feat(net): fix TRX inv rate limit bug and add BLOCK inv rate limit

[xxo1shine]

What does this PR do?

Tighten and extend the inbound inventory rate limit on the P2P layer. Two fixes plus a new knob:

1. Fix the TRX-inv counting bug — P2pEventHandlerImpl previously checked count > maxCountIn10s against the existing 10-second window count only, ignoring
   the size of the incoming InventoryMessage. A peer sending a single message with thousands of hashes could slip through whenever the window count alone was still
   under the limit. The check is now count + currentSize > maxCountIn10s, which compares the projected window against the cap.

2. Add a BLOCK-inv rate limit — block inventories were previously unbounded. New per-peer cap on BLOCK inventory hashes per 10s, controlled by:

   • node.maxBlockInvPerSecond (default 10, minimum 1)
   • Wired through NodeConfig.maxBlockInvPerSecond (auto-bound by ConfigBeanFactory, clamped in postProcess())
   • Bridged to runtime via Args.applyNodeConfig → CommonParameter.maxBlockInvPerSecond
   • Default value mirrored in reference.conf

3. Refactor for readability — the inline TRX check inside processMessage was extracted into checkInvRateLimit(PeerConnection, InventoryMessage), which now
   handles both TRX and BLOCK branches uniformly.

4. Tests — P2pEventHandlerImplTest adds testCheckInvRateLimitTrxBoundary and testCheckInvRateLimitBlockBoundary to cover the at-limit and over-limit cases
   for both inventory types.

Why are these changes required?

1. The original TRX check was a TOCTOU-style undercount. A burst peer could legitimately stay below count while still pushing the system over maxCountIn10s
   in a single message — the gating condition simply did not include the new payload. This let an attacker amplify by batching: one message of 10,000 inventory hashes
   was indistinguishable from one of 10. The fix restores the intended invariant: projected window size must stay under the cap, not the current window alone.

2. Unbounded BLOCK-inv was an unmonitored attack surface. TRX inv had a cap; block inv did not. A misbehaving or malicious peer could flood block-inv hashes —
   each requiring lookup work on the receiver — without any throttling, consuming I/O and CPU. Adding a bounded maxBlockInvPerSecond closes the gap symmetrically,
   with a default tuned for the protocol's healthy block rate (~3 s interval, so 10/s is generous headroom for retransmits and forks).

3. Surfacing the limit as a config knob (not a constant) lets operators tune it without a release, which is important the first time a new limit ships in case
   the default proves too tight on real networks.

4. Refactoring out checkInvRateLimit keeps the dispatch path in processMessage short and makes the two inventory-type branches uniform — easier to reason
   about, and easier to add a third inventory type later without re-introducing the old undercount bug.

This PR has been tested by:

• Unit Tests
• Manual Testing

Follow up

Extra details

Fixes #6659