Add real-time RFQ quote auctions

.env.example

@@ -113,6 +113,9 @@ SOROBAN_FEE_PERCENTILE=p50
 INTENT_RETENTION_DAYS=30
 INTENT_RETENTION_SWEEP_MS=60000
 
+# Time allowed to collect connected solver RFQ responses (1-1000 ms).
+QUOTE_AUCTION_WINDOW_MS=300
+
 # ─── CORS ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # Comma-separated list of allowed origins for the frontend.
 # Development default: "*"  (any origin allowed — convenient for local work)

.env.mainnet.example

@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@ CORS_ORIGIN=https://app.vortex.trade    # <CHANGE_ME>
 # ─── WebSocket ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # Tune based on expected solver + frontend connection count.
 WS_MAX_CONNECTIONS=5000
+QUOTE_AUCTION_WINDOW_MS=300
 
 # ─── Pluggable signer backend (issue #400) ───────────────────────────────────
 # REQUIRED in production: use SIGNER_BACKEND=vault so the signing key never

.env.staging.example

@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ SOROBAN_FEE_PERCENTILE=p50
 
 CORS_ORIGIN=*
 WS_MAX_CONNECTIONS=1000
+QUOTE_AUCTION_WINDOW_MS=300
 
 # ─── Pluggable signer backend (issue #400) ───────────────────────────────────
 SIGNER_BACKEND=local

.env.testnet.example

@@ -20,6 +20,21 @@ NODE_ENV=development
 
 # ─── Stellar / Soroban ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 STELLAR_NETWORK=testnet
+INTENTS_PERSISTENCE=prisma
+ETHEREUM_RPC_URL=
+ETHEREUM_ESCROW_ADDRESS=
+BASE_RPC_URL=
+BASE_ESCROW_ADDRESS=
+POLYGON_RPC_URL=
+POLYGON_ESCROW_ADDRESS=
+ARBITRUM_RPC_URL=
+ARBITRUM_ESCROW_ADDRESS=
+OPTIMISM_RPC_URL=
+OPTIMISM_ESCROW_ADDRESS=
+AVALANCHE_RPC_URL=
+AVALANCHE_ESCROW_ADDRESS=
+EVM_RPC_ALLOWLIST=
+ALLOW_LEGACY_STELLAR_SIGNATURES=false
 SOROBAN_RPC_URL=https://soroban-testnet.stellar.org
 
 # Testnet contract IDs — leave blank until you have deployed contracts.
@@ -53,6 +68,7 @@ CORS_ORIGIN=*
 
 # ─── WebSocket ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 WS_MAX_CONNECTIONS=1000
+QUOTE_AUCTION_WINDOW_MS=300
 
 # ─── Pluggable signer backend (issue #400) ───────────────────────────────────
 # SIGNER_BACKEND=local is the default for development.
@@ -120,3 +136,134 @@ PARAMS_POLL_INTERVAL_MS=30000
 LEADER_ELECTION_ENABLED=false
 LEADER_ELECTION_HEARTBEAT_MS=5000
 
+# ─── Background jobs (issue #494) ────────────────────────────────────────────
+# api | worker | all — queue workers only run in "worker" or "all".
+PROCESS_ROLE=all
+# memory (single-process, dev/test) | bullmq (Redis-backed, uses REDIS_URL)
+JOBS_DRIVER=memory
+# Grace period for in-flight jobs on SIGTERM before they are returned to the queue.
+JOBS_SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT_MS=25000
+
+# ─── Runtime feature flags (issue #495) ──────────────────────────────────────
+# Change propagation across instances: memory (single instance) | redis
+FLAGS_PUBSUB=memory
+# Safety-net cache reload interval (ms)
+FLAGS_REFRESH_MS=30000
+# Break-glass pins that win over DB state, e.g. onchain-dry-run=true
+FLAG_OVERRIDES=
+
+# ─── Admin RBAC ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Comma-separated id:role:secret (role = admin | superadmin, secret >= 16 chars).
+# Sent as the x-admin-key header (the secret part). Empty disables admin APIs.
+ADMIN_API_KEYS=
+
+# ─── Guardian emergency ingestion (issue #507) ───────────────────────────────
+# Guardian / security-council contract ID. Leave blank to disable ingestion.
+GUARDIAN_CONTRACT_ID=
+
+# ─── Synthetic canary (issue #496) ───────────────────────────────────────────
+# Canary user + solver addresses; excluded from public stats and leaderboards.
+CANARY_ADDRESSES=
+
+# Public anonymised datasets (docs/rfcs/0001)
+# Master switch for the public dataset publication job.
+DATASETS_ENABLED=false
+# Hash user addresses with the rotating salt before export.
+DATASETS_ANONYMIZE=true
+# Base anonymisation salt. Required (>= 32 chars) when datasets are enabled
+# and anonymisation is on; generate with `openssl rand -hex 32`.
+DATASETS_SALT=
+# How often the anonymisation salt rotates, in hours.
+DATASETS_SALT_ROTATION_HOURS=24
+# How many previous salt windows are retained for continuity.
+DATASETS_SALT_RETENTION_WINDOWS=2
+# Public bucket/prefix the published datasets live under.
+DATASETS_PUBLIC_BUCKET=vortex-public-datasets
+# Storage backend: local (writes to disk) | memory (tests only).
+DATASETS_STORAGE=local
+# Root directory for the local storage backend.
+DATASETS_LOCAL_DIR=.datasets
+
+# Secrets Manager (issue #465)
+# Provider: env | aws-secrets-manager | vault-kv
+SECRETS_PROVIDER=env
+# Poll interval for secret rotation (ms)
+SECRETS_REFRESH_INTERVAL_MS=60000
+# Extra secrets: comma-separated "name:envVar:required"
+SECRETS_EXTRA=
+
+# AWS Secrets Manager
+AWS_SECRETS_MANAGER_PREFIX=
+AWS_SECRETS_MANAGER_POLL_INTERVAL_MS=60000
+
+# Vault KV
+VAULT_KV_MOUNT=secret
+VAULT_KV_PREFIX=vortex/
+VAULT_KV_POLL_INTERVAL_MS=60000
+
+# Extra secret env vars referenced by the default SecretConfig
+JWT_SIGNING_KEY=
+WEBHOOK_SECRET=
+CHANNEL_KEY=
+
+# Egress/SSRF Protection
+EGRESS_TIMEOUT_MS=10000
+EGRESS_MAX_REDIRECTS=3
+EGRESS_MAX_BODY_SIZE_BYTES=10485760
+SOROBAN_RPC_ALLOWLIST=soroban-testnet.stellar.org,soroban-rpc.stellar.org
+WEBHOOK_ALLOWLIST=hooks.example.com,hooks.trusted.com
+ORACLE_ALLOWLIST=oracle.trusted.io
+# ─── WS gateway hardening (issue #455) ───────────────────────────────────────
+# Inbound frames larger than this close the socket (1009).
+WS_MAX_PAYLOAD_BYTES=16384
+# Concurrent WS connections per client IP (0 = unlimited).
+WS_MAX_CONNECTIONS_PER_IP=20
+# Trusted reverse-proxy hops for X-Forwarded-For (0 = socket address only).
+WS_TRUST_PROXY_HOPS=0
+# Inbound token bucket per connection; repeat violators are disconnected.
+WS_RATE_LIMIT_PER_SEC=10
+WS_RATE_LIMIT_BURST=20
+WS_RATE_LIMIT_MAX_VIOLATIONS=5
+# Outbound backpressure: messages held per slow consumer, socket buffer
+# threshold (bytes), and what to do when the queue is full.
+WS_OUTBOUND_QUEUE_MAX=1000
+WS_OUTBOUND_BUFFER_BYTES=1048576
+WS_SLOW_CONSUMER_POLICY=drop_oldest
+# HS256 secret for solver JWTs from the SEP-10 auth flow (#442); >= 32 chars.
+# Empty disables JWT auth on the WS gateway.
+AUTH_JWT_SECRET=
+
+# ─── API keys & distributed rate limiting (issue #441) ─────────────────────────
+RATE_LIMIT_LOCAL_PRUNE_MS=60000
+# Redis URL for the shared rate-limit window. Empty = bounded local limiter.
+RATE_LIMIT_REDIS_URL=
+
+# ─── Scoped solver credentials (issue #443) ───────────────────────────────────
+CREDENTIAL_REVOCATION_PUBSUB=memory
+
+# ─── SSE intent feed (issue #433) ─────────────────────────────────────────────
+SSE_HEARTBEAT_MS=15000
+SSE_MAX_BUFFER_BYTES=1048576
+
+# ─── Public anonymised datasets ──────────────────────────────────────────────
+DATASETS_ENABLED=false
+DATASETS_ANONYMIZE=true
+DATASETS_SALT=
+DATASETS_SALT_ROTATION_HOURS=24
+DATASETS_SALT_RETENTION_WINDOWS=2
+DATASETS_PUBLIC_BUCKET=
+DATASETS_STORAGE_KIND=memory
+DATASETS_LOCAL_DIR=
+
+# ─── Health probes (issue #492) ──────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Roles served by this process (api, ws, worker); readiness checks follow them.
+SERVICE_ROLES=api,ws,worker
+HEALTH_CHECK_INTERVAL_MS=5000
+# Readiness hysteresis: failures before not-ready, successes before ready again.
+HEALTH_READY_FAILURE_THRESHOLD=3
+HEALTH_READY_SUCCESS_THRESHOLD=2
+# Liveness fails when event-loop delay exceeds this.
+HEALTH_EVENT_LOOP_MAX_LAG_MS=1000
+# Soroban RPC endpoints for the quorum check (default: SOROBAN_RPC_URL).
+SOROBAN_RPC_HEALTH_URLS=
+

docs/solver-onboarding.md

@@ -173,6 +173,38 @@ Upon subscription, the WebSocket server responds with a `subscribed` event:
 ```
 Subsequent `intent_created` events will only be broadcast to the bot if the intent's `srcChain` matches one of the subscribed chains.
 
+### RFQ Quote Requests
+Authenticated, active solvers with a positive bond and matching source-chain/token capabilities may receive a short-lived `rfq_request` over this WebSocket. The default response window is 300 ms and can be configured from 1 to 1,000 ms with `QUOTE_AUCTION_WINDOW_MS`.
+
+```json
+{
+  "type": "rfq_request",
+  "requestId": "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000",
+  "srcChain": "ethereum",
+  "srcTokenSymbol": "USDC",
+  "srcAmount": "1000000",
+  "dstTokenSymbol": "USDC",
+  "deadline": 1775836800300
+}
+```
+
+Reply before `deadline` with the gross destination amount, solver fee, expiry in Unix seconds, and a Stellar Ed25519 signature:
+
+```json
+{
+  "type": "rfq_response",
+  "requestId": "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000",
+  "dstAmount": "998500",
+  "fee": "100",
+  "expiresAt": 1775836860,
+  "signature": "base64EncodedSignatureString=="
+}
+```
+
+Sign the UTF-8 bytes of `vortex:rfq:v1:<requestId>:<payloadHash>`. `payloadHash` is the lowercase SHA-256 hex digest of the JSON encoding of the request fields (`requestId`, `srcChain`, `srcTokenSymbol`, `srcAmount`, `dstTokenSymbol`, optional `srcTokenAddress` and `dstTokenContract`, and `deadline`) plus `solver`, `dstAmount`, `fee`, and `expiresAt`. Omit absent optional fields and sort keys lexicographically before `JSON.stringify`. The signature is Base64-encoded. The backend accepts one valid response per solver and request; late, expired, malformed, or invalidly signed responses are ignored.
+
+Quotes are ranked by destination amount after solver and protocol fees, with reputation breaking ties. If no valid solver response arrives within the window, the API returns the existing model-based estimate with `indicative: true`; otherwise `indicative` is false.
+
 ### Event Replay & Reconnection
 On connection or reconnection, the bot can request event replay from its last received sequence ID (`seq`) to avoid missing intents during network blips:
 ```json

scripts/db-migrate-locked.spec.ts

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
  * `require` and typed here instead of via an ES import (no allowJs in
  * tsconfig, and the runtime must not depend on generated types).
  */
-// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-require-imports
+// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-var-requires
 const migrate = require("./db-migrate-locked.js") as {
   CHECKPOINT_DDL: string;
   CHECKPOINT_TABLE: string;

src/common/rfq-signature.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
+import { RfqResponseSignaturePayload } from "../intents/rfq.types";
+
+/** Canonical domain-separated message signed by a solver for an RFQ response. */
+export function buildRfqResponseMessage(payload: RfqResponseSignaturePayload): string {
+  const canonicalPayload = JSON.stringify(
+    Object.fromEntries(
+      Object.entries(payload)
+        .filter(([, value]) => value !== undefined)
+        .sort(([left], [right]) => left.localeCompare(right)),
+    ),
+  );
+  const payloadHash = createHash("sha256").update(canonicalPayload, "utf8").digest("hex");
+  return `vortex:rfq:v1:${payload.requestId}:${payloadHash}`;
+}

src/common/stellar-signature.ts

@@ -11,6 +11,61 @@
  */
 import { Keypair } from "@stellar/stellar-sdk";
 import { UnauthorizedException } from "@nestjs/common";
+import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
+import { Keypair } from "@stellar/stellar-sdk";
+import { UnauthorizedException } from "@nestjs/common";
+
+export const INTENT_SIGNATURE_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS = 30;
+export const MAX_INTENT_SIGNATURE_TTL_SECONDS = 900;
+
+export interface IntentSignatureContext {
+  network: string;
+  nonce: string;
+  expiresAt: number;
+}
+
+function canonicalPayload(payload: Record<string, string | number | null>): string {
+  return JSON.stringify(
+    Object.fromEntries(Object.entries(payload).sort(([left], [right]) => left.localeCompare(right))),
+  );
+}
+
+function buildV2IntentMessage(
+  context: IntentSignatureContext,
+  action: "accept" | "fill" | "cancel",
+  intentId: string,
+  payload: Record<string, string | number | null>,
+): string {
+  const payloadHash = createHash("sha256").update(canonicalPayload(payload), "utf8").digest("hex");
+  return `vortex:${context.network}:${action}:${intentId}:${context.nonce}:${context.expiresAt}:${payloadHash}`;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Verify that `signature` (base64) over `message` (utf-8) was produced by
+ * the private key corresponding to `publicKey` (Stellar G-address).
+ *
+ * Throws UnauthorizedException on any failure so callers can let it propagate
+ * straight to the HTTP layer.
+ */
+export function verifyStellarSignature(
+  publicKey: string,
+  message: string,
+  signature: string,
+): void {
+  try {
+    const keypair = Keypair.fromPublicKey(publicKey);
+    const messageBytes = Buffer.from(message, "utf8");
+    const signatureBytes = Buffer.from(signature, "base64");
+    if (!keypair.verify(messageBytes, signatureBytes)) {
+      throw new UnauthorizedException("Invalid Stellar signature");
+    }
+  } catch (error) {
+    if (error instanceof UnauthorizedException) {
+      throw error;
+    }
+    throw new UnauthorizedException("Invalid Stellar signature");
+  }
+}
 
 /**
  * Verify that `signature` (base64) over `message` (utf-8) was produced by
@@ -42,7 +97,11 @@ export function verifyStellarSignature(
 /**
  * Build the canonical message that a user must sign to cancel an intent.
  */
-export function buildCancelMessage(intentId: string): string {
+export function buildCancelMessage(intentId: string, context?: IntentSignatureContext, user?: string): string {
+  if (context) return buildV2IntentMessage(context, "cancel", intentId, { user: user ?? "" });
+
+  return `cancel:${intentId}`;
+}
   return `cancel:${intentId}`;
 }
 
@@ -56,14 +115,32 @@ export function buildWsAuthMessage(solver: string, timestamp: number | string):
 /**
  * Build the canonical message that a solver must sign to accept an intent.
  */
-export function buildAcceptMessage(intentId: string, solver: string): string {
+export function buildAcceptMessage(intentId: string, solver: string, context?: IntentSignatureContext): string {
+  if (context) return buildV2IntentMessage(context, "accept", intentId, { solver });
+
+  return `accept:${intentId}:${solver}`;
+}
   return `accept:${intentId}:${solver}`;
 }
 
 /**
  * Build the canonical message that a solver must sign to fill an intent.
  */
-export function buildFillMessage(intentId: string, solver: string): string {
+export function buildFillMessage(
+  intentId: string,
+  solver: string,
+  context?: IntentSignatureContext,
+  fill?: { fillAmount: string; txHash?: string },
+): string {
+  if (context) {
+    return buildV2IntentMessage(context, "fill", intentId, {
+      solver,
+      fillAmount: fill?.fillAmount ?? "",
+      txHash: fill?.txHash ?? null,
+    });
+  }
+  return `fill:${intentId}:${solver}`;
+}
   return `fill:${intentId}:${solver}`;
 }
 
@@ -114,3 +191,16 @@ export function buildDisputeReviewMessage(disputeId: string): string {
 export function buildDisputeDecisionMessage(disputeId: string, resolution: string, reason: string): string {
   return `dispute-decision:${disputeId}:${resolution}:${reason}`;
 }
+
+/**
+ * Build the canonical message that a solver must sign to update their mutable
+ * profile fields (name / supportedChains / supportedTokens / avgFillTime).
+ *
+ * Signing over just the address is sufficient here: it proves control of the
+ * account whose profile is being edited, and the request body is already
+ * constrained by the DTO whitelist so no immutable field can ride along.
+ */
+export function buildUpdateSolverMessage(address: string): string {
+  return `update-solver:${address}`;
+}
+