spec: resolver-trusted-parent

[yihanzhu]

Tracks #271

Specify the supported trusted parent for resolving a real profile outside the test launcher. The existing resolver behavior stays unchanged. This is a high-risk spec-only PR; implementation requires a separately accepted plan.

The spec binds the accepted DR-2 intent (blob eaa322c405502cc0ca7c453814ca0f005f11b48f). It defines the supported entry, pinned parent/runtime/tool identities, environment and descriptor handling, process supervision, cleanup, refusal behavior and complete tests. Direct parent invocation remains test-only; the operator launches the supported entry.

The current continuation preserves the original branch and inherited edits. Independent full-content review and follow-up review closed the identified issues: Linux awk symlinks, exact run-directory contents, jq hardlink directory binding, descriptor-read boundaries, self-path capture before environment scrubbing, interruption/reaping status, cleanup sequencing and parent refusal coverage. No construction-mode or live-execution authority is claimed.

Validation: intent hash link and spec-only scope verified; git diff --check passes; independent content review found no unresolved Important finding in spec blob b81fc2dcbf0358e3c796300b640170425bda511c. Publication, required CI and fresh exact-head/base review remain necessary before G2 acceptance. No runtime tests are claimed for this documentation-only revision.

The artifact's size exception and implementation size estimate are distinct and stated in the spec. This PR accepts no implementation or reduced testing merely because the artifact is large.

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[yihanzhu]

Codex reviewer (cross-vendor, read-only)

Reviewed-head: bd232b1
Reviewed-base: 40582c2
reviewer: gpt-5.5 @ high

Posted verbatim by codex-review.sh (codex exec review --json --base refs/codex-review/276-7784/base in an isolated temp worktree, sandbox forced read-only). Comments only — Codex never pushes, approves, or merges.

The spec currently contradicts the accepted no-network and human-merge constraints and contains an unimplementable parent-side helper provenance requirement. These issues should be fixed before the artifact is accepted as the basis for implementation.

Full review comments:

• [P1] Keep jq resolution offline — /var/folders/rm/bkx4f4b91vqfn79vk02pcd140000gn/T/tmp.VLvsfQnAaX/work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:114-114
  When the pinned jq is missing or has a bad digest, this spec tells resolve-profile.sh to fetch it, but the accepted intent for this component explicitly says the shipped resolver path has “No network” (work/resolver-trusted-parent/intent.md:30-38). Following this would either fail locked-down step-7 runs or put network I/O ahead of the trusted launch boundary, so require a pre-provisioned caller-supplied jq/cache instead of downloading here.

• [P1] Remove yshifu merge authorization — /var/folders/rm/bkx4f4b91vqfn79vk02pcd140000gn/T/tmp.VLvsfQnAaX/work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:142-145
  For this high-risk plan gate, the current repo state has no active construction overlay, so this sentence grants yshifu a merge path that the working rules do not allow; outside an active identity-matching overlay, “Opening a PR ends an agent's authority; the operator merges” (AGENTS.md:405-408, with config/construction-mode.json:95 currently retired). Leaving this in the accepted spec can cause the next plan PR to be merged by the wrong actor.

• [P2] Define an attestable helper provenance check — /var/folders/rm/bkx4f4b91vqfn79vk02pcd140000gn/T/tmp.VLvsfQnAaX/work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:61-62
  If the parent is invoked with a swapped helper binary, it only receives a path to that binary, while changing resolver/v1/nofollow-snapshot.c is out of scope here; without a trusted build receipt, embedded source identity, or having the parent perform the build itself, it cannot prove the helper “was built from the committed source in this run.” As written, this R5 refusal is not implementable as a parent-side check and will force either a weak placeholder check or a test that proves entry-script behavior instead of the stated boundary.

[yihanzhu]

Codex reviewer (cross-vendor, read-only)

Reviewed-head: ebbef0f
Reviewed-base: 40582c2
reviewer: gpt-5.5 @ high

Posted verbatim by codex-review.sh (codex exec review --json --base refs/codex-review/276-35653/base in an isolated temp worktree, sandbox forced read-only). Comments only — Codex never pushes, approves, or merges.

The new high-risk spec contains contradictions and test gaps that would authorize a leaky or insufficiently bound trusted launcher. These should be corrected before accepting the artifact for planning.

Full review comments:

• [P2] Preserve cleanup when replacing the shell — /private/var/folders/rm/bkx4f4b91vqfn79vk02pcd140000gn/T/tmp.RuHl1MweZz/work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:191-193
  When implemented with exec, the entry shell is replaced and its EXIT trap will not run, so the run directory promised earlier as “removed on exit” will leak the compiled parent/helper plus copied jq/awk after every successful invocation. Either avoid exec so the shell can clean up after the parent exits, or make the parent explicitly own removal of the run directory.

• [P1] Bind the helper path the runtime actually executes — /private/var/folders/rm/bkx4f4b91vqfn79vk02pcd140000gn/T/tmp.RuHl1MweZz/work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:106-108
  In the same-uid swap case, checking an opened helper file in the parent does not bind what the runtime later executes, because scripts/lib/profile-resolution.sh invokes $YSTACK_RESOLVER_HELPER by path. As written, the accepted mode 0700 also leaves the helper owner-writable, so the file or directory entry can change after the parent's check; require a non-writable helper/run directory before exec or pass an executable descriptor that the runtime actually uses.

• [P2] Exercise the parent's jq refusal directly — /private/var/folders/rm/bkx4f4b91vqfn79vk02pcd140000gn/T/tmp.RuHl1MweZz/work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:155-157
  With the shipped entry path, a wrong-digest jq is rejected by the entry before the parent runs, so this test requirement can pass while the parent's R5 jq digest/version check is missing or broken. Because R5 makes that a parent refusal, add a direct-parent or otherwise post-entry tamper case that proves the bound jq seen by the parent is rejected.

• [P2] Narrow the read-boundary claim — /private/var/folders/rm/bkx4f4b91vqfn79vk02pcd140000gn/T/tmp.RuHl1MweZz/work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:128-133
  The “no read outside the repositories named in the map” claim is impossible for the shipped path described here: the entry and parent must read the supplied jq, committed C sources, runtime, compiler/system tools, and copied awk before the resolver reads mapped repositories. This should be narrowed to repository/content reads or explicitly list the trusted local inputs, otherwise the accepted spec overstates the security boundary.

[yihanzhu]

Codex reviewer (cross-vendor, read-only)

Reviewed-head: 5a18ff3
Reviewed-base: 40582c2
reviewer: gpt-5.5 @ high

Posted verbatim by codex-review.sh (codex exec review --json --base refs/codex-review/276-41657/base in an isolated temp worktree, sandbox forced read-only). Comments only — Codex never pushes, approves, or merges.

The added spec has actionable issues in the accepted size bound and in requirements that would let the implementation or test proof miss declared boundary guarantees. These should be corrected before the spec is accepted as the basis for planning.

Full review comments:

• [P2] Recalculate the review-size exception — /private/var/folders/rm/bkx4f4b91vqfn79vk02pcd140000gn/T/tmp.ERK6p0B3Pg/work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:17-18
  If the implementation follows R2 and copies the existing launcher's supervisor, limit, error-sanitizing, Darwin, and environment-construction code verbatim, the C file alone is much closer to the current launcher's ~600+ reusable lines than the stated ~260, so the later PR is likely to exceed the accepted 650-1000 range before tests/docs are counted. Because this repo requires review-size exceptions to have an evidence-based range and treats unexplained overruns as blocking (AGENTS.md:103-106), please revise the range before G2 accepts it.

• [P2] Keep compiler temporaries inside the declared boundary — /private/var/folders/rm/bkx4f4b91vqfn79vk02pcd140000gn/T/tmp.ERK6p0B3Pg/work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:289-292
  When cc/clang creates intermediate files, this compile step only places the final binaries in the run directory; without binding the compiler's temp environment, those writes can land in ambient TMPDIR or /tmp, contradicting R7's no-writes-outside-output/run-dir claim and leaving cleanup blind. Require compiler temporaries to be inside the fresh run directory, or relax the write-boundary claim.

• [P2] Exercise cleanup after the run directory exists — /private/var/folders/rm/bkx4f4b91vqfn79vk02pcd140000gn/T/tmp.ERK6p0B3Pg/work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:251-252
  The wrong-digest jq case fails during the pin check, before the design creates the run directory and installs the cleanup trap, so this refusal does not prove that post-mktemp failures are cleaned up. Use a refusal that happens after the run directory is created or after the parent is launched, such as a bad runtime mode or malformed request.

[yihanzhu]

Codex reviewer (cross-vendor, read-only)

Reviewed-head: 52e10fd
Reviewed-base: 40582c2
reviewer: gpt-5.5 @ high

Posted verbatim by codex-review.sh (codex exec review --json --base refs/codex-review/276-47267/base in an isolated temp worktree, sandbox forced read-only). Comments only — Codex never pushes, approves, or merges.

The spec leaves gaps in the trusted-code provenance and signal handling for a high-risk launch boundary, and its required test does not actually cover the parent refusals it claims. These issues should be fixed before accepting the artifact.

Full review comments:

• [P1] Pin the resolver code that the wrapper sources — /private/var/folders/rm/bkx4f4b91vqfn79vk02pcd140000gn/T/tmp.uXN97CM1aF/work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:194-195
  With a working tree where resolver/v1/profile-resolve-runtime.sh still matches the pinned blob but scripts/lib/profile-resolution.sh or resolver/v1/profile-resolution.jq is changed, this check still accepts and /bin/bash immediately sources/loads the changed resolver code before any trusted validation can run. Since this parent is the production provenance boundary, R5 should pin/check the sourced library and jq program, not only the thin wrapper.

• [P1] Stop the resolver process group on entry signals — /private/var/folders/rm/bkx4f4b91vqfn79vk02pcd140000gn/T/tmp.uXN97CM1aF/work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:103-105
  When INT, TERM, or HUP reaches the entry after trusted-launch has forked the resolver, killing only the entry's direct child kills the C supervisor; the supervised resolver is in its own process group, so it can continue without the wall/process supervisor while the trap deletes its run directory. The signal path needs the parent to kill its process group, or another explicit group handoff, before cleanup is claimed.

• [P2] Make R10 cover the R5 parent checks it claims — /private/var/folders/rm/bkx4f4b91vqfn79vk02pcd140000gn/T/tmp.uXN97CM1aF/work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:333-340
  Here R10 claims to prove each R5 refusal, but the named cases do not exercise several parent-owned R5 checks such as runtime blob mismatch, non-absolute/symlink request or map paths, overlong allowlist paths, and the compiled-parent mode check; conversely, malformed request is a runtime parse/input refusal and leaked caller variables are an R3 no-copy invariant. An implementation could omit those parent checks and still satisfy this test plan, so add direct-parent cases for the missing checks or narrow the claim.

[yihanzhu]

Codex reviewer (cross-vendor, read-only)

Reviewed-head: eb96ef6
Reviewed-base: 1095ca4
reviewer: gpt-5.5 @ high

Posted verbatim by codex-review.sh (codex exec review --json --base refs/codex-review/276-56990/base in an isolated temp worktree, sandbox forced read-only). Comments only — Codex never pushes, approves, or merges.

The spec contains contradictory parent pinning requirements and permits degraded signal-test proof for newly added security-boundary behavior. These should be corrected before accepting the artifact.

Full review comments:

• [P2] Scope parent pinning to files it actually checks — /var/folders/rm/bkx4f4b91vqfn79vk02pcd140000gn/T/tmp.wJiYnQ6KbI/work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:246-251
  When trusted-launch is invoked directly, this says the parent rejects a mismatch in any runtime-loaded file, but the same R5 section later says the parent only re-pins files 1–3 and direct callers lose the module checks. That leaves the plan and tests with incompatible security requirements for the five jq modules, so please scope this parent refusal to the parent-pinned subset or move the missing checks into the parent.

• [P2] Make the signal test exercise the signal path — /var/folders/rm/bkx4f4b91vqfn79vk02pcd140000gn/T/tmp.wJiYnQ6KbI/work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:563-568
  When the default-profile run finishes before SIGTERM lands, this allows the test to pass with a fallback that explicitly does not exercise the new parent handler or kill(-pgid, ...) path. In that timing, an implementation that leaves the resolver process group running could still pass CI, so the spec should require a deterministic long-running fixture or direct-parent child that makes the signal path mandatory.

[yihanzhu]

Codex reviewer (cross-vendor, read-only)

Reviewed-head: a69c86e
Reviewed-base: 1095ca4
reviewer: gpt-5.5 @ high

Posted verbatim by codex-review.sh (codex exec review --json --base refs/codex-review/276-65212/base in an isolated temp worktree, sandbox forced read-only). Comments only — Codex never pushes, approves, or merges.

The spec contains internally inconsistent and infeasible test requirements for a high-risk security-boundary component. These should be corrected before accepting the artifact because the downstream plan and proof would otherwise be built on inaccurate requirements.

Full review comments:

• [P2] Make the unsupported-platform refusal testable — /private/var/folders/rm/bkx4f4b91vqfn79vk02pcd140000gn/T/tmp.WmCo81gjOE/work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:490-495
  On normal supported CI hosts, the entry's platform check is described as using fixed /usr/bin/uname with no PATH/env override, so there is no input that can drive an unsupported platform through the shipped entry. Keeping this as an R10 refusal either leaves an untestable required case or forces adding a test-only platform override to the shipped security wrapper; please specify a testable seam or downgrade this to manual/code-review coverage.

• [P2] Fix the exact read allowlist — /private/var/folders/rm/bkx4f4b91vqfn79vk02pcd140000gn/T/tmp.WmCo81gjOE/work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:454-458
  When the plan/tests treat R7 as an exact read claim, this “whole list” omits tools this same spec requires, including /usr/bin/uname for platform selection, /usr/bin/mktemp for the run directory, /bin/rm for cleanup, and the concrete compiler path. That makes the spec internally inconsistent: an implementation that performs those required steps violates the stated allowlist, while a test based on this list would miss real local inputs.

• [P3] Use a reachable overlong-path check — /private/var/folders/rm/bkx4f4b91vqfn79vk02pcd140000gn/T/tmp.WmCo81gjOE/work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:521-523
  For a direct-parent test where the jq argument exceeds PATH_MAX, the copied launcher validates regular_absolute(argv[4], 1) before the cited strlen(argv[4]) guard, so such a path fails as not openable/regular before reaching portable-profile-resolution-launcher.c:662-665. This case therefore won't prove the allowlisted-value buffer refusal it claims; use a reachable overlong value/check or adjust the expected owner/error.

[yihanzhu]

Codex reviewer (cross-vendor, read-only)

Reviewed-head: a8a9374
Reviewed-base: 1095ca4
reviewer: gpt-5.5 @ high

Posted verbatim by codex-review.sh (codex exec review --json --base refs/codex-review/276-71165/base in an isolated temp worktree, sandbox forced read-only). Comments only — Codex never pushes, approves, or merges.

The spec adds a materially inaccurate read-boundary claim and widens the write surface beyond the accepted intent. These should be corrected before the artifact is accepted and used to drive implementation.

Full review comments:

• [P2] Include process-table reads in R7’s read scope — /private/var/folders/rm/bkx4f4b91vqfn79vk02pcd140000gn/T/tmp.M8nNnsywqd/work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:460-474
  For implementations that copy the R4 supervisor, the parent also reads host process-table state: on Linux process_group_count opens /proc and /proc/<pid>/stat, and on Darwin the copied memory/process checks use proc_listallpids/proc_pidinfo. This R7 list says the entry and parent read only the listed files/directories, so the documented read boundary is false on every run that enforces process limits; add those host process-table reads to the scope or narrow the claim.

• [P2] Keep scratch writes inside the accepted output scope — /private/var/folders/rm/bkx4f4b91vqfn79vk02pcd140000gn/T/tmp.M8nNnsywqd/work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:432-438
  When TMPDIR points outside the caller's output directory, this authorizes compiler outputs, copied tools, and intermediates in a second write root, but the accepted intent constrains the work to “no writes outside the caller's own output” (work/resolver-trusted-parent/intent.md:36). Either put this scratch/run directory under the caller-owned output scope or update the accepted intent before G2 accepts the wider write surface.

[yihanzhu]

Codex reviewer (cross-vendor, read-only)

Reviewed-head: b568fc0
Reviewed-base: e9bea97
reviewer: gpt-5.5 @ high

Posted verbatim by codex-review.sh (codex exec review --json --base refs/codex-review/276-25368/base in an isolated temp worktree, sandbox forced read-only). Comments only — Codex never pushes, approves, or merges.

The spec leaves security-boundary behavior under-specified in ways that would either write into an unvalidated output root or make the proposed environment tests/provenance claims unreliable. These should be fixed before accepting the artifact as the basis for implementation.

Full review comments:

• [P1] Validate the output root before creating .run — /var/folders/rm/bkx4f4b91vqfn79vk02pcd140000gn/T/tmp.pzI2u46g2t/work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:246-249
  When <output> is a symlink, not caller-owned, or not mode 0700, the entry still creates .run and runs both compiles before the parent performs the R5 validation. That lets the first writes and compiler intermediates land in a directory that is not yet proven to be the caller's own trusted output root, violating the accepted intent's write-root constraint (work/resolver-trusted-parent/intent.md:36); move the owner/mode/non-symlink/emptiness validation before mkdir, or write only through an already-validated directory handle.

• [P1] Do not test direct-parent cleanup with loader vars — /var/folders/rm/bkx4f4b91vqfn79vk02pcd140000gn/T/tmp.pzI2u46g2t/work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:838-840
  When the polluted direct-parent run includes LD_PRELOAD or DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES, those variables are consumed by the dynamic loader before trusted-launch reaches main, so the parent cannot prove it ignores them and the test can emit loader diagnostics or run injected code before the clean environment is built. This conflicts with the spec's own boundary note at work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:1155-1158; drive loader-variable pollution through the entry after it scrubs them, or remove them from the direct-parent invariant.

• [P2] Scrub the compiler environment before using /usr/bin/cc — /var/folders/rm/bkx4f4b91vqfn79vk02pcd140000gn/T/tmp.pzI2u46g2t/work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:1001-1004
  When the caller has compiler-affecting variables such as CPATH, C_INCLUDE_PATH, LIBRARY_PATH, SDKROOT, or DEVELOPER_DIR, these /usr/bin/cc invocations still use caller-selected headers or toolchain inputs even though $CC is ignored. That undermines the provenance claim that pinned sources plus a fixed compiler invocation define the parent/helper; run the pin checks and compiles under an explicit whitelisted environment, rather than clearing only loader/shell variables afterward.

[yihanzhu]

Codex reviewer (cross-vendor, read-only)

Reviewed-head: d8da6ec
Reviewed-base: 986531a
reviewer: gpt-5.5 @ high

Posted verbatim by codex-review.sh (codex exec review --json --base refs/codex-review/276-68362/base in an isolated temp worktree, sandbox forced read-only). Comments only — Codex never pushes, approves, or merges.

The spec has blocking contradictions and security-boundary gaps that would either make the planned test fail or permit behavior the spec explicitly promises to prevent. These should be resolved before using this artifact as the implementation contract.

Full review comments:

• [P1] Scrub loader variables before running external tools — /private/var/folders/rm/bkx4f4b91vqfn79vk02pcd140000gn/T/tmp.5PdRu8g1Fj/work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:405-407
  On Linux when the caller has LD_PRELOAD/LD_LIBRARY_PATH set, starting the parent via /usr/bin/env -i does not prevent injected code from running below the entry: the dynamic loader processes those variables for /usr/bin/env itself, and earlier absolute tools such as uname/stat run before this point as well. R10's marker assertion would therefore observe processes below the entry, and a malicious preload could tamper with pin checks, compilation, or launch before trusted-launch starts; the entry needs to scrub these variables with shell builtins before any external command or use a launch mechanism that does not execute an injected env process.

• [P2] Create pin-check scratch directories before using them — /private/var/folders/rm/bkx4f4b91vqfn79vk02pcd140000gn/T/tmp.5PdRu8g1Fj/work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:1255-1263
  Following this sequence runs the pin checks under the R1 env -i line, which sets TMPDIR=<output>/.run/tmp and HOME=<output>/.run/home, before the next step creates .run, tmp, or home; R10 also says wrong-digest pin failures happen before any .run exists. As written, either the hash/version commands run with nonexistent scratch/home directories or the cleanup assertions are wrong, so the spec needs a pre-pin scratch location inside the output root or the mkdir/cleanup order updated consistently.

• [P2] Use the checked output fd for later sandbox writes — /private/var/folders/rm/bkx4f4b91vqfn79vk02pcd140000gn/T/tmp.5PdRu8g1Fj/work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:491-500
  With a same-uid race after this descriptor check, the output path can be renamed and replaced with a symlink before the copied supervisor uses the sandbox string to create home, tmp, child.stdout, and child.stderr; the fstat on the old descriptor does not protect those later path-based writes. Since R7 promises one write root and this paragraph calls the parent pass authoritative, the parent should create/open sandbox entries relative to the checked directory fd, such as with mkdirat/openat, or explicitly record the residual.

[yihanzhu]

Codex reviewer (cross-vendor, read-only)

Reviewed-head: 0540b47
Reviewed-base: 986531a
reviewer: gpt-5.5 @ high

Posted verbatim by codex-review.sh (codex exec review --json --base refs/codex-review/276-73614/base in an isolated temp worktree, sandbox forced read-only). Comments only — Codex never pushes, approves, or merges.

The spec has security-boundary gaps around supported Darwin writes, same-uid replacement of the run directory path, and the entry script's clean-path handoff. These should be resolved before treating the artifact as an accepted basis for implementation.

Full review comments:

• [P1] Keep xcrun cache inside the output root — /private/var/folders/rm/bkx4f4b91vqfn79vk02pcd140000gn/T/tmp.lKu0VtvywA/work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:498-501
  On supported Darwin runs, this assumption is what keeps R7's one-write-root promise, but xcrun does not keep its lookup cache under TMPDIR; /usr/bin/cc and often /usr/bin/git can create xcrun_db-* under the per-user temp directory or /tmp before the real tool runs. A Darwin invocation following this spec can therefore write outside <output> or fail in restricted temp dirs, so the plan needs to avoid the shim/cache or change the write-root claim.

• [P1] Protect the .run path from parent-directory renames — /private/var/folders/rm/bkx4f4b91vqfn79vk02pcd140000gn/T/tmp.lKu0VtvywA/work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:520-524
  When another same-uid process can write the 0700 output directory, it can rename <output>/.run itself and replace it with a new .run after the parent checks it; that does not require chmoding the 0500 run dir. Since the runtime later resolves helper, jq, and PATH entries by the <output>/.run/... strings, it can execute the replacement even though the checked descriptor still points at the original directory, so either protect the parent directory/pass descriptors or state this broader residual instead of saying replacement needs chmod.

• [P2] Reject forged clean-path invocations — /private/var/folders/rm/bkx4f4b91vqfn79vk02pcd140000gn/T/tmp.lKu0VtvywA/work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:320-323
  With this dispatch, a caller can invoke resolve-profile.sh __resolve_profile_clean ... with five args and land on the clean path directly. That skips the empty-environment re-exec for the main body, leaving validation and compile logic in the original bash process whose loader already consumed the caller's environment; make the clean handoff unforgeable or reject marker invocations that did not come from the re-exec.

[yihanzhu]

Codex reviewer (cross-vendor, read-only)

Reviewed-head: 5619bfc
Reviewed-base: 1b46de0
reviewer: gpt-5.5 @ high

Posted verbatim by codex-review.sh (codex exec review --json --base refs/codex-review/276-80052/base in an isolated temp worktree, sandbox forced read-only). Comments only — Codex never pushes, approves, or merges.

The spec leaves a path re-resolution hole in the parent output handling and explicitly permits Darwin writes outside the output root despite the accepted intent forbidding them. These issues should be resolved before using the spec as the basis for the high-risk implementation.

Full review comments:

• [P2] Keep supervisor reads fd-relative too — /private/var/folders/rm/bkx4f4b91vqfn79vk02pcd140000gn/T/tmp.OYrtI0rvCZ/work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:760-763
  When a same-uid process can rename or replace the output directory after the child writes, changing only creation to openat is not enough: the copied supervisor later calls empty_regular_file(stderr_path) and stream_file(stdout_path) by path, so the parent can still read a different child.stdout/child.stderr than the descriptors it gave the child. Since this paragraph claims there is no path left to re-resolve, the spec should also require the later stderr checks and stdout streaming to use the checked directory descriptor/open file descriptors.

• [P2] Reconcile Darwin cache writes with the intent — /private/var/folders/rm/bkx4f4b91vqfn79vk02pcd140000gn/T/tmp.OYrtI0rvCZ/work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:985-996
  For the supported Darwin platforms, this permits /usr/bin/cc and /usr/bin/git to write xcrun_db under the per-user temp directory, but the accepted intent requires “No network, no credentials, no writes outside the caller's own output” (work/resolver-trusted-parent/intent.md:36) and R7 still frames the output path as the only write root. A plan built from this spec can therefore satisfy the spec while violating the G1 constraint; either remove/limit Darwin support, use a toolchain path that does not write outside the output root, or send the changed constraint back through the artifact chain.

[yihanzhu]

Codex reviewer (cross-vendor, read-only)

Reviewed-head: 83a581c
Reviewed-base: e62b90b
reviewer: gpt-5.5 @ high

Posted verbatim by codex-review.sh (codex exec review --json --base refs/codex-review/276-85067/base in an isolated temp worktree, sandbox forced read-only). Comments only — Codex never pushes, approves, or merges.

The spec contains two actionable correctness issues: one can lead the planned signal handler to signal a reaped/reused pid, and one makes a required regression test ineffective. These should be fixed before treating the artifact as accepted.

Full review comments:

• [P2] Skip SIGKILL after the handler already reaped the target — /var/folders/rm/bkx4f4b91vqfn79vk02pcd140000gn/T/tmp.jluVUlWlBX/work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:4033-4035
  When the bounded waitpid(..., WNOHANG) succeeds during the grace wait, this instruction still sends SIGKILL and performs a final reap "whichever way the loop left". In the pre-resolver-helper branch, that means pre_child has already been reaped, so kill(pre_child, SIGKILL) can target a reused pid and reopens the stale-pid/stranger-kill class this signal design is trying to close; track whether the target was reaped and avoid signalling a reaped single-pid target.

• [P2] Restore blocking mode before the full-pipe test run — /var/folders/rm/bkx4f4b91vqfn79vk02pcd140000gn/T/tmp.jluVUlWlBX/work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:6581-6584
  In this full-pipe case, setting O_NONBLOCK on a copy of the pipe write end leaves the shared open file description non-blocking for the entry unless the filler restores the original flags before launch. With stderr already non-blocking, an unconditional bash printf to the full pipe returns EAGAIN instead of hanging, so the test can pass even if the entry fails to omit the diagnostic.

[yihanzhu]

Codex reviewer (cross-vendor, read-only)

Reviewed-head: 794611c
Reviewed-base: e62b90b
reviewer: gpt-5.5 @ high

Posted verbatim by codex-review.sh (codex exec review --json --base refs/codex-review/276-86366/base in an isolated temp worktree, sandbox forced read-only). Comments only — Codex never pushes, approves, or merges.

The spec is hash-linked and risk-classified, but it omits the required exact review_size record for this oversized artifact PR. That leaves the manual plan-gate compliance record incomplete.

Review comment:

• [P2] Record this spec's review_size value — /private/var/folders/rm/bkx4f4b91vqfn79vk02pcd140000gn/T/tmp.5lkVIhDbYR/work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:803-803
  This waiver describes a size exception for the artifact PR, but it never records the exact review_size: accepted-exception value for this spec; the only exact review_size token in the file is explicitly for the future implementation PR. Since the plan gate requires review_size: standard|accepted-exception to be recorded with the one-concern range (work/README.md:71-73), future reviewers/checks can treat this 7,878-line spec PR as missing its own review-size record despite the prose waiver.

[yihanzhu]

Codex reviewer (cross-vendor, read-only)

Reviewed-head: fce5309
Reviewed-base: e62b90b
reviewer: gpt-5.5 @ high

Posted verbatim by codex-review.sh (codex exec review --json --base refs/codex-review/276-87255/base in an isolated temp worktree, sandbox forced read-only). Comments only — Codex never pushes, approves, or merges.

The spec leaves a direct-parent path able to execute an untrusted awk next to a valid jq, and its fd cleanup design can leak high-numbered caller descriptors to helper children. These are security-boundary issues that should be corrected before accepting the patch.

Full review comments:

• [P1] Require bound jq/awk to stay in .run — /var/folders/rm/bkx4f4b91vqfn79vk02pcd140000gn/T/tmp.fX0lobu0f3/work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:4912-4920
  With direct trusted-launch invocations, checking only the helper and parent binary leaves the bound jq directory untrusted: the parent still sets PATH=<dir of the bound jq>, and the runtime derives and executes $tool_root/awk after only [ -x ] && [ ! -L ] (scripts/lib/profile-resolution.sh:673-676). A caller can pass a valid pinned jq from another directory containing their own executable awk, so the resolver can execute caller-controlled code despite the parent checks; bind jq/awk to the checked .run directory or validate them alongside the helper.

• [P2] Do not cap fd cleanup at current soft limit — /var/folders/rm/bkx4f4b91vqfn79vk02pcd140000gn/T/tmp.fX0lobu0f3/work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:4724-4729
  If a direct caller opens a high-numbered fd and then lowers RLIMIT_NOFILE before execing the parent, that existing fd remains open even though its number is above rlim_cur. Capping the close loop at the smaller current limit leaves that descriptor inherited by the SHA/jq probe children, contradicting the “no caller state reaches the parent's children” claim; enumerate open fds or close across a range that covers already-open descriptors instead of using the current soft limit as a ceiling.

• [P3] Document omitted entry-signal lines — /var/folders/rm/bkx4f4b91vqfn79vk02pcd140000gn/T/tmp.fX0lobu0f3/work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:5474-5477
  For callers whose stderr is a pipe, FIFO, or socket, R1 says the entry deliberately omits its entry-signal: line to avoid blocking, but this documentation requirement promises an interrupted launch prints that line beside the parent line. An implementation following R1 will make the docs false for piped stderr; mention the same best-effort/omission condition here too.

[yihanzhu]

Codex reviewer (cross-vendor, read-only)

Reviewed-head: 7bfc9b6
Reviewed-base: e62b90b
reviewer: gpt-5.5 @ high

Posted verbatim by codex-review.sh (codex exec review --json --base refs/codex-review/276-88689/base in an isolated temp worktree, sandbox forced read-only). Comments only — Codex never pushes, approves, or merges.

The spec currently authorizes a direct parent path that does not preserve the pinned dependency boundary, and it also specifies a signal diagnostic path that can still hang on blocking terminal/character stderr. These are blocking correctness issues for a high-risk launch-boundary spec.

Full review comments:

• [P1] Do not support direct launches without entry pins — /var/folders/rm/bkx4f4b91vqfn79vk02pcd140000gn/T/tmp.VgjueIZWFB/work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:4812-4813
  When trusted-launch is invoked directly, which this spec says the operator and R10 do, it bypasses the entry's source and module pin checks: the direct caller gets only files 1-3 pinned, and the helper check is only owner/mode. A caller-owned 0500 helper or edited jq module can therefore pass these parent checks and then be executed/evaluated by the runtime, violating the pinned-dependency boundary for exactly the direct path named here; either make direct parent invocation test-only/unsupported or require equivalent pins before launch.

• [P2] Do not treat TTY stderr as nonblocking — /var/folders/rm/bkx4f4b91vqfn79vk02pcd140000gn/T/tmp.VgjueIZWFB/work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:2905-2906
  When stderr is a TTY or other character device whose output is flow-controlled or whose pty master is not being read, this branch still runs bash printf, but that write can block. That breaks the signal-path guarantee that the entry always reaches cleanup and exits with 128 + signal; restrict the diagnostic to actually safe targets such as regular files, or use a nonblocking writer.

[yihanzhu]

Codex reviewer (cross-vendor, read-only)

Reviewed-head: d362560
Reviewed-base: e62b90b
reviewer: gpt-5.5 @ high

Posted verbatim by codex-review.sh (codex exec review --json --base refs/codex-review/276-90072/base in an isolated temp worktree, sandbox forced read-only). Comments only — Codex never pushes, approves, or merges.

The spec contains a security-boundary overclaim that conflicts with its own later description of a pre-close fork inheriting caller descriptors.

Review comment:

• [P2] Correct the descriptor-close guarantee — /private/var/folders/rm/bkx4f4b91vqfn79vk02pcd140000gn/T/tmp.bIMhN5Jwc8/work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:5547-5548
  In a supported entry invocation where the caller has fd 7 open to a credential/socket/write handle, this statement overclaims the boundary: R1 specifies nofile=$(ulimit -n) and says bash 3.2 forks one child before the close loop (work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:3414-3420), so that child briefly inherits fd 7. R7 should carry that one-child residual or the precondition needs a fork-free shape; otherwise a plan can satisfy R1 while falsely claiming every child starts after descriptor cleanup.

[yihanzhu]

Codex reviewer (cross-vendor, read-only)

Reviewed-head: a558ffe
Reviewed-base: e62b90b
reviewer: gpt-5.5 @ high

Posted verbatim by codex-review.sh (codex exec review --json --base refs/codex-review/276-93126/base in an isolated temp worktree, sandbox forced read-only). Comments only — Codex never pushes, approves, or merges.

The added spec mandates a descriptor-closing sequence that can silently fail under a plausible inherited-fd state, undermining a stated security boundary. That should be corrected before accepting the artifact.

Review comment:

• [P1] Close inherited fds before capping the fd table — /private/var/folders/rm/bkx4f4b91vqfn79vk02pcd140000gn/T/tmp.jisCZKgUvU/work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:3361-3362
  This sequence fails when the caller already occupies every descriptor below the normalized soft limit, such as fds 3-255 before the 256 cap: after lowering the limit, bash has no free fd to open /dev/fd, so the glob can expand only to the literal * and the loop closes nothing. That preserves exactly the credential/socket/write descriptors this requirement says must be removed before later child processes, breaking R7's one-write-root and no-leaked-descriptor claims.

[yihanzhu]

Codex reviewer (cross-vendor, read-only)

Reviewed-head: ec23df1
Reviewed-base: e62b90b
reviewer: gpt-5.5 @ high

Posted verbatim by codex-review.sh (codex exec review --json --base refs/codex-review/276-95009/base in an isolated temp worktree, sandbox forced read-only). Comments only — Codex never pushes, approves, or merges.

The added high-risk spec contains internal contradictions in security-relevant requirements. These should be corrected before it is used to drive implementation and tests.

Full review comments:

• [P2] Update the parent fork count for all hash children — /private/var/folders/rm/bkx4f4b91vqfn79vk02pcd140000gn/T/tmp.tOr5u27vED/work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:4679-4683
  When a signal arrives during one of the five new module-hash forks, this rule can be read as protecting only the old three blob-id children, even though R5 now requires eight parent-pinned SHA-1 checks. Please update this every-fork mask rule to match the widened parent-pinned set so the implementation does not leave the module hash children outside the publish/reap protection.

• [P2] Update stale soft-limit invariant for the 1024 rung — /private/var/folders/rm/bkx4f4b91vqfn79vk02pcd140000gn/T/tmp.tOr5u27vED/work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:3881-3884
  On callers whose hard limit allows the new 1024 rung, the entry should run downstream commands with a soft limit of 1024, but this normative paragraph still says the postcondition is only 256 or 64. That contradiction can lead the plan or tests to assert the old limit and miss the high-headroom path the preceding section adds.

• [P2] Keep E_* printing out of the external command allowlist — /private/var/folders/rm/bkx4f4b91vqfn79vk02pcd140000gn/T/tmp.tOr5u27vED/work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:6191-6191
  For early E_RUNTIME paths before the scrub/re-exec, implementing this as /usr/bin/printf would run an external binary before the section’s own “first external command is /usr/bin/env” boundary; implementing those paths with the builtin printf instead makes this exact command allowlist/R10 grep stale. Please separate /usr/bin/printf uses for the blob/shim data writes from refusal-line printing.

[yihanzhu]

Codex reviewer (cross-vendor, read-only)

Reviewed-head: 95cdf5b
Reviewed-base: e62b90b
reviewer: gpt-5.5 @ high

Posted verbatim by codex-review.sh (codex exec review --json --base refs/codex-review/276-96069/base in an isolated temp worktree, sandbox forced read-only). Comments only — Codex never pushes, approves, or merges.

The added spec contains signal-handling requirements that would direct the implementation toward incorrect status handling and contradict its own command-substitution rule. These should be corrected before accepting the artifact as the implementation contract.

Full review comments:

• [P2] Preserve the parent status when wait reaps it — /var/folders/rm/bkx4f4b91vqfn79vk02pcd140000gn/T/tmp.QxKBGrQzuB/work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:2709-2714
  When a signal arrives after wait_interrupted='' but before wait "$parent_pid" actually blocks, the trap sets wait_interrupted=1; if the parent then exits normally before another signal interrupts wait, this loop discards the real status even though that wait reaped the parent, and the next iteration can report 127 or a synthetic signal status instead. This contradicts the surrounding R1 text that this window reports the parent's real status, so the implementation/test plan should distinguish a pre-wait recorded signal from a wait that was actually interrupted.

• [P2] Avoid inline uname substitutions in the platform check — /var/folders/rm/bkx4f4b91vqfn79vk02pcd140000gn/T/tmp.QxKBGrQzuB/work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:6710-6711
  This prescribed platform-check shape runs both /usr/bin/uname calls inside the case word, but R1 explicitly says the uname substitutions must assign output, capture status, run checkpoint, and only then refuse. If a terminal signal interrupts one of these commands, an implementation following this shape can fall into the unsupported-platform refusal path instead of the promised signal path, so the spec should show the three-step form here too.

[yihanzhu]

Codex reviewer (cross-vendor, read-only)

Reviewed-head: b7a3f86
Reviewed-base: e62b90b
reviewer: gpt-5.5 @ high

Posted verbatim by codex-review.sh (codex exec review --json --base refs/codex-review/276-3591/base in an isolated temp worktree, sandbox forced read-only). Comments only — Codex never pushes, approves, or merges.

The spec has two actionable inconsistencies around the supported launch contract and the documented non-privileged refusal behavior. These should be fixed before the artifact is accepted because they would misdirect the implementation and docs for a security-boundary component.

Full review comments:

• [P2] Make the shebang launch actually invocable — /var/folders/rm/bkx4f4b91vqfn79vk02pcd140000gn/T/tmp.XBckrB7IKU/work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:4423-4426
  This makes executing the file via its #!/bin/bash -p shebang one of the two supported launches, but the spec never requires the new entry to be committed executable, and the re-exec path later requires ${BASH_SOURCE[0]} to already be absolute. A common repo-root invocation like resolver/v1/resolve-profile.sh ... would therefore either fail with permission denied if the file lands as 100644 (not caught because the manifest only checks scripts/*.sh executability; AGENTS.md:96-99) or refuse on the absolute-path check; require 100755 and either resolve the self path or document/test an absolute entry path.

• [P2] Narrow the non-privileged refusal claim — /var/folders/rm/bkx4f4b91vqfn79vk02pcd140000gn/T/tmp.XBckrB7IKU/work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:6803-6806
  This promises more than the entry can enforce: the earlier marker-branch discussion says a non--p Bash process can run caller pollution before the first statement and even shadow case or exit, so documenting that any invocation without -p exits 78 is false in the exact unsupported scenario being called out. Please narrow this to the clean non--p case or explicitly say polluted non--p direct/marker invocations are outside the safety claim; otherwise the docs will promise a security refusal the shell cannot reliably provide.

[yihanzhu]

Codex reviewer (cross-vendor, read-only)

Reviewed-head: 70779e6
Reviewed-base: e62b90b
reviewer: gpt-5.5 @ high

Posted verbatim by codex-review.sh (codex exec review --json --base refs/codex-review/276-4872/base in an isolated temp worktree, sandbox forced read-only). Comments only — Codex never pushes, approves, or merges.

The added spec contains several contradictions and missing requirements around supported Linux behavior, the parent security boundary, and the stated test coverage. These would likely lead to a broken or under-specified implementation if accepted as-is.

Full review comments:

• [P1] Allow symlinked /usr/bin/awk on Linux — /private/var/folders/rm/bkx4f4b91vqfn79vk02pcd140000gn/T/tmp.1OJhh40D4B/work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:6313-6314
  On Debian/Ubuntu-style Linux systems, /usr/bin/awk is commonly a symlink through alternatives, so opening it with O_NOFOLLOW makes every otherwise valid Linux launch fail before the resolver runs. Since Linux:x86_64 is a supported platform, either compare the resolved host awk that the entry's /bin/cp /usr/bin/awk actually copied or explicitly require/test a regular-file awk installation.

• [P2] Require an exact .run entry set — /private/var/folders/rm/bkx4f4b91vqfn79vk02pcd140000gn/T/tmp.1OJhh40D4B/work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:6325-6328
  For a direct-parent invocation, the caller builds .run by hand, and the parent checks the four expected files but never lists the run directory to reject extras. That means a .run pre-populated with an extra cat, wc, mktemp, etc. can still satisfy these checks while PATH=<.run>:/usr/bin:/bin lets runtime/core scripts find those extras, contradicting the “no fifth entry” security claim here.

• [P2] Include /dev/fd in the read boundary — /private/var/folders/rm/bkx4f4b91vqfn79vk02pcd140000gn/T/tmp.1OJhh40D4B/work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:6579-6582
  Both shipped files now inspect /dev/fd to close inherited descriptors (the entry via a glob and the parent via opendir/readdir), but this “fixed, listed set of trusted local inputs, and nothing else” omits that host-state read. As written, R7's exact read claim and R10's coverage plan can pass while the implementation performs an unlisted filesystem read; add /dev/fd enumeration as a stated read/residual or change the close design.

• [P2] Narrow the signal-forwarding promise — /private/var/folders/rm/bkx4f4b91vqfn79vk02pcd140000gn/T/tmp.1OJhh40D4B/work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:2560-2562
  This says that once a parent exists the entry always forwards the signal and exits 128 + signal, but the loop later intentionally preserves the parent's real status when the parent has already exited before the job-table check can forward (for example the measured 7/42 cases). That makes the top-level R1 contract conflict with the detailed algorithm, so an implementer or test can choose either behavior and still point to the spec.

• [P2] Cover the missing parent refusal cases — /private/var/folders/rm/bkx4f4b91vqfn79vk02pcd140000gn/T/tmp.1OJhh40D4B/work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md:7248-7262
  Group 2 is the only coverage for the parent's own R5 checks, but this list omits some parent-side refusals R5 requires, including a non-absolute repository-map path and an output directory that is not owned by the caller or is itself a symlink. The entry-level cases refuse before the parent starts, so those parent checks could be absent or miswired while this test plan still reports “the parent's R5 refusals are proved.”

[yihanzhu]

Full G2 content-review conclusion: no unresolved Important finding. Required CI and operator G2 acceptance remain pending.

Reviewed tuple:

• Reviewer: independent Codex subagent /root/resolver_review, separate from author.
• PR: https://github.com/yihanzhu/ystack/pull/276
• Branch: ystack/spec/resolver-trusted-parent
• Published-head identity in supplied API response: 8e4015924482e79ab1aa6413360e6bbfd95e1fed
• Base: ec40e665407253eb1a081a657f564a0efcfdc32b
• Spec blob: b81fc2dcbf0358e3c796300b640170425bda511c
• Accepted intent blob: eaa322c405502cc0ca7c453814ca0f005f11b48f
• Local worktree: clean.

This conclusion combines substantive prior review with a fresh base review. I previously read the complete 10,003-line spec, relevant accepted resolver contracts, and the complete copied 702-line launcher. I subsequently reviewed the entire correction diff producing the current 10,025-line blob and its affected surrounding contracts. This turn verified that exact blob is unchanged, read the complete seven-file base delta introduced by CI sharding, and checked its implications for the spec. I did not substitute a bounded review for the full artifact review.

Bugs: No unresolved Important finding. The seven earlier finding groups remain resolved. The new base changes CI execution and documentation; it does not change the resolver runtime, library, core contracts, copied launcher, or materializer source on which this review depends. Filename-based suite discovery remains compatible with the future focused test required by the spec.

Security: No unresolved Important finding. The entry-only supported launch, direct-parent test boundary, pinning, descriptor and environment handling, signal/cleanup requirements, and explicitly documented residuals remain intact. This PR introduces no runtime implementation, credential access, installation, activation, or construction-mode authority.

Compliance: No unresolved Important content finding. Verified:

• Only work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md differs from the reviewed base.
• HEAD is an ordinary two-parent merge: c37c411bb31c67454cb517391bd6ee485371f488, then the exact new base.
• The intent hash link remains correct.
• risk: high and the artifact size exception remain explicit; the implementation estimate is separate.
• Current AGENTS.md’s CI update was read; REVIEW.md is unchanged from the previously fully read blob fb40e1abf4c2e741a797f22ae1b334d9b6cb8a63.
• Construction mode is retired, so normal artifact gates apply.
• Supplied API body uses Tracks #271, describes spec-only scope, and claims neither runtime-test completion nor implementation acceptance.
• git diff --check passes.

The supplied API response matches the local head/base, reports PR OPEN with no labels, and shows CI still pending. My independent gh pr view attempt failed to connect to GitHub, so remote observations rely on the manager-supplied API response rather than a second live retrieval.

This is clean full-content review evidence for the exact tuple above, not a completed CI gate, G2 acceptance, or merge authorization. The manager must verify final required CI and unchanged remote head/base before the operator’s G2 decision.

[yihanzhu]

Final independent review: PASS — no unresolved Important findings; required CI is green. Operator G2 acceptance remains pending.

Exact reviewed identity:

• PR: #276
• Reviewer: independent Codex subagent /root/resolver_review, separate from author.
• Head: 8e4015924482e79ab1aa6413360e6bbfd95e1fed
• Base: ec40e665407253eb1a081a657f564a0efcfdc32b
• Spec blob: b81fc2dcbf0358e3c796300b640170425bda511c
• Accepted intent blob: eaa322c405502cc0ca7c453814ca0f005f11b48f

The complete substantive content review remains valid. It comprised the full original artifact read, complete correction-diff review producing the current 10,025-line blob, relevant resolver/source-contract review, and complete new-base delta review. This final turn refreshed identity and CI evidence; it does not present that narrow refresh as a replacement for the substantive review.

All three passes remain clean:

• Bugs: Previously identified issues are resolved; no new Important finding.
• Security: Supported-entry boundary, refusal requirements, explicit residuals, and separation of duties remain intact.
• Compliance: Only work/resolver-trusted-parent/spec.md differs from base. Hash link and risk: high match; worktree is clean; git diff --check passes. Supplied final API evidence reports PR open, unmerged, non-draft, with no labels—including no merge-ready.

CI run 34763567835 completed successfully on that exact head:

• Required ci: success, GitHub Actions app 15368, check ID 103743561588.
• checks and all six test shards: completed successfully, also app 15368.
• Logs confirm shellcheck 0.11.0, sharding proof 202 passed / 0 failed, and all 62 suites passed across the six shards.
• Aggregate log records checks: success, test: success, and ci gate ok.

Remote observations are verified against the manager-supplied final API/run records and logs; my earlier direct GitHub API attempt was unavailable. Local identities independently match those records.

This is final clean review evidence for the stated head/base. It accepts no implementation, activation, or live qualification and does not replace the operator’s G2 decision.

[yihanzhu]

Operator G2 acceptance and delegated merge

The operator directly accepted PR #276 and PR #288 in the current Codex session, reply to question call_TL2Pvpizotz44mnffDKQzCLE/0: “接受这两份文件并授权代合并（推荐）”. The decision permits sequential delegated merges with unchanged artifact contents and renewed CI/independent review after any base change.

For #276 this accepts spec blob b81fc2dcbf0358e3c796300b640170425bda511c and high risk at head 8e40159, reviewed base ec40e66. Full independent PASS and all required CI are recorded above. This is G2 acceptance for the separate planning stage, not implementation or live execution authority.

[yihanzhu]

Merge receipt

PR #276 was squash-merged under the operator's direct G2 acceptance and delegated merge authorization. Main is cfc8eab, with parent ec40e66. Its full tree 5fec2ab647f3ed58d19ad38440c9816a66a5de15 exactly equals reviewed head 8e40159. The merge used a matching head constraint, required green CI and strict up-to-date protection; no bypass or history rewrite.

G2 is accepted. The next stage is a separate high-risk plan, not implementation.