dependabot creating any more for this major version (unless you reopen the PR or upgrade to it yourself)
• @dependabot ignore this minor version will close this PR and stop Dependabot creating any more for this minor version (unless you reopen the PR or upgrade to it yourself)
• @dependabot ignore this dependency will close this PR and stop Dependabot creating any more for this dependency (unless you reopen the PR or upgrade to it yourself)
  You can disable automated security fix PRs for this repo from the Security Alerts page.