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This project is a local / CI laboratory simulator. It is not hardened as a multi-tenant public vCenter service. Default credentials, UI demo controls, and compatibility endpoints are convenient for development and intentionally open in the default Compose stack.

Do not expose ports 443 / 80 to untrusted networks without additional controls you supply yourself.

• Passwords are stored as scrypt hashes (vsphere_credentials.password_hash).
• Session ids are opaque tokens (vmware-api-session-id) with a 2-hour sliding expiry, tracked in PostgreSQL (vsphere_sessions).
• Logs redact recognized session-id and password representations.
• Content library update/download session responses expose upload/download endpoints, not raw secrets.

Change TICKET_SIGNING_KEY for any shared lab. Replace seeded passwords before demoing to others.

docker/tls/ contains a checked-in self-signed certificate for the local api-gateway nginx service. It exists so unmodified TLS clients (pyvmomi, govmomi, Terraform's hashicorp/vsphere provider) can connect with insecure/verify=False set. Never reuse these files in production.

There is currently no separately authenticated admin control plane. Web UI helper routes under /ui/api/* are available whenever the process is reachable — including reseed and hot-swap actions. Treat network exposure as the trust boundary.

Mutating REST endpoints check role-derived privileges (app/vsphere/security/authz.py) before touching inventory. The seeded readonly@vsphere.local principal cannot power on/create/delete VMs (HTTP 403). See Authorization.

NSX/Supervisor/vSAN/SAML-OIDC/VECS-certificate stand-ins (see API coverage) persist local simulator state only. They do not open real connections to external IdPs, NSX Manager, or a live vSAN cluster. Do not rely on the simulator for testing live credential exfiltration defenses against real providers.