feat(protect): hardening follow-ups (partial-scan, IPv6 egress, Set-Cookie redaction, WebSocket, verbose-error breadth)#80
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Addresses the gaps surfaced reviewing #79: - Body cap → partial-scan (was discard). An oversize body is now TRUNCATED to the cap and its prefix scanned (front-loaded payloads are caught), with memory bounded by a 4× hard ceiling; only a declared body over that ceiling is skipped. Content- Length is compared in bytes; the prefix slice is by char (can only over-scan). - IPv6 host extraction on the node:http egress path. extractHttpTarget no longer mangles `::1` / `[::1]` / `[::1]:port` via split(':') — normalizeHost preserves them so isInternalHost (which strips brackets) blocks IPv6-internal SSRF via options host. - Redact array-valued headers. Header screening now masks multi-valued Set-Cookie (via getSetCookie / node arrays) and re-emits each cookie separately, in both the fetch and node paths. - Multipart parser robustness: tolerate LF-only line endings and collect duplicate field names (arrays), matching the body/urlencoded behavior. - WebSocket egress screening: the guard now also wraps the global WebSocket so ws:// /wss:// egress is screened; restored on uninstall. - Verbose-error breadth: a default response rule redacts multi-language exception/ traceback signatures (Python/JVM/.NET/Go) beyond the node stack-trace + SQL rules. +6 tests (body-cap partial-scan incl. the past-cap residual, IPv6 node egress, Set-Cookie array redaction, multipart LF/dup, WebSocket block, exception redaction, allowHosts override). 443 tests pass, typecheck + build clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Comprehensive security hardening with cohesive, well-tested follow-up enhancements. 🎯 Quality: 100% Elite · 📦 Size: Medium 📈 This month: Your 32nd PR — above team average · Averaging Excellent |
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mariojgt
approved these changes
Jul 15, 2026
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Follow-ups from the security review of #79 (now merged) — closes the gaps that review surfaced.
extractHttpTargetno longer mangles::1/[::1]/[::1]:portviasplit(':');normalizeHostpreserves them soisInternalHostblocks IPv6-internal SSRF passed as an optionshost/hostname.Set-Cookie(viagetSetCookie()/ node arrays) and re-emits each cookie separately (fetch + node paths).WebSocketsows:///wss://egress is screened; restored on uninstall.Deferred (noted, not done): DNS-rebinding resistance for egress (needs async resolve that doesn't fit the sync
http.requestwrapper).Tests (+6)
fetch-body-cap,egress-followups,multipart,response-hardening. 443 pass, typecheck + build clean.🤖 Generated with Claude Code